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ARTICLE
KINDLY REMOVE MY CHILD FROM THE BUBBLE
WRAP1—ANALYZING CHILDRESS V. MADISON COUNTY AND
WHY TENNESSEE COURTS SHOULD ENFORCE PARENTAL
PRE-INJURY LIABILITY WAIVERS

By: Joshua D. Arters &
Ben M. Rose2
“I overstepped my parental boundaries at the Aiguille Rock
Climbing Center . . . . I signed a waiver absolving it of
1

2

Comparing the notion of placing a child in “bubble wrap” to a
parent not having the authority to sign a liability waiver on behalf
of her child comes from a 2009 editorial in the Orlando New
Sentinel after the Florida Supreme Court ruled that parental preinjury liability waivers were unenforceable. See infra note 3.
Joshua D. Arters and Ben M. Rose are attorneys in Nashville,
Tennessee, and are graduates of the University of Tennessee
College of Law. They are counsel of record for the defendant in
Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville Operations, M2016–
00447–COA–R9–CV (Tenn. Ct. App. argued Nov. 16, 2016). In
Blackwell, a minor filed a lawsuit in Davidson County Circuit
Court, by and through his mother, against Sky High Sports
Nashville Operations, which is a Nashville business operating in
the rapidly-growing “indoor trampoline park” industry. The minor
asserted claims related to an injury he allegedly sustained while
playing dodgeball at the Sky High Nashville trampoline facility.
Sky High Nashville filed a motion with the trial court seeking,
among other relief, enforcement of a parental pre-injury liability
waiver the minor’s mother executed on behalf of the minor. After
the trial court denied the motion, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
granted Sky High Nashville’s application for interlocutory appeal
to address the enforceability of the parental pre-injury liability
waiver. Much of the substance of this article was presented to the
Tennessee Court of Appeals in Sky High Nashville’s brief in
support of its position and the oral argument held on November 16,
2016. At the time this article was published, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals had not yet issued its decision in the Blackwell case.
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blame if my daughter pulled a Humpty Dumpty from the top
of a wall. The Florida Supreme Court recently ruled I
didn't have that right. I can make all kinds of decisions for
my girl, including life-and-death calls on medical care. But
I can’t judge the risk she will take scaling a 20-foot wall
and decide it is so miniscule that I’m willing to sign a
waiver so she can do it—not even if I’m holding the safety
line . . . . I appreciate that litigation has made the world a
safer place . . . . But I also don’t think we should encase
kids in bubble wrap and stick them in front of a Wii.”3
I. Introduction
In today’s increasingly litigious society, every
parent has likely executed a liability waiver on his or her
child’s behalf at one time or another. Sending your
daughter to play soccer? Liability waiver. Is your son going
on a field trip? Liability waiver. Church canoe trip in the
Smokies? Liability waiver. These “parental pre-injury
liability waivers,” as referred to in this article, seem to be
virtually everywhere. But are these waivers worth the paper
on which they are written? It may come to a surprise to
many parents—not to mention the businesses using such
waivers—that the traditional answer to that question in
Tennessee is “no.” In 1989, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals held in Childress v. Madison County that a parent
has no authority to make the decision to waive her child’s
right to sue someone as a condition of the child’s
participation in an activity the parent deems worthwhile.4
Under Childress, a parent’s relationship to her child—and
her authority to make important decisions on her child’s
3

4

Mike Thomas, Editorial, Court Decides: Father Doesn't Know
Best, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 12, 2009, at B1,
http://www.fljustice.org/mx/hm.asp?id=Father_doesnt_know_best.
Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1989).
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behalf—is arguably no different than that of a distant courtappointed guardian.5
In the nearly three decades since Childress,
however, there have been developments in Tennessee law,
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, and law in
other jurisdictions which strongly suggest that the
Childress rule is obsolete. For example, since Childress,
the Tennessee Supreme Court has expressly recognized for
the first time that the Tennessee Constitution shields a
parent’s fundamental decision-making authority from state
intrusion absent an affirmative finding of significant harm
to the child.6 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court
has held that such parental authority is protected under the
United States Constitution, as well. 7 Those parental
decisions are firmly rooted in the now commonly applied
principle that “fit parents act in the best interests of their
children,” and that the state cannot overturn a parenting
decision even if a court believes that a “better” decision
could have been made.8 Based on that principle, numerous
other jurisdictions have enforced parental pre-injury
liability waivers since Childress. Indeed, this article intends
to show why other jurisdictions that have enforced parental
pre-injury liability waivers since Childress accurately
reflect a parent’s constitutional decision-making authority,
thus emphasizing the outdated, unworkable, and unjustified
nature of the rule espoused in Childress.

5

6

7

8

Id. (citing 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 49 (1945); 39 Am.Jur.2d,
Guardian & Ward, § 102 (1968); 42 Am.Jur.2d, Infants § 152
(1969)); see also infra note 29.
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (citing TENN.
CONST. art I, § 8).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend XIV).
Id. at 68, 73; Wadkins v. Wadkins, No. M2012–00592–COA–R3–
CV, 2012 WL 6571044, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2012).
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Part II summarizes Childress and its relatively
abbreviated progeny. Part III discusses the important
constitutional framework that has developed since
Childress, which has expressly recognized that the
Tennessee and United States Constitutions protect a
parent’s decision-making authority from unwarranted state
intrusion. In other words, such a framework strongly
suggests that a parent’s decision to execute a parental preinjury liability waiver is now constitutionally protected,
fundamental in character, and superior to Tennessee’s
parens patriae9 interests. Part IV evaluates both the strong
shift favoring the enforcement of parental pre-injury
liability waivers in other jurisdictions, and those courts that
have been hesitant to follow.10
Finally, Part V discusses why enforcement of
parental pre-injury liability waivers is appropriate and
legally justified in Tennessee. Specifically, a parent has the
authority to bind her minor child to other pre-injury
contracts, like arbitration provisions or forum selection
provisions, so a parental pre-injury liability waiver should
not necessarily be any different. This is particularly true
because enforcement neither conflicts with a parent’s
inability to independently settle her child’s existing tort
claim without court approval, nor a minor child’s right to
avoid or disaffirm a contract. Rather, enforcement is
appropriate in light of a parent’s newly recognized
constitutional parental authority, and it supports other
important Tennessee public policies.
A parental pre-injury liability waiver should
therefore be enforced under the same standards that any
9

10

Parens patriae is Latin for “parent of his or her country” and
describes “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to
those unable to care for themselves.” Parens patriae, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See also infra Table I for a state-by-state survey of the
enforceability of parental pre-injury liability waivers.
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other liability waiver is enforced in Tennessee, and courts
should allow parents to remove their children from the
proverbial “bubble wrap.”
II. An Overview of Current Tennessee Law
A. The General Test for Enforcing Any Given
Liability Waiver in Tennessee
A preliminary overview of the factors Tennessee
courts apply for determining whether any given liability
waiver is enforceable is helpful for a clear understanding of
parental pre-injury liability waivers. In that regard, the
freedom to contract outweighs the policy favoring the
enforcement of tort liability, and, therefore, liability
waivers are not per se invalid. 11 Certainly, Tennessee
courts have long enforced liability waivers. 12 However,
courts have been wary of such contracts since their
11

12

Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d
885, 892 (Tenn. 2002); Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 756
(Tenn. 1992); Webster v. Psychemedics Corp., 2011 WL 2520157,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Saulsbury, 90 S.W. 624
(Tenn. 1905); see e.g., Houghland v. Security Alarms & Services,
755 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tenn. 1988) (liability of burglar alarm
service was limited by an exculpatory clause); Evco Corp. v. Ross,
528 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tenn. 1975) (agreed allocation of risk by
parties with equivalent bargaining powers in a commercial setting
serves a valid purpose where the agreement explains the parties’
duty to obtain and bear the cost of insurance); Kellogg Co. v.
Sanitors, 496 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tenn. 1973) (same); Empress
Health & Beauty Spa v. Turner, 503 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tenn. 1973)
(customer assumed the risk of injury from negligence of a health
spa); Chazen v. Trailmobile, 384 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964)
(commercial lease absolved both landlord and tenant from liability
for a loss resulting from fire); Moss v. Fortune, 340 S.W.2d 902
(Tenn. 1960) (renter assumed the risk incident to injury from the
hiring and riding of a horse).
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inception.13 Thus, the enforceability of any given pre-injury
liability waiver is governed by certain considerations. 14 As
a general matter, these considerations are rooted in contract
law principles, public policy considerations, or both. 15
When addressing whether any given pre-injury
liability wavier violates public policy, specifically, the
majority of jurisdictions, including Tennessee, have
modeled their analytical framework after California
precedent. 16 In Olson v. Molzen, the Tennessee Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning in the seminal California case,
13

14
15

16

See Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in
Youth Activities-the Alternative to "Nerf (r)" Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO
ST.
L.J.
683,
710
(1992),
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/64603
/OSLJ_V53N3_0683.pdf. Although the law is now well-settled
that liability waivers are to be construed using a reasonable
interpretation rather than a strict approach, Tennessee case law
arguably shows the application of different approaches. Id.; see
e.g., Empress Health and Beauty Spa, 503 S.W.2d at 191 (plain,
complete, and unambiguous meaning); Chazen, 384 S.W.2d at 4
(terms strictly construed); Tate v. Trialco Scrap, 745 F. Supp. 458,
461 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) aff’d, 908 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished opinion) (highlighting inconsistencies in Tennessee
law on whether a reasonable or strict construction should apply to
exculpatory clauses).
Planters Gin Co., 78 S.W.3d at 892–93.
See, e.g., Adams v. Roark, 686 S.W.2d 73, 75–76 (Tenn. 1985)
(general contract law: fraud and duress; and public policy: cannot
waive gross negligence or intentional conduct); Miller v. Hembree,
1998 WL 209016, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1998) (general
contract law: rules of construction); Burks v. Belz-Wilson
Properties, 958 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (general
contract law: ambiguity); see also Memphis & Charleston Railroad
Co. v. Jones, 2 Head 517, 518–19 (Tenn. 1859) (same). Pre-injury
liability waivers are hybrids of contract and tort law and stem from
the inevitable junction of two competing interests: (1) the freedom
to contract; and (2) one’s duty to take responsibility for his or her
actions. See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, Contracts Limiting Liability: A
Paradox with Tacit Solutions, 69 TUL. L. REV. 715, 716–17
(1995).
See Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977).
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Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 17 and
promulgated six criteria for determining whether a liability
waiver impairs public policy. 18 In short, these criteria
consider whether the waiver involves a business that is
subject to public regulation, the released party performs a
public necessity and/or essential service, the released party
has superior bargaining power, and/or the transaction
places the person releasing the other from liability in
control of the released party. 19 Regardless, a legitimate
pecuniary motivation is not contrary to public policy and
will therefore not automatically invalidate an exculpatory
clause if it is the impetus for including the clause in a
contract.20
B. Childress v. Madison County
In 1989, the Western Section of the Tennessee
Court of Appeals in Childress v. Madison County held that
a parental pre-injury liability waiver that a mother executed
on behalf of her mentally handicapped son was against
public policy and therefore unenforceable. 21 Childress
involved an injury sustained by William Childress, a
mentally handicapped 20-year-old, while he was training
for the Special Olympics at a Y.M.C.A. 22 While under the
supervision of Madison County employees, William nearly
drowned. 23 William’s parents thereafter filed a lawsuit
against Madison County and asserted claims on William’s
behalf.24

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
Olson, 558 S.W.2d at 431.
Id. (citing Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445–46).
See, e.g., Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.

14
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On appeal, the court evaluated the enforceability of
a parental pre-injury liability waiver that the mother
executed on William’s behalf.25 After first determining that
the waiver did not otherwise violate public policy under
Olson, 26 the court addressed the first-impression question
of whether a parent may execute an enforceable pre-injury
liability waiver on behalf of her incompetent child.27
The court held that the mother did not have the
authority to bind William to the liability waiver because her
relationship to him as his parent was essentially the
equivalent to that of a legal guardian to a ward.28 The court
reasoned that because a guardian may not generally waive
the rights of a ward and because a guardian cannot settle an
existing lawsuit on behalf of a ward apart from court
approval or statutory authority, a parent cannot execute a
valid pre-injury waiver as to the rights of her minor or
incompetent child.29 The court placed significant emphasis

25

26

27
28
29

Id. at 3 (The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
determination that Madison County was not negligent, which
consequently implicated the validity of the parental pre-injury
liability waiver.).
Id. at 4. The court first addressed the general public policy criteria
outlined in Olson and held that the Special Olympics does not
normally operate under a public duty and, therefore, does not fall
into the public policy exception prohibiting exculpatory clauses.
Id. (citing Olson, 558 S.W.2d at 431). Thus, the court
unequivocally held that the liability waiver applied to the mother’s
claims she asserted on her own behalf. Id. at 5–6 (citing Dodge v.
Nashville Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 215 S.W. 274 (Tenn.
1919) (a party’s failure to read does not constitute lack of notice to
that party); Dixon v. Manier, 545 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1976)).
Id. at 6.
Id. (citing 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 49 (1945)).
Id. (citing 39 Am.Jur.2d, Guardian & Ward, § 102 (1968); 42
Am.Jur.2d, Infants § 152 (1969); Miles v. Kaigler, 18 Tenn. (10
Yerg. 1836) (a guardian cannot settle a minor’s existing claim
apart from court approval); Spitzer v. Knoxville Iron, Co., 180

15
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on authority related to a guardian’s general inability to bind
a ward to a contract and waive a ward’s existing tort
claims. 30 Significantly, because there was a lack of
authority analyzing parental liability waivers for a minor
child’s future tort claim, the court only relied on two cases
regarding a parent’s authority to bind her minor child to a
pre-injury exculpatory agreement.31

30

31

S.W. 163 (Tenn. 1915) (same); Tune v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co., 223 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1963) (same)).
Id. (citing Gibson v. Anderson, 92 So.2d 692, 695 (Ala. 1956)
(legal guardian’s acts do not estop ward from asserting rights in
property); Ortman v. Kane, 60 N.E.2d 93, 98 (Ill. 1945) (guardian
cannot wave tender requirements of land sale contract entered into
by ward prior to incompetency); Stockman v. City of South
Portland, 87 A.2d 679 (Me. 1952) (guardian cannot waive ward’s
property tax exemption); Sharp v. State, 127 So.2d 865 (Miss.
1961) (guardian cannot waive statutory requirements for service of
process on ward); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981)
(ratification by parent of contract executed by child does not bind
child); Whitcomb v. Dancer, 443 A.2d 458 (Vt. 1982) (guardian
cannot settle personal injury claim for ward without court
approval); Natural Father v. United Methodist Children’s Home,
418 So.2d 807 (Miss. 1982) (infant not bound by evidentiary
admissions of parent); Colfer v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 519 A.2d
893 (N.J. Super. 1986) (guardian cannot settle personal injury
claim without court approval)).
Id. at 7 (citing Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 fn. 3
(Me. 1979); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 143
A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. 1958)). Significantly, at least two
Connecticut cases since Childress have enforced pre-injury
liability waivers signed by parents against minor children. See
infra, Saccente v. LaFlamme, No. CV0100756730, 2003 WL
21716586 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 2003); Fischer v. Rivest, No.
X03CV000509627S, 2002 WL 31126288 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002
Aug. 15, 2002). The court in Childress suggested that it could be
appropriate for the Tennessee legislature or the Tennessee
Supreme Court to weigh in on the issue. Childress, 777 S.W.2d at
8. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently denied
Madison County’s permission to appeal. Id.

16
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C. Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of
Commerce and Subsequent Cases Relying on
Childress
The last time any Tennessee appellate court has
addressed the enforceability of a parental pre-injury
liability waiver was only one year after Childress when the
Middle Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals decided
Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce. 32

32

Although the Childress court only cited two cases regarding
parental pre-injury liability waivers, several other courts had also
invalidated parental pre-injury liability waivers before Childress
was decided. See, e.g., Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. and
Junior Coll., 630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“Under
Pennsylvania law, parents do not possess the authority to release
the claims or potential claims of a minor child merely because of
the parental relationship”) (citing Crew v. Bartels, 27 F.R.D. 5
(E.D. Pa. 1961); Commonwealth v. Rothman, 209 223 A.2d 919
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1966); Myers v. Sezov, 39 Pa. D & C 2d 650 (1966);
Langon v. Strawhecker, 46 Pa. D & C 2d (1969)); Valdimer v.
Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, 172 N.E.2d 283 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1961) (“A fortiori, we are extremely wary of a transaction that puts
parent and child at cross-purposes and, in the main, normally tend
to quiet the legitimate complaint of the minor child. Generally, we
may regard the parent’s contract of indemnity, however, wellintended, as an instrument that motivates him to discourage the
proper prosecution of the infant’s claim, if that contract be legal.
The end result is either the outright thwarting of our protective
policy or, should the infant ultimately elect to ignore the settlement
and to press his claim, disharmony within the family unit.
Whatever the outcome, the policy of the state suffers.”).
Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807
S.W.2d 242, 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Coincidentally, a
California case issued in the same month that the Rodgers decision
was rendered held for the first time—in any jurisdiction—that a
parental pre-injury liability waiver was enforceable. See Hohe v.
Unified Sch. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 3d 1559, 1564–65 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990). See infra Section IV(A).

17
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There, Brandy Nichole Rogers, a minor, participated in a
horse race event at the annual Andrew Jackson Day
celebration at the Hermitage in Nashville, Tennessee.33 As
a condition of Brandy’s participation, her parents needed to
provide a permission slip.34 Accordingly, Brandy’s mother
provided a handwritten note stating: “Brandy Rogers has
my permission to race today. Under no circumstances will
anyone or anything be liable in case of an accident.”35
When Brandy crossed the finish line, two vehicles
crossed her path, causing her to turn her horse’s head to the
left to avoid colliding with the vehicles. 36 Unfortunately,
the horse fell and rolled over Brandy and caused severe
injuries, which ultimately led to her death two days later.37
Brandy’s parents sued the organizers of the horse race and
the owners of the land upon which the horse race took
place pursuant to Tennessee’s wrongful death statute.38
The defendants ultimately conceded to the
Childress rule as it applied to personal injury claims, but
argued that it did not apply to the parents’ wrongful death
claim. 39 In that regard, the defendants argued that the
release affected only the parents’ rights, as the parents
possessed the right to bring the wrongful death claim.40 In
other words, the defendants contended that the enforcement
of the release would only bar the parents’ right to assert the
wrongful death claim and would not limit Brandy’s rights,
33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40

Rodgers, 807 S.W.2d at 243.
Id. at 243–44.
Id. at 244. The court reflected on whether the permission slip
needed to include specific wording. Id. at 243–44. The plaintiffs
argued that Brandy told them all that they needed to provide is a
simple permission slip, while the defendants asserted that everyone
in the race needed to provide a full liability release. Id. Ultimately,
this constituted a non-issue in the court’s determination. Id.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 244–45 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 20–5–106(a) (1978)).
Id. at 246.
Id.

18
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specifically.41 The court disagreed, however, and held that
the defendants’ position “place[d] too much emphasis on
where . . . [the] recovery . . . [would] ultimately go, and
overlook[ed] the theory of the wrongful death statute and
the reasoning of Childress.”42 In that regard, the court held
that the claim for wrongful death actually belonged to
Brandy and that the parents were merely nominated to
maintain the action on her behalf.43 Accordingly, the court
held that the parental pre-injury liability waiver that
Brandy’s mother had executed was unenforceable as to the
wrongful death claim pursuant to the Childress rule.44
Since Rogers, Childress has not been substantively
developed any further, as there have not been any published
Tennessee appellate court cases analyzing the Childress
rule. Similarly, there are only two unpublished cases from
United States District Courts in Tennessee that have relied
on Childress and Rogers but contain relatively little
substantive analysis of Childress.45

41
42
43

44

45

Id.
Id.
Id. (stating that “the right of action for wrongful death is that
which this child would have possessed had she lived, and any
recovery is in her right”) (citing Middle Tenn. R.R. v. McMillan,
184 S.W. 20 (Tenn. 1915)).
Id. at 243. However, the court emphasized that the liability waiver
was valid with respect to the mother’s claims. Id. (citing Childress,
777 S.W.2d at 4); see also Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6 (stating that
“the trial judge was correct in dismissing this case as to Mrs.
Childress individually”).
See Bonne v. Premier Athletics, No. 3:04–CV–440, 2006 WL
3030776, at *5–6 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 23, 2006); Albert v. Ober
Gatlinburg, No. 3:02–CV–277, 2006 WL 208580, at *5–6 (E.D.
Tenn. Jan. 25, 2006).
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III. A New Constitutional Standard Developed Since
Childress
In the nearly three decades since Childress, both the
Tennessee and United States Supreme Courts have
expressly recognized a parent’s fundamental right to make
important decisions for her child pursuant to the Tennessee
and United States Constitutions.46 As a result, the analysis
outlined in Childress does not fully account for a parent’s
fundamental decision-making authority. 47 Indeed, as
described in this Section, new constitutional precedent
strongly suggests that a parent now possesses the
constitutional authority to make the decision to sign a
parental pre-injury liability waiver, and the state is
significantly more limited in overturning that decision by
refusing to enforce the contract.
A. Tennessee’s New Standard for State Invalidation
of Parental Decisions
In Hawk v. Hawk—decided four years after
Childress—the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized for
the first time that parents possess a right to make important
decisions for their children, and that such a right is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by both the
Tennessee and United States Constitutions. 48 Hawk
46

47
48

See Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575 (citing TENN. CONST. art I, § 8);
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63 (citing U.S. CONST. amend XIV).
See Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 7.
TENN. CONST. art I, § 8; Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575. At the time of
the Hawk decision, the United States Supreme Court had not yet
expressly recognized the specific character of a parent’s
fundamental liberty interest protected by the U.S. Constitution—a
decision that would come seven years later in Troxel. See Troxel,
530 U.S. at 63. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court
thoughtfully recognized that a parent’s authority to make important
family decisions is firmly rooted in United States jurisprudence.
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involved a parent’s constitutional challenge to a Tennessee
statute that allowed a court to order visitation to her child’s
grandparents, if a court deemed such visitation to be as “in
the best interests of the minor child.” 49 The trial court
awarded visitation to the grandparents over the parents’
decision to deny such visitation, thereby exercising the
state’s parens patriae power to impose “its own opinion of
the ‘best interests’ of the children over the opinion of the
parents[.]”50
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed
and unequivocally recognized for the first time that
parenting decisions are protected from unwarranted state
intrusion by Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee
Constitution:
Tennessee’s historically strong protection of
parental rights and the reasoning of federal
constitutional cases convince us that
parental rights constitute a fundamental

49
50

Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition.”). Moreover, “[f]or centuries it has
been a canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor
children. So deeply imbedded in our traditions is this principle of
law that the Constitution itself may compel a State to respect it.”
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(citations and footnotes omitted). Accordingly, “the child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare for additional obligations.” Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). In that way, the Tennessee Supreme
Court was arguably ahead of its time and accurately predicted the
outcome of Troxel, recognizing the continuing shift toward
strengthening parental privacy. See Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575.
Id. at 577 (footnote omitted).
Id.
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liberty interest under Article I, Section 8 of
the Tennessee Constitution. In Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992), we
recognized that although “[t]he right to
privacy is not specifically mentioned in
either the federal or the Tennessee state
constitution . . . there can be little doubt
about its grounding in the concept of liberty
reflected in those two documents.” Id. at
598. We explained that “the notion of
individual liberty is . . . deeply embedded in
the Tennessee Constitution . . . ,” and we
explicitly found that “[t]he right to privacy,
or personal autonomy (‘the right to be let
alone’), while not mentioned explicitly in
our state constitution, is nevertheless
reflected in several sections of the
Tennessee Declaration of Rights . . . .” Id. at
599–600. Citing a wealth of rights that
protect personal privacy, rights such as the
freedom of worship, freedom of speech,
freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the regulation of the quartering
of soldiers, we had “no hesitation in drawing
the conclusion that there is a right of
individual privacy guaranteed under and
protected by the liberty clauses of the
Tennessee Declaration of Rights.” Id.
Finding the right to procreational autonomy
to be part of this right to privacy, we noted
that the right to procreational autonomy is
evidence by the same concepts that uphold
“parental rights and responsibilities with
respect to children.” Id. at 601. Thus, we
conclude that the same right to privacy
espoused in Davis fully protects the right of
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parents to care for their children without
unwarranted state intervention.51
As a result, the Tennessee Supreme Court
established a new standard for determining when parenting
decisions warrant the state’s oversight and intrusion. 52
Following Hawk, a party must show more than the “best
interests of the child” to overcome a parent’s fundamental
right to make parenting decisions.53 That is, the state may
only intrude upon parenting decisions where such intrusion
is “necessary to prevent serious harm to a child.” 54
Significantly, the Tennessee Supreme Court provided
insight as to what it considered “serious harm to a child” by
comparing such harm to “an individualized finding of
parental neglect[.]”55
According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the
reason for such a limitation is relatively straightforward.
Specifically, requiring a court to make an initial finding of
harm to the child before intervening in a parental decision
works to “prevent judicial second-guessing of parental
decisions.” 56 Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court
recognized that Tennessee courts resolutely support such a
51

52
53

54
55
56

Id. at 579 (internal footnotes omitted and emphasis added); see
TENN. CONST. art I, § 8; Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598
(Tenn. 1992) (recognizing the right to procreational autonomy).
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580.
See id. The Court also affirmed the application of the strictscrutiny test for the fundamental right to make parenting decisions:
“‘[w]here certain fundamental rights are involved . . . ,
regulation[s] limiting these rights may be justified only by a
‘compelling state interest’ . . . and . . . legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake.’” Id. at 579 n. 8 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973)).
Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
Id. at 581; see also Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682, 683
(Tenn. 1995) (discussing the Hawk standard).
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limitation because “[i]mplicit in Tennessee case and
statutory law has always been the insistence that a child’s
welfare must be threatened before the state may intervene
in parental decision-making.”57
B. The United States Supreme Court’s Recognition
of a New Standard
Seven years after the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
decision in Hawk—and eleven years after Childress—the
United States Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in
Troxel v. Granville. 58 Echoing the Tennessee Supreme
Court seven years earlier, Troxel recognized once and for
all that a parent’s right to make important decisions for her
children free from unwarranted state intrusion is a
fundamental liberty interest guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.59

57

58
59

Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 581 (emphasis added); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36–6–101(a)(1) (stating that in a divorce case, the harm
from the discontinuity of the parents’ relationship compels the
court to determine child custody “as the welfare and interest of the
child or children may demand”); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658; Yoder,
406 U.S. at 234 (denying state action because the First and
Fourteenth amendments disallowed the state from forcing Amish
children to attend public schools until they reached sixteen years of
age); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (holding that parents’ decisions to
send their children to private schools were “not inherently
harmful,” as there was “nothing in the . . . records to indicate that .
. . [the private schools] have failed to discharge their obligations to
patrons, students, or the state”); In re Hamilton, 658 S.W.2d 425
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that state action was appropriate
when a child was declared “dependent and neglected” because her
father refused cancer treatment for her on religious grounds and
such neglect exposed the child to serious harm) (citing State Dep’t
of Human Serv. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1979)).
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 66; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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Similar to Hawk, Troxel involved an action for
visitation rights brought by the grandparents of two young
girls pursuant to a Washington statute which provided that
a court may award such visitation over the parents’ wishes
if the court believes that it “may serve the best interest of
the child[.]” 60 After the Washington Supreme Court held
that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the
fundamental rights of parents,61 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 62 In doing so, the
Court expressly recognized for the first time parents’ robust
constitutional right to control the upbringing of their
children free from unwarranted state oversight:
[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right
of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.63
In addition, Troxel confirmed that courts cannot
interfere with a parental decision without first finding harm
or potential harm to the child.64 Indeed, it is now clear that
after Troxel, a court is constitutionally prohibited from
overturning a parental decision based on its subjective
notion of a child’s best interests, even if the court believes
that a “better” decision could have been made:
The problem here is not that the Superior
Court intervened, but that when it did so, it
gave no special weight to Granville’s
determination of her daughters’ best
60
61
62
63
64

Troxel, 500 U.S. at 61.
See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998).
Troxel, 500 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 71.
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interests. More importantly, it appears that
the Superior Court applied exactly the
opposite
presumption[,]
[favoring
grandparent visitation].
* * *
[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a
State to infringe on the fundamental right of
parents to make child rearing decisions
simply because a state judge believes a
“better” decision could be made.65
Thus, the limitation on state intrusion into a parent’s
decision—even if a court believes that a “better” decision
could have been made—is firmly rooted in a presumption
that “fit parents act in the best interests of their children.” 66
Tennessee courts now recognize and routinely apply these
principles.67
IV. Courts Dealing With Parental Liability Waivers
After Hawk and Troxel, the Childress rule no longer
accurately reflects the relevant body of constitutional law
that has developed over the last three decades. At the very
least, Childress does not consider a parent’s fundamental
decision-making authority. 68 Significantly, other
jurisdictions have strongly shifted toward favoring the
enforcement of parental pre-injury liability waivers since
Childress by considering a parent’s constitutionally
65

66
67
68

Id. at 69, 72–73 (emphasis added); see also Lovelace v. Copley,
418 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2013) (affirming the principles of Hawk as
supplemented by Troxel).
Troxel, 500 U.S. at 68.
See, e.g., Wadkins, 2012 WL 6571044, at *5.
See id.
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protected decision-making authority. 69 These cases make
clear that a court’s interference with a parent’s decision to
execute a parental pre-injury liability waiver on behalf of
her minor child constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into
the parent’s constitutional rights.70
A. Courts Have Shifted Toward Enforcement.
In 1990—coincidentally in the same month that the
Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its ruling in Rogers—
California 71 became the first state to hold that parental
waivers were enforceable in Hohe v. San Diego Unified
School District.72 Hohe involved a 15-year-old high school
student who was injured while under the effects of
hypnosis at a school assembly. 73 The student’s father had
signed a waiver prior to the child’s voluntary participation
in the assembly, but he sued claiming the parental preinjury liability waiver was against public policy and
therefore unenforceable because of the child’s minority
status. 74 Citing Tunkl, the California Court of Appeals
disagreed and held that no public policy necessarily
opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party
agrees to shoulder a risk, which the law would otherwise
have placed upon the other party—even in the context of a
parental pre-injury liability waiver.75

69
70
71

72
73
74
75

See, e.g., Hohe, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1564–65.
See id.
Notably, California was also the state that ultimately designed the
general public policy architecture relating to the validity of liability
waivers for the majority of jurisdictions, including Tennessee. See
generally Olson, 558 S.W.2d; Tunkl, 383 P.2d.
Hohe, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1564–65.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 441).
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In pertinent part, the court held as follows:
The public as a whole receives the benefit of
such waivers so that groups such as Boy and
Girl Scouts, Little League, and parentteacher associations are able to continue
without
the
risks
and
sometimes
overwhelming costs of litigation. Thousands
of children benefit from the availability of
recreational and sports activities. Those
options are steadily decreasing—victims of
decreasing financial and tax support for
other than the bare essentials of an
education. Every learning experience
involves risk. In this instance Hohe agreed
to shoulder the risk. No public policy forbids
the shifting of that burden.76
The court acknowledged the rule that a minor can
generally disaffirm a contract signed by the minor alone,
but ultimately held that parental pre-injury liability waivers
are clearly enforceable and may not be disaffirmed. 77 In
that regard, the court judiciously reasoned that “[a] parent
may contract on behalf of his or her children” and that the
law which allows minors to disaffirm their own contracts
“was not intended to affect contracts entered into by adults
on behalf of their children.”78
Since Hohe, other courts have enforced parental
pre-injury liability waivers and have principally relied upon
the constitutionally protected parental rights expressly
recognized after Childress. For example, in Zivich v.
Mentor Soccer Club, the Ohio Supreme Court enforced a
76
77
78

Id. at 1564.
Id.
Id. at 1565 (citing Doyle v. Guiliucci, 62 Cal. 2d. 606, 609 (Cal.
1965)).
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parental pre-injury liability waiver signed by a mother as a
condition of her son’s participation in a youth soccer club.79
There, the court first emphasized the important policy
interests favoring the enforcement of liability waivers
because they enable organizations the opportunity to
provide affordable recreational opportunities for minors.80
Next, the court recognized that the parental authority to
bind one’s child to such exculpatory agreements is rooted
in the parent’s fundamental rights:
[T]he right of a parent to raise his or her
child is a natural right subject to the
protections of due process. Additionally,
parents have a fundamental liberty interest
in the care, custody and management of their
offspring. Further the existence of a
fundamental, privacy-oriented right of
personal choice in family matters has been
recognized under the Due Process Clause by
the United States Supreme Court.
[M]any decisions made by parents “fall
within the penumbra of parental authority,
e.g., the school that the child will attend, the
religion that the child will practice, the
medical care that the child will receive, and
the manner in which the child will be
disciplined.”81

79
80
81

Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ohio 1998).
Id. at 205.
Id. at 206 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
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Indeed, according to the Ohio Supreme Court, invalidating
a release is “inconsistent with conferring other powers on
parents to make important life choices for their children.”82
Numerous other jurisdictions have since enforced
parental pre-injury liability waivers in a wide variety of
contexts, including both commercial and non-commercial
settings.83 For example, in Fischer v. Rivest, a Connecticut
82

83

Id.; see also BJ’s Wholesale Club v. Rosen, 80 A.3d 345, 346 (Md.
Ct. App. 2013) (noting all of the other laws providing parents the
right to make important decisions on their children’s behalf);
Doyice J. Cotten & Sarah J. Young, Effectiveness of Parental
Waivers, Parental Indemnification Agreements, and Parental
Arbitration Agreements as Risk Management Tools, 17 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS OF SPORT 53, 60–61 (2007); King, supra note 13, at 716
(“[J]udicial attitudes toward [invalidating] exculpatory agreements
signed by parents on behalf of their minor children seem
inconsistent with the powers conferred on parents respecting other
important life choices.”).
See generally Kelly v. U.S., 809 F. Supp. 2d 429 (E.D.N.C. 2011)
(parental pre-injury liability waiver as a condition of the minor
child’s participation in the Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training
Corps is enforceable against the minor); Saccente, 2003 WL
21716586 (parental pre-injury liability waiver as a condition of the
minor child’s participation in horseback-riding lesson is
enforceable against the minor); Fischer v. Rivest, No.
X03CV000509627S, 2002 WL 31126288 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug.
15, 2002) (affirming the parental principles outlined in Zivich and
enforcing a parental pre-injury liability waiver in the context of
youth hockey); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass.
2002) (enforcing a parental pre-injury liability waiver in the
context of a cheerleading program); Quirk v. Walker’s Gymnastics
& Dance, No. 005274L, 2003 WL 21781387 (Mass. Super. July
25, 2003) (parental pre-injury liability waiver as a condition of the
minor child’s participation in gymnastics is enforceable against the
minor because “[s]uch releases are clearly enforceable even when
signed by a parent on behalf of their child”); Rosen, 80 A.3d 345
(parental pre-injury liability waiver as a condition of the minor
child’s use of a supervised play area offered by a wholesale retail
store is enforceable against the minor); Kondrad v. Bismarck Park
Dist., 655 N.W.2d 411 (N.D. 2003) (parental pre-injury liability
waiver as a condition of the minor child’s participation in an after-
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court held that a parental pre-injury liability waiver signed
by a parent as a condition of his minor son’s participation
in a hockey league is enforceable against the minor. 84
Citing Zivich, the court held that there were persuasive
policy reasons to enforce such exculpatory contracts. 85
Noting that there was no essential service or good being

84

85

school child care program is enforceable against the minor);
Zivich, 696 N.E.2d 201 (parental pre-injury liability waiver in the
context of a minor’s injury while participating in a youth soccer
club); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 76 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. App. 2002)
(parents had the authority to execute a prospective liability waiver
that binds their minor child’s future claims); Walker v. V.I. Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 2015 WL 404007 (V.I. Super. Jan. 26, 2015)
(parental pre-injury liability waiver as a condition of minor’s
participation in the Virgin Islands Waste Management Authority’s
Youth Environmental Summer Program is enforceable against the
minor); Osborn v. Cascade Mountain, 655 N.W.2d 546 (Wi. Ct.
App. 2002) (parental pre-injury liability waiver as a condition of
the minor’s participation in skiing is enforceable against the
minor).
Notably, at least three other states—Georgia, Idaho, and
Mississippi—have cases that imply that a parental pre-injury
liability waiver might be enforceable against a minor child. See,
e.g., DeKalb Cty. Sch. Sys. v. White, 260 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. 1979)
(upholding an athletic eligibility release signed by a parent against
a minor child); Smoky v. McCray, 396 S.E.2d 794, 797 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990) (invalidating a parental pre-injury liability waiver
because only the minor executed the release and “was fourteen
years old and unaccompanied by any adult or guardian”); Davis v.
Sun Valley Ski Educ. Found., 941 P.2d 1301 (Id. 1997)
(invalidating a parental pre-injury liability waiver because it was
not drafted properly); Quinn v. Mississippi State Univ., 720 So.2d
843 (Miss. 1998) (Mississippi Supreme Court held that reasonable
minds could differ as to the risks that the plaintiffs were assuming
and did not suggest that parental pre-injury liability waivers violate
public policy).
Fisher, 2002 WL 31126288 at *8. Significantly, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals in Childress relied on a case from Connecticut to
support its decision to invalidate the pre-injury liability wavier as
to the child. See Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6.
Fisher, 2002 WL 3116288 at *14.
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withheld by the defendant—along with the obvious benefit
which recreational and sports activities provide children—
the court held that every learning experience involves risks
and that no public policy forbids the shifting of the burden
to the participant’s parents, who have agreed to shoulder
such risks.86
Similarly, in Sharon v. City of Newton, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court enforced a parental preinjury liability waiver signed by a father on behalf of his
daughter as a condition of the minor’s participation in a
cheerleading program.87 Like the court in Hohe, the Sharon
court addressed the minor’s right to avoid a contract, which
the court recognized as founded on a policy “to afford
protection to minors from their own improvidence and want
of sound judgment.” 88 The court held that such a policy
“comports with common sense and experience and is not
defeated by permitting parents to exercise their own
providence and sound judgment on behalf of their minor
children.”89
Importantly,
however,
Sharon
expressly
emphasized the fundamental principles outlined in Hawk
and Troxel—that is, “the law presumes that fit parents act
in furtherance of the welfare and best interests of their
children, and with respect to matters relating to their care,
custody, and upbringing have a fundamental right to make
those decisions for them.” 90 Indeed, according to the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, “[t]o hold that releases of
the type in question here are unenforceable would expose
public schools, who offer many of the extracurricular sports
opportunities available to children, to financial costs and
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at *6.
Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 746 (citing Frye v. Yasi, 101 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1951)).
Id. (citing Parham, 442 U.S. 584).
Id. (citing Parham, 442 U.S. 584; Petition of the Dep't of Pub.
Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 421 N.E.2d 28
(Mass. 1981); Sayre v. Aisner, 748 N.E.2d 1013 (2001)).
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risks that will inevitably lead to the reduction of those
programs.”91
In Saccente v. LaFlamme, a Connecticut Superior
Court enforced a parental waiver, noting that “the essence
of parenthood is the companionship of the child and the
right to make decisions regarding his or her care, control,
education health, religion and association.” 92 Saccente
made clear that the ability of a parent to execute a liability
waiver on behalf of her child “clearly” comports with both
the essence of parenthood and emphasized the presumption
that “fit parents act in furtherance of the welfare and best
interests of their children, and with respect to matters
relating to their care, custody, and upbringing have a
fundamental right to make those decisions for them[.]” 93
Indeed, the Saccente court reasoned that, by executing the
parental pre-injury liability waiver, the parent made “an
important family decision cognizant of the risk of physical
injury to his child and the financial risk to the family as a
whole.” 94 Thus, according to the Saccente court, in the
context of a “voluntary nonessential activity,” courts should
not disturb such parental judgment.95
In 2011, in Kelly v. United States, a United States
district court analyzed the effectiveness of a parental preinjury liability waiver under North Carolina law executed
on behalf of a minor high school student in conjunction
with the student’s participation in the Navy Junior Reserve
Officer Training Corps.96 The plaintiffs cited the traditional
rule that parents may not bind their children to pre-injury
liability waivers. 97 The Kelly court recognized that many
91
92

93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 747.
Saccente, 2003 WL 21716586, at *6 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at
534–35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Kelly, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
Id. at 435.
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jurisdictions ultimately reached that conclusion by relying
on traditional policy principles—including the same
principle cited in Childress—that refusing to enforce a preinjury waiver is supported by the well-settled rule that a
parent may not settle a minor’s post-injury tort claim
without court approval.98
The Kelly court stressed, however, that such a
stringent rule may not be applicable in all scenarios, and
particularly in circumstances where parental pre-injury
liability waivers are enforced in the context of noncommercial activities.99 The Kelly court held that the North
Carolina Supreme Court would uphold a parental pre-injury
liability waiver in the context of litigation against “schools,
municipalities, or clubs providing activities for children.”100
Recently, in BJ’s Wholesale Club v. Rosen, the
Maryland Court of Appeals enforced a parental pre-injury
liability waiver in a commercial setting: a minor child’s use
of a supervised play area offered by a wholesale retail
center. 101 The Rosen court held that the parent made the
decision to execute the parental pre-injury liability waiver
“in the course of the parenting role.” 102 The Rosen court
recognized that such broad parental authority is reflected by
many Maryland laws that are rooted in the “societal
expectation that parents should make significant decisions
pertaining to a child’s welfare” and enable parents to
“exercise their authority on behalf of their minor child in
the most important aspects of a child’s life,” like important
health decisions,103 important educational and employment
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 437.
Rosen, 80 A.3d at 345.
Id. at 362.
Id. 353 (citing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20–101(b); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §102 (parental consent to having their
children give blood); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20–106(b)
(parental consent to the use of a tanning bed); MD. CODE ANN.,
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decisions, 104 and important familial and societal
decisions.105
Ultimately, it is important for the purposes of
determining the viability of Childress to recognize that the
constitutional bases upon which the foregoing courts have
enforced parental pre-injury liability waivers are nearly
mirror images of the constitutional rights recognized in
post-Childress Tennessee decisions.106

104

105

106

HEALTH-GEN. § 18–4A–02(a) (familial consent to immunization of
minor family member); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10–610
(parental authority to commit child for mental treatment); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10–923 (parental consent for
therapeutic group home services)).
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., EDUCATION § 7–301(a)(1) (parental
choice to homeschool children); MD. CODE ANN., EDUCATION § 7–
301(a)(2) (parental decision to defer compulsory schooling for one
year if parent determines child is not mature enough); MD. CODE
ANN., EDUCATION § 7–305(c) (parent may meet with school
superintendent if child is suspended for more than ten days or is
expelled from school); MD. CODE ANN., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
§ 3–211(b)(1) (child may not work more than is statutorily
permitted without a parent giving written consent); MD. CODE
ANN., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT § 3–403(a)(7) (wage and hour
restrictions do not apply when child works for parent)).
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 2–301 (parental
permission for child to marry); MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 4–
501(b)(2) (parental decision to use corporal punishment to
discipline children); MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 4–522(a)(2)
(parental authority to apply on behalf of minor to address
confidentiality program); MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 10-314
(authority to bring action on behalf of minor child for unpaid child
support); MD. CODE ANN., NATURAL RESOURCES § 10–301(h)
(consent to a child obtaining a hunting license)).
Compare Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 746-47 (a parental pre-injury
liability waiver should be enforced because the “law presumes that
fit parents act in furtherance of the welfare and best interests of
their children . . . and with respect to matters relating to their care,
custody, and upbringing have a fundamental right to make those
decisions for them”) (citation omitted and emphasis added);
Saccente, 2003 WL 21716586, at *6 (citation omitted and
emphasis added); Rosen, 80 A.3d at 362 (a parent’s decision to
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B. Analysis of Cases Hesitant to Enforce Parental
Pre-Injury Liability Waivers
Several courts since Hohe have refused to enforce
parental pre-injury liability waivers.107 The bases for those
rulings can summarily be described with two basic and
related ideologies: (1) pre-injury waivers are no different
that post-injury settlements; 108 and (2) a parent’s
relationship to her child is essentially identical to the
relationship between a guardian and a ward, and, therefore,
a parent has no greater rights than any other courtappointed legal guardian.109

107

108

109

execute a pre-injury liability waiver on her child’s behalf should
not be invalidated because it was “made by a parent on behalf of
her child in the course of the parenting role”), with Hawk, 855
S.W.2d at 579 (“without a substantial danger of harm to the child,”
a court may not constitutionally exercise the state’s parens patriae
interest by imposing its own subjective notions of the “best
interests of the child”); Wadkins, 2012 WL 6571044, at *5 (“a fit
parent [acts] in [their] child’s best interest”) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., J.T. ex rel. Thode v. Monster Mountain, 754 F. Supp. 2d
1323 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (applying Alabama law); Hojnowski v.
Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006); Scott v. Pacific West
Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992) (en banc); Meyer v.
Naperville Manner, 634 N.E.2d 411 (2d Dist. 1994); Cooper v.
Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002); Kirton v. Fields,
997 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2008); Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252
(Iowa 2010); Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001). See
infra Section V for a more complete analysis as to why these
decisions do not fully consider important policy considerations.
Meyer, 634 N.E.2d at 414; Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1234; Kirton, 997
So.2d at 359 (Anstead, J., specially concurring); Galloway, 790
N.W.2d at 257; Hawkins, 37 P.3d at 1066.
Monster Mountain, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1327–28 (applying Alabama
law); Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 387; Scott, 834 P.2d 6. In addition, a
small minority of cases also have held that these waivers simply
violate the general public policy as promulgated in Tunkl, but this
analysis has been essentially encompassed by the other cases. See,
e.g., Wagenblast v. Odessa, 758 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1988) (a
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For example, two years after Hohe, in Scott v.
Pacific West Mountain Resort, the Washington Supreme
Court invalidated a parental pre-injury liability waiver
signed by a mother on behalf of her minor son. 110
Ultimately, the Scott court held that such a pre-injury
release was invalid because “a parent generally may not
release a child’s cause of action after injury, it makes little
sense, if any sense, to conclude a parent has the authority to
release a child’s cause of action prior to an injury.” 111
Moreover, in addressing the argument that invalidating
such waivers could lead to prohibitive costs for those
providing minors with opportunities to participate in
inherently more risk-related activities, the Scott court
recycled the traditional argument that pre-injury waivers
simply conflict with the fundamentals of tort law—an
argument which has been asserted against the freedom to
shift liability for prospective negligence in the context of
waivers more generally since their very inception.112
However, Scott was decided long before the
landmark United States Supreme Court ruling in Troxel.
Notably, Troxel was also a case originating in Washington
and ultimately led to the United States Supreme Court
clearly establishing a parent’s broad right to raise her own
children.113 At least one post-Troxel Washington case has
suggested that the principals espoused in Troxel could have
affected the Smith ruling.114 Indeed, like Childress, there is

110
111
112

113
114

standardized form signed by a parent on behalf of a child releasing
a school district from liability is a waiver that impairs the public
interest as set forth in Tunkl).
Scott, 834 P.2d at 12.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12; see King, supra note 13, at 710 (concern over general
liability waivers has historically led to ambiguity and unpredictable
application).
Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 62–63.
See Chauvlier v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, 35 P.3d 383, 388 n. 27
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (noting in dicta that “Scott . . . focused
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certainly a question over whether Scott offers a complete
analysis of whether a parent’s rights in a post-Troxel world
are superior to the state’s parens patriae powers.
In Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Company, the Colorado
Supreme Court refused to enforce a parental pre-injury
liability waiver—a decision that prompted the Colorado
Legislature to immediately respond with expressly
superseding legislation, effectively overturning the
ruling. 115 In Cooper, a father brought a negligence suit
individually and on behalf of his minor son against a ski
club in connection with a skiing accident that left the minor
blinded and with other severe injuries. 116 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
the basis of the parental pre-injury liability waiver signed
on the minor’s behalf, and the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed, relying heavily on Troxel—which was published
only two months before the Colorado Court of Appeals’
ruling in Cooper.117
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that
Colorado’s general public policy affords minors significant
protections that ultimately preclude a parent’s right to
contract on behalf of her minor child. 118 In rejecting the

115

116
117

118

solely on the issue of parental power to sign releases on behalf of
their children” (emphasis added)).
Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1237 superseded by statute, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13–22–107. Indeed, within a year of the Colorado Supreme
Court’s holding in Cooper, the Colorado Legislature responded
with legislation explicitly overturning the Colorado high court’s
holding. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–22–107. The Colorado
legislation, which remains current today, allows parents to “release
or waive the child’s prospective claim for negligence” and
ultimately declares that parents have a fundamental right to make
decisions on behalf of their children, including deciding whether
the children should participate in risky activities. Id.
Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1229.
See Cooper v. U.S. Ski Ass'n., 32 P.3d 502, 504–05 (Colo. App.
2000) rev'd sub nom. Cooper, 48 P.3d 1229.
Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1231.
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argument that a parent’s right to execute an enforceable
parental pre-injury liability waiver is rooted in the parent’s
right to make other important decisions for her child, the
Colorado Supreme Court essentially held that parental preinjury liability waivers are different.119 That is, the Cooper
court held that the refusal to enforce a pre-injury liability
waiver against a child signed by that child’s parent does not
implicate a parent’s traditional fundamental interests, such
as those respective of a child’s education, religious
upbringing, or with respect to the parent’s right to play a
“substantial role” in medical decisions for the child. 120 In
other words, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, a
parent’s fundamental right to make other important
decisions on behalf of her child does not necessarily
include her decision to accept the risk of her child’s
participation in a worthwhile activity. 121
The Florida Supreme Court issued a ruling similar
to Cooper in Kirton v. Fields that received a nearly
identical public response and that was overruled by statute
in less than a year. 122 In Kirton, the estate of a deceased
minor child brought an action against the operators of an
ATV course after the minor child was killed while

119
120

121
122

Id. at n. 11.
Id.; see, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (regarding education);
Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at, 214 (regarding religion); Parham, 442 U.S.
at 603.
Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1231.
Kirton 997 So.2d at 350, superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. §
744.301(3). Like Cooper, Kirton was not the law for very long.
The Florida Legislature responded to Kirton within a year after its
publication and passed FLA. STAT. § 744.301(3), which provides
that parents can release commercial providers of activities for
children from liability for injuries sustained due to “the inherent
risks” of the activity. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(3). The statue provides
a rebuttable presumption that a child’s injury was caused by an
“inherent risk,” which may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. FLA. STAT. § (3)(c)(2).

39

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 40
operating an ATV. 123 In analyzing the parental pre-injury
liability waiver signed on behalf of the minor, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the state’s parens patriae power
prevails over a parent’s fundamental right to raise his
children in the context of a parental pre-injury liability
waiver related to commercial activity. 124 The court held
that, despite Troxel and in the court’s view of Florida
precedent, “[i]t cannot be presumed that a parent who
decided to voluntarily risk a minor child’s physical wellbeing is acting in the child’s best interest.” 125 Rather, in the
Kirton court’s view, “when a parent decides to execute a
pre-injury release on behalf of a minor child, the parent is
not protecting the welfare of the child, but is instead
protecting the interests of the [commercial] activity
provider.”126 The Kirton court essentially emphasized that
commercial entities should be treated differently than noncommercial entities on the logic that the former “can take
precautions to ensure the child’s safety and insure itself
when a minor child is injured while participating in the
activity[.]” 127 Ostensibly, the Kirton court suggested that
commercial entities need to be exposed to potential liability
as an “incentive to take reasonable precautions to protect
the safety of minor children.”128
Finally, in the sharply divided case Woodman v.
Kera, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a parental preinjury liability waiver was against Michigan public policy

123
124

125
126
127
128

Kirton, 997 So.2d at 351.
Id. at 358. With its emphasis on commercial activity, the Kirton
court arguably implicitly suggested that a parental pre-injury
liability waiver executed in the context of non-commercial activity
might have otherwise been enforceable under Florida law.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id.

40

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 41
and therefore unenforceable.129 In Woodman, a child broke
his leg when he jumped off a slide at an indoor play area.130
Ultimately, the court held that under Michigan common
law, a parent has no authority to bind his child by contract,
just as a guardian cannot contractually bind a minor
ward. 131 Moreover, in ostensibly rejecting Troxel, the
Woodman court emphasized that the fundamental character
of a parent’s decision-making authority “does not alter this
bedrock legal principle.”132 In doing so, the Woodman court
expressly held that a parent’s relationship to his or her
child is essentially no different than the parent’s
relationship to any other non-consenting third party, like
his or her “neighbor or a coworker.” 133 Ultimately, the
Woodman court recycled the commonly cited position with
little substantive analysis that, because a parent cannot
settle her child’s claim post-injury without court approval,

129

130
131

132

133

Woodman, 785 N.W.2d at 2. However, as noted by Justice
Markman in his concurring opinion, the majority’s discussion as to
the validity of parental pre-injury liability waivers in Woodman is
arguably non-binding dicta. Id. at 19 (Markman, J., concurring).
In that regard, the majority’s holding that the minor was not bound
by the liability waiver was first based upon the court’s conclusion
that the specific liability waiver at issue did not clearly indicate
that the parent was waiving specifically the minor’s claims. Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5 (citing Reynolds v. Garber-Buick Co., 149 N.W. 985
(Mich. 1914); Lothrop v. Duffield, 96 N.W. 577 (Mich. 1903);
Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124 (1877)).
Id. Notably, the court evaluated a Michigan statute, which
provided a parent the authority to bind a minor child to an
arbitration provision in medical care contexts. Id. at 8. The court
recognized that under Michigan common law specifically, a parent
is without the authority to bind her child to an arbitration
provision. Id. This is in stark contrast to other case law, including
law in Tennessee, which has held that minor children may be
bound to forum selection clauses selecting arbitral forums. See
infra Section V(A).
Woodman, 785 N.W.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
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she should not be allowed to waive her child’s prospective
tort claims.134
134

Id. Having concluded that Michigan’s common law supported
invalidating the pre-injury liability waiver, the court went on to
conclude that it had no place to change the common law. Id. at 16.
Notably, there was a stark division among the justices in
Woodman, which led to equally sharply divided opinions drafted
by several justices. For example, four justices concluded that the
basis of the court’s ruling should be that the common law simply
does not permit a parent to contract on behalf of her child. Id. at 2,
9, 15 (majority opinion); id. at 17 (Hathaway, J., concurring). In
addition, ostensibly only three of those justices concluded that preinjury liability waivers should be treated the same as post-injury
settlement releases. Id. at 17 (Hathaway, J., concurring). However,
three justices, although concurring that the underlying Court of
Appeals opinion should be affirmed on other grounds, would hold
that pre-injury waivers signed on behalf of minor children by their
parents are not presumptively invalid. Id. at 18 (Cavanagh, J.,
concurring); id. at 18 (Markman, J., concurring); id. at 45
(Corrigan, J. concurring with Markman, J.).
Among the three justices submitting opinions stating that they
would not hold a parental pre-injury waiver presumptively invalid
was Justice Markman, who was joined by Justice Corrigan, who
submitted a scathing concurring opinion outlining the erroneous
reasoning of the majority holding. Id. at 18 (Markman, J.,
concurring). Indeed, Justice Markman’s concurring opinion offers
significant insight into the reasons why courts should enforce
parental pre-injury liability waivers. Id. Ultimately, Justice
Markman criticized the majority on a total of seven separate
grounds, including: (1) that the rules regarding a minor’s
incapacity to contract are not inconsistent with a parent exercising
her fundamental authority—which Troxel solidified—to act in
ways which she deems are in the best interest of the child; (2) that
logic of cases from other states which enforce parental pre-injury
waivers are persuasive; (3) that other authority exists that supports
a public policy in favor of enforcing parental pre-injury waivers;
(4) that courts should not intrude in a private party’s freedom to
contract in this context; and (5) that the result will ultimately open
the floodgates of litigation and cause dwindling recreational
opportunities for minors by “summarily strik[ing] down tens of
thousands of waivers . . . believed to be valid and enforceable by
thousands of providers of recreational and sporting opportunities
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V. Enforcing Parental Pre-Injury Liability Waivers Is
Appropriate and Justified Under Current Tennessee
Law and Public Policies.
Notwithstanding some courts’ hesitancy to enforce
parental pre-injury liability waivers, there are certainly
valid justifications now supporting enforcement in
Tennessee. At the very least, the Childress rule does not
consider the limits that a parent’s now-recognized
fundamental decision-making authority places on the
state’s power to intervene therein. This is particularly true
in light of other laws and public policies supporting
enforcement, outlined below, which courts that have been
hesitant to enforce parental pre-injury liability waivers
respectfully fail to fully appreciate.
A. A Parent Can Choose the Forum in Which Her
Minor Child’s Claim is Litigated and Even Bind
Her Child to Mandatory Arbitration.
A parent is certainly not unable to execute other
types of enforceable contracts on her child’s behalf. For
example, courts have routinely permitted parents to
prospectively waive a minor’s right to file a lawsuit by
executing a mandatory arbitration provision on behalf of
her child. One of the first cases that analyzed a parent’s
authority to prospectively select a forum for her minor
child’s claims was another California case, Doyle v.
Guiliucci, dealing with a minor’s rights under an insurance
contract. 135 The Doyle court enforced an arbitration
provision in the insurance contract against the minor child,
holding that it did not unreasonably restrict the child’s

135

and the parents of children who partake in such opportunities.” Id.
at 43.
Doyle, 401 P.2d at 1.
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rights because it did “no more than specify a forum for the
settlement of disputes.” 136 Thus, because a parent has a
“right and duty to provide for the care of his child,” the
parent must be allowed to contract on behalf of her minor
child in the context of medical services. 137
Since Doyle, other courts have routinely held that
parents have the authority to bind their minor child to
arbitration provisions in lawsuits involving general
negligence and other tort liability. 138 That is because these
courts have reasoned that an arbitration provision is really a
forum selection provision and merely “specifies the forum
for resolution of the child’s claim.” 139 Forum selection
provisions are enforced against minors outside of
arbitration provision contexts because courts uphold
arbitration provisions on the basis that they are essentially
choice of law provisions.140 Indeed, “[l]ogically, if a parent
136
137
138

139

140

Id. at 3.
Id.
See, e.g., Global Travel Mktg. v. Shea, 908 So.2d 392 (Fla. 2005)
(father’s wrongful death action against a safari operator brought on
behalf of his minor son after the minor was killed by hyenas while
on a safari is subject to arbitration provision signed by the father);
Hojnowski, 868 A.2d at 1092 (child’s claim for bodily injuries he
received at a skateboarding park is subject to an arbitration
provision signed by the child’s parents); Cross v. Carnes, 724
N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1998) (child’s defamation and fraud claims
against the Sally Jessy Raphael Show are subject to an arbitration
provision signed by the child’s parents); see also Leong v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 788 P.2d 164, 169 (Haw. 1990).
Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836; see also Shea, 908 So.2d at 403392
(arbitration provision merely “constitutes a prospective choice of
forum”).
Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836; Shea, 908 So.2d 392. In addition,
although laws generally allow minors to disaffirm their own
contracts, those laws are ultimately “not intended to affect
contracts entered into by adults on behalf of their children.” Hohe,
224 Cal. App. 3d at 1565 (citing Doyle, 401 P.2d 1). It is also not
necessary to make a distinction between commercial versus noncommercial entities in the determination of whether a forum
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has the authority to bring and conduct a lawsuit on behalf
of the child, he or she has the same authority to choose
arbitration as the litigation forum.” 141 Importantly, it is
immaterial that the selected forum is more preferable to one
party over a minor child.142 Rather, the real test is “whether
the contracting parties intended that [a minor] should
receive a benefit,” thereby subjecting the minor to
enforceable obligations.143
In Doe v. Cedars Academy, a Delaware Superior
Court upheld a California forum selection and choice of
law provision against a minor’s personal injury claims.144
There, a mother entered into a contract with a private
boarding school to enroll her minor son as a student. 145 The
mother executed the contract individually and on behalf of
her minor son, which included a pre-injury liability waiver,
a mandatory California forum selection provision, and a
California choice of law provision.146
After the minor was allegedly sexually assaulted on
campus, his mother sued the private school individually
and on behalf of her minor son.147 The court first held that
both the mother and her minor son were generally bound by
the contract because the son would not have been able to go

141
142

143

144

145
146

147

selection provision executed by a parent is enforceable against her
minor child. Compare Cross, 724 N.E.2d 828, with Hojnowski,
868 A.2d 1087 and Shea, 908 So.2d 392.
Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836.
Shea, 908 So.2d at 403; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836 (citing Zivich,
696 N.E.2d 201).
Hojnowski, 868 A.2d at 1092 (citing Borough of Brooklawn v.
Brooklawn Hous. Corp., 11 A.2d 83, 85 (N.J. 1940)).
Doe v. Cedars Acad., No. 09C–09–136 JRS, 2010 WL 5825343
(Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2010).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–2. The contract also contained an arbitration provision, id.
at *2, but it was ultimately a non-issue as the court dismissed the
case in favor of either California courts or an arbitral forum in the
state of California. Id. at *7.
Id. at *2.
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to that specific school without his mother contracting for
such services. 148 The court held that to conclude that the
contract did not apply to the minor would be inconsistent
with fundamental parental rights and would be practically
unworkable:
[Not enforcing the contract against the
minor would be] tantamount to concluding
that a parent can never contract with a
private school (or any other service
provider) on behalf and for the benefit of her
child. As a practical matter, no service
provider would ever agree to a contract with
a parent if a child could ignore the
provisions of the contract that pertain to him
without recourse. Such a result is
inconsistent with the law’s concept of the
family which “rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult
decisions.”149
Because the choice of law and forum selection provisions
did not “seriously impair” the plaintiff or the minor son’s
ability to pursue the cause of action, the court enforced the
forum selection and choice of law provisions and dismissed
the entire case in favor of California jurisdiction.150
148
149

150

Id. at *4.
Id. (emphasis added and footnote omitted) (quoting Parham, 442
U.S. at 602).
Id. at *7 (“Mere inconvenience or additional expense is not
sufficient evidence of unreasonableness.”); see also Sevier Cnty.
Bank v. Paymentech Merch. Servs., No. E2005–02420–COA–R3–
CV, 2006 WL 2423547, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006) (“A
party resisting a forum selection clause must show more than
inconvenience or annoyance such as increased litigation

46

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 47
Recently, in Williams v. Smith, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals ostensibly arrived at a nearly identical result as
those reached in the foregoing authorities and held that a
parent may bind her child to a choice of law contract.151 In
Williams, the plaintiffs—a minor child and her parents—
were involved in a car accident in Tennessee while driving
from North Carolina to Missouri in a vehicle owned by
North Carolina residents.152 The vehicle was insured by a
Missouri insurance policy and provided coverage of
$25,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per accident. 153 In
addition, the relevant policy included a Missouri choice of
law provision and provided $50,000.00 per person and
$100,000.00 per accident in uninsured motorist
coverage. 154 The policy did not provide underinsured
motorist coverage, however, and such coverage was not
required under Missouri law.155 Conversely, North Carolina
law required a minimum automobile insurance liability
limits of $30,000.00 per person and $60,000.00 per
accident. 156 Further, under North Carolina law, a driver
carrying less than the minimum limits is considered an

151
152
153
154
155
156

expenses.”) (emphasis in original). The court’s ruling applied
regardless of whether California law could ostensibly be more
favorable to Cedars Academy. See Hohe, 224 Cal. App. 3d at
1559. The court also emphasized that the forum selection clause
was valid and enforceable because the clause was not ambiguous
and because the parties “intended to consent to the exclusive
jurisdiction of California courts or arbitration panels to litigate
their claims.” Cedars Acad., 2010 WL 5825343, at *7. The court
did not rule on the validity of the liability waiver because the
dispositive issue to dismissal was the choice of law and forum
selection provisions.
Williams v. Smith, 465 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20–279.21(b)(2)).
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“uninsured motorist.” 157 Accordingly, if the insurance
policy’s choice of law provision were not enforced, North
Carolina law would apply, and the plaintiffs’ would be
permitted to assert a claim for underinsured motorist
coverage.158
The trial court held that the Missouri choice of law
provision was enforceable against the plaintiffs, including
the minor, and dismissed the claim for underinsured
motorist coverage on the basis of the choice of law
provision.159 The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court, ostensibly sanctioning the notion that a minor
may be bound as a non-signatory to a choice of law and/or
forum selection provision. 160 Indeed, if the minor in that
case was not so bound, the applicable coverage would have
been determined under North Carolina law, or arguably
through a conflicts of law analysis based on Tennessee
common law.161
Accordingly, enforcing a contract executed by a
parent on her minor child’s behalf is certainly not as taboo
as one might think. At the very least, such enforcement
reflects the well-settled rule that he may be the third-party
beneficiary of a contract to which he is a non-signatory.162

157
158
159

160
161
162

Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20–279.21(b)(3)).
Id.
Id. If Missouri law controlled, there was no underinsured motorist
coverage; while if North Carolina law controlled, there was such
coverage. Id.
See id.
See generally id. at 153.
See, e.g., Benton v. Vanderbilt Univ., 137 S.W.3d 614, 615–16
(Tenn. 2004); In re Justin A.H., No. M2013–00292–COA–R3CV,
2014 WL 3058439, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2014); Lopez v.
Taylor, 195 S.W.3d 627, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Butler v.
Eureka Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 105 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1937).
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B. Enforcing Parental Pre-Injury Liability Waivers
Comports With Existing Tennessee Law and
Public Policies.
Like several of the cases outlined in Section IV(B),
supra, the general rule espoused in Childress was based
upon the following two principles: (1) the rule that a
guardian cannot settle a minor’s existing tort claim apart
from court approval or statutory authority; and (2) the rule
that minors cannot waive anything themselves, so their
parents cannot waive anything for them. 163 However, a
parent’s constitutional right to make the “important family
decision” to execute a pre-injury liability waiver on her
child’s behalf is congruent with other Tennessee laws and
public policies. In other words, there is no reason to extend
the policy behind those two well-settled rules to invalidate
a parent’s constitutional decision-making authority,
because those principles are not mutually exclusive.
1. No Conflict With a Parent’s Inability to Settle
Her Minor Child’s Existing Tort Claims
As Childress recognized, Tennessee has longrequired court approval for minor settlements. 164
Significantly, the policy for disallowing parents from
settling their children’s existing tort claims is rooted in the
concern that the parent might place her own financial
motivations over her child’s interests. 165 However, laws
permitting state intrusion into a parent’s decision to settle
her minor’s existing tort claim fit precisely within the
framework promulgated by Hawk and Troxel. In other
163
164

165

Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6–7.
See generally TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–34–105 (2012); Busby v.
Massey, 686 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tenn. 1984); Wade v. Baybarz, 660
S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
Id.

49

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 50
words, enforcing parental pre-injury liability waivers
pursuant to Hawk and Troxel would not disrupt the wellsettled rule against the settlement of a minor’s existing tort
claims apart from court approval.
This is because a parent’s decision to settle her
child’s existing tort claim involves myriad interests that
conflict with those of her child—most significantly, a
financial interest—which naturally rebuts the presumption
that she acts in her child’s best interests. 166 Stated simply,
Hawk and Troxel certainly permit judicial oversight of a
minor settlement based on the obvious conflict of interest
created by a parent’s potential financial motivations to
settle her child’s lawsuit, which rebuts the presumption that
her decision to settle a claim serves her child’s best
interests.167
When a parent signs a pre-injury liability waiver on
her child’s behalf, however, her interests do not conflict
with her child’s—in actuality, they fall squarely in line with
her child’s interests. Therefore, the constitutional
presumption that she acts in her child’s best interest
remains. As the court in Zivich reflected:

166

167

Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 206 (“A parent dealing with an existing
claim is simultaneously coping with an injured child; such a
situation creates a potential for parental action contrary to that
child’s ultimate best interests.”) (quoting Angeline Purdy, Scott v.
Pacific West Mountain Resort: Erroneously Invalidating Parental
Releases of A Minor's Future Claim, 68 WASH. L. REV. 457, 474
(1993)).
Even Tennessee’s minor settlement statute reflects the specific
concern that a parent has a financial motivation to settle her minor
child’s existing claims by requiring more thorough judicial
oversight for larger settlements. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–34–
105 (2012) (a minor settlement that is less than $10,000.00 can be
approved by a court without a hearing and relying solely on
affidavits from legal guardians, while settlements over $10,000.00
require a greater judicial oversight and a hearing before the court).
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“The concerns underlying the judiciary’s
reluctance to allow parents to dispose of a
child’s existing claim do not arise in the
situation where a parent waives a child’s
future claim.
* * *
A parent who signs a release before her
child participates in a recreational activity . .
. faces an entirely different situation. First,
such a parent has no financial motivation to
sign the release. To the contrary, because a
parent must pay for medical care, she risks
her financial interests by signing away the
right to recover damages. Thus, the parent
would better serve her financial interests by
refusing to sign the release.
A parent who dishonestly or maliciously
signs a preinjury release in deliberate
derogation of his child’s best interests also
seems unlikely. Presumably parents sign
future releases to enable their children to
participate in activities that the parents and
children believe will be fun or educational.
Common sense suggests that while a parent
might misjudge or act carelessly in signing a
release, he would have no reason to sign
with malice aforethought.
Moreover, parents are less vulnerable to
coercion and fraud in a preinjury setting. A
parent who contemplates signing a release as
a prerequisite to her child’s participation in
some activity faces none of the emotional
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trauma and financial pressures that may
arise with an existing claim. That parent has
time to examine the release, consider its
terms, and explore possible alternatives. A
parent signing a future release is thus more
able to reasonably assess the possible
consequences of waiving the right to sue.” 168
Accordingly, laws prohibiting a parent from settling
her minor child’s existing tort claim without court approval
do not necessarily conflict with her constitutionally
protected right to make the decision to execute a pre-injury
liability waiver on her child’s behalf, as Childress and other
courts that are hesitant to enforce parental pre-injury
liability waivers suggest.
2. No Conflict With a Minor’s Right to Avoid or
Disaffirm Contracts
Similarly, enforcing a parental pre-injury liability
waiver does not necessarily conflict with the Tennessee law
allowing minors to avoid and/or disaffirm contracts, as
Childress suggests.169 To be clear, the minor’s right in that
context is “based upon the underlying purpose of the
‘infancy doctrine’ which is to protect minors from their
lack of judgment[.]”170 Certainly, the state has an interest in
protecting minors “from squandering their wealth through
improvident contracts with crafty adults who would take
advantage of them in the marketplace.”171
168
169

170

171

Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 206 (quoting Purdy, supra note 166, at 474).
Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6–7; see, e.g., Dodson v. Shrader, 824
S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Human v. Hartsell, 148
S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940)).
Dodson, 824 S.W.2d at 547 (citing Halbman v. Lemke, 298
N.W.2d 562, 564 (Wis. 1980)).
Id.
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Parenting decisions are fundamentally different,
however, because “the law’s concept of the family rests on
a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life’s difficult decisions.”172 Indeed, disallowing
a parent to exercise her fundamental right to make a
decision to execute an enforceable contract on her child’s
behalf could be as harmful to her child as it would be
practically unworkable.173
The California Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that the policy behind a minor’s right to
disaffirm contracts conflicts with enforcing parental preinjury liability waivers, as early as the Hohe case: “[a]
parent may contract on behalf of his or her children” and
the laws allowing minors to disaffirm their own contracts
were “not intended to affect contracts entered into by adults
on behalf of their children.” 174 During the nearly thirty
years since Childress, courts have routinely recognized that
the public policy permitting minors to avoid and/or
disaffirm their contracts is congruent with allowing a parent
to exercise her parental authority to execute a pre-injury
liability waiver on behalf of her minor child:
[A minor’s right to avoid a contract is
founded on a policy] to afford protection to
minors from their own improvidence and
want of sound judgment [and such a
purpose] comports with common sense and
experience and is not defeated by permitting
parents to exercise their own providence and
172
173

174

Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
Cedars Acad., 2010 WL 5825343, at *4 (“As a practical matter, no
service provider would ever agree to a contract with a parent if a
child could ignore the provisions of the contract that pertain to him
without recourse.”).
Hohe, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1565 (citing Doyle, 62 Cal.2d. at 609).
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sound judgment on behalf of their minor
children.175
Further, Tennessee law already reflects its trust in
parenting decisions by granting a parent the authority to
make significant, potentially life-altering decisions on
behalf her minor child in a number of instances. For
example, statutory law provides a parent the authority to
refuse medical treatment for her minor child,176 to consent
to an abortion procedure,177 or to submit her minor child to
involuntary mental health or socioemotional screening. 178
Additionally, statutory law allows a parent to submit her
minor child to convulsive therapy,179 to provide consent for
her minor child to be legally married, 180 to release her
minor child’s protected health information,181 to release her
minor child’s confidential education records,182 or to allow,
or prohibit, a physician to report a pregnancy believed to be

175

176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 746 (upholding parental pre-injury liability
waiver) (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602; Frye v. Yasi, 101 N.E.2d
128 (Mass. 1951)); see also Elisa Lintemuth, Parental Rights v.
Parens Patriae: Determining the Correct Limitations on the
Validity of Pre-Injury Waivers Effectuated by Parents on Behalf of
Minor Children, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 169, 197 (2010) (“Parents
have the fundamental right to make decisions for their child and do
so every day . . . . There is a presumption that in doing so, parents
act in their child’s best interest . . . . ‘[And when executing a
liability waiver on behalf of their child], in the circumstance of a
voluntary, nonessential activity, [courts] will not disturb this
parental judgment.’”) (citing Parham, 422 U.S. at 602) (quoting
Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 747).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34–6–307 (2003).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37–10–303 (2006).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49–2–124 (2016).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33–8–303 (2000).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–3–106 (2012).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68–1–118 (2001).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49–7–1103 (2005).
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the result of statutory rape.183 Moreover, these rights extend
to the often varied situations that a parent may face, such as
the right to allow her minor child to donate blood, 184 to
have
physicians
furnish
information
regarding
185
contraceptive supplies to her minor child, to allow her
minor child to be employed,186 to solicit her minor child’s
name, photograph, or likeness,187 to allow her minor child
to get a body piercing, 188 to allow her minor child to use a
tanning device,189 or the authority to expose her minor child
to clothing-optional beaches. 190 Certainly, the trust that
Tennessee law extends to parenting decisions has been
long-recognized as contradictory to the invalidation of
parental pre-injury liability waivers, or as Professor King
observed:
[J]udicial attitudes toward [invalidating]
exculpatory agreements signed by parents
on behalf of their minor children seem
inconsistent with the powers conferred on
parents respecting other important life
choices.191
Indeed, if the law respects a parent’s authority to make
other significant decisions on behalf of her child in
numerous contexts, there is not necessarily any reason to
183

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

TENN. CODE ANN. § 38–1–302 (1996); see also State v. Goodman,
90 S.W.3d 557, 559 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that a minor child may
be removed and/or confined against her will, absent force, threat,
or fraud, and such removal/confinement would not constitute
kidnapping given parental consent).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68–32–101 (2008).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68–34–107 (1971).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50–5–105 (1999).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47–25–1105 (2005).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62–38–305 (2001).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68–117–104 (2002).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–6–304 (1996).
King, supra note 13, at 716; see also Rosen, 80 A.3d at 346.
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believe that public policy demands invalidating her
decision to prospectively waive her child’s right to sue so
that the child can participate in a worthwhile activity. This
is particularly true in light of a parent’s newly-recognized
fundamental right to make precisely those types of
decisions.
Accordingly, laws allowing a minor to avoid or
disaffirm a contract certainly do not necessarily conflict
with a parent’s constitutionally protected right to make the
decision to execute a pre-injury liability waiver on her
child’s behalf.
3. Enforcing Parental Pre-Injury Liability Waivers
Furthers Other Important Public Policies.
Finally, enforcing a parental pre-injury liability
waiver promotes other important Tennessee public policies.
For instance, enforcing a pre-injury liability waiver
executed by a parent on behalf of her minor child
encourages the availability of affordable recreational
activities. The California Court of Appeals emphasized this
benefit:
Hohe volunteered to be part of a [school]
activity because it would be “fun.” There
was no essential service or good being
withheld by [the school]. Hohe, like
thousands of children participating in
recreational activities sponsored by groups
of volunteers and parents, was asked to give
up her right to sue. The public as a whole
receives the benefit of such waivers so that
groups such as Boy and Girl Scouts, Little
League, and parent-teacher associations are
able to continue without the risks and
sometimes overwhelming costs of litigation.
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Thousands of children benefit from the
availability of recreational and sports
activities. Those options are steadily
decreasing—victims of decreasing financial
and tax support for other than the bare
essentials of an education. Every learning
experience involves risk. In this instance
Hohe agreed to shoulder the risk. No public
policy forbids the shifting of that burden.192
Moreover, although parental pre-injury liability
waivers have been enforced in cases involving noncommercial settings, even those cases emphasize the
primary importance of promoting opportunities for children
to “learn valuable life skills . . . to work as a team and how
to operate within an organizational structure . . . and to
exercise and develop coordination skills.” 193 Accordingly,
the public policy behind enforcing parental pre-injury
liability waivers is nevertheless furthered when commercial
activity is involved. 194
Therefore, a commercial versus non-commercial
distinction is not necessarily appropriate when determining
the enforceability of a parental pre-injury liability waiver.
Indeed, courts have expressly analyzed and rejected the
commercial
versus
non-commercial
distinction,
emphasizing that such a distinction has no basis in common
law:
Whether a child’s judgment renders him less
capable of looking out for his own welfare
heeds true whether or not he or she is
192
193
194

Hohe, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1564.
Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205.
See, e.g., Saccente, 2003 WL 21716586, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 11, 2003) (enforcing a parental pre-injury liability waiver in a
case involving a contract for a child’s horseback riding lessons).
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playing on a school playground or in a
commercial setting. As we have explained,
parents are charged with protecting the
welfare of their children, and we will defer
to a parent’s determination that the potential
risks of an activity are outweighed by the
perceived benefit to the child when she
executes an exculpation agreement.195
Stated simply, applying a commercial versus noncommercial distinction leads to the flawed and paradoxical
conclusion that the law should allow parents to exculpate
only non-profit and state entities because such entities
either cannot “take precautions to ensure the child’s safety
and insure [themselves]” from risks of loss, or they simply
do not need any incentive to take reasonable precautions as
commercial entities purportedly do. 196 Indeed, such logic
clearly conflicts with the entire purpose of the parens
patriae principle itself: that the state has the ultimate
responsibility—and the ability—to act as provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves.
Moreover, a rejection of the commercial versus
non-commercial distinction is supported by scholarly
publications analyzing this precise issue:
[A court which invalidated a parental preinjury liability waiver] reached a flawed
decision
which
threatens
children’s
organized recreational activities. Such
195

196

Rosen, 80 A.3d at 360 (enforcing a parental pre-injury liability
waiver in a case involving a contract between a mother and a
retailer); see also Lehmann, 76 S.W.3d at 55 (enforcing a parental
pre-injury liability waiver in a case involving a commercial entity);
Osborn, 655 N.W.2d at 546 (enforcing a parental pre-injury
liability waiver in a case involving a contract between a mother
and a ski resort).
See, e.g., Rosen, 80 A.3d at 358.
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activities already suffer from severe
pressures. Increased costs and the fear of
litigation threaten to drive recreation
activities for children out of the market.
Given the virtues of and need for children’s
recreational programs, courts should do
what they can to encourage such programs.
Because recreation providers will take care
of their customers in order to assure their
continued patronage, validating releases
that protect a recreation provider would
help to keep children’s recreational
programs available and affordable without
diminishing the safety of such programs. 197
In addition to an outright rejection of the
commercial versus non-commercial distinction, other
courts have emphasized that such a distinction would
necessarily render an unclear application of the law:
For example, is a Boy Scout or Girl Scout,
YMCA, or church camp a commercial
establishment or a community-based
activity? Is a band trip to participate in the
Macy’s Thanksgiving Day parade a school
or commercial activity? What definition of
commercial is to be applied?
197

Purdy, supra note 166, at 475–76 (emphasis added). See generally,
Robert S. Nelson, The Theory of the Waiver Scale: An Argument
Why Parents Should be Able to Waive their Children’s Tort
Liability Claims, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 535 (2002); Cotten, et al.,
supra note, 82; Allison M. Foley, We, the Parents and Participant,
Promise not to Sue . . . Until There is an Accident. The Ability of
High School Students and their Parents to Waive Liability for
Participation in School-Sponsored Athletics, 37 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 439 (2004).
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The importance of this issue cannot be
overstated because it affects so many youth
activities and involves so much monetary
exposure. Bands, cheerleading squads,
sports teams, church choirs, and other
groups that often charge for their activities
and performances will not know whether
they are a commercial activity because of
the fees and ticket sales. How can these
groups carry on their activities that are so
needed by youth if the groups face exposure
to large damage claims either by paying
defense costs or damages? Insuring against
such claims is not a realistic answer for
many activity providers because insurance
costs deplete already very scarce
resources.198
Certainly, the ultimate issue is a threat of litigation
that often “strongly deters” the availability of recreational
activities for children in any setting.199 Public policy has a
strong preference for protecting opportunities to provide
children “affordable recreation.”200 Therefore, the problem
is not whether to allow parental pre-injury liability waivers
in a non-commercial versus a commercial setting. Rather,
enforcement of parental pre-injury liability waivers is
important to diminish the risk of overwhelming costs of
litigation that constrains opportunities for children:
[W]here parents are no longer able to sign
preinjury waivers allowing their minor
198

199
200

Rosen, 80 A.3d at 360 (citing Kirton, 997 So. 2d at 363 (Wells, J.,
dissenting)).
Id.; cf. Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 206.
Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205 (emphasis added).
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children to participate in commercial
activities, businesses across [that] state have
become weary of exposure to total liability.
Even businesses whose customer base is
comprised mostly of adults have wheezed at
the potential legal implications affecting
their patrons. These companies also cater to
the children accompanying their parents . . .
. [Rulings that invalidate parental pre-injury
liability waivers] have several long-lasting
impacts on the manner in which
corporations, both in and out of the state,
anticipate risks that were previously
immunized by exculpatory agreements.
First, corporate risk management offices
must undertake a careful analysis of the
consequences exposed by the invalidation of
parental waivers. Second, corporations will
likely need to carry additional insurance to
cover lawsuits by minors, which are now
unleashed by the blanket of voidance of
certain preinjury waivers. This will lead to
the eventual rise in prices charged to
customers, as businesses receive the bills
from the insurance contracts. In the end, the
consumer will face a higher cost to engage
in certain activities as a result of the delicate
balance between the state’s role as parens
patriae and the parent’s right to assess the
perils awaiting her child.201
201

Jordan A. Dresnick, The Minefield of Liability for Minors:
Running Afoul of Corporate Risk Management in Florida, 64 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1031 (2010); see also Fischer, 2002 WL 31126288,
*14 (enforcing a liability waiver signed by a parent against his
child in conjunction with his participation in a hockey league
because a contrary holding would deprive “thousands of children .
. . of the valuable opportunity to play organized sports”).
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Accordingly, enforcing parental pre-injury liability
waivers against minors is not only required by the
constitutional authority developed since Childress, but also
promotes Tennessee public policy.
VI. Conclusion
Certainly, the law has changed since Childress, as
recognized by other jurisdictions. At the very least,
Childress fails to fully appreciate a parent’s newlyrecognized constitutional authority. However, there is
certainly good reason to believe that the Childress rule now
entirely misses the mark. In that regard, a parent’s decision
to execute parental pre-injury liability waiver is now more
accurately considered as constitutionally protected,
fundamental in character, and superior to Tennessee’s
parens patriae interests. A parental pre-injury liability
waiver should therefore be enforced under the same
standards that any other liability waiver that is enforced in
Tennessee. 202 Undoubtedly, such parental pre-injury
liability waivers allow businesses the ability to provide
children with affordable and worthwhile activities in an
increasingly litigious society. Tennessee courts should
therefore extend a parent the recognition that she makes the
decision to execute a parental pre-injury liability waiver
with her child’s interests in mind.
In short, parents and children would simply be
better off if courts recognized a parent’s right to remove her
child from the “bubble wrap.”

202

See Olson, 558 S.W.2d at 431.
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TABLE I: STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
State

Enforcement

Relevant Case(s) and/or Statute(s)

Ala.

Unlikely

Thode v. Monster Mountain, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 1323, 1328 (M.D. Ala. 2010)
(“Based on all of the above
considerations, the court concludes that,
under Alabama law, a parent may not
bind a child to a pre-injury liability
waiver in favor of a for-profit activity
sponsor by signing the liability waiver
on the child's behalf. Accordingly, the
Release Thompson signed on J.T.'s
behalf, based on authority given by
J.T.'s parents, does not bar J.T. from
asserting a negligence claim against the
Monster Mountain Defendants.”)

Alaska

Yes

ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.292 (“Except as
provided in (b) of this section, a parent
may, on behalf of the parent’s child,
release or waive the child’s prospective
claim for negligence against the provider
of a sports or recreational activity in
which the child participates to the extent
that the activities to which the waiver
applies are clearly and conspicuously set
out in the written waiver and to the
extent the waiver is otherwise valid. The
release or waiver must be in writing and
shall be signed by the child’s parent.”)
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Ariz.

Yes
(Equine
Facilities)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12–533(A)(2) (“An
equine owner or an agent of an equine
owner who regardless of consideration
allows another person to take control of
an equine is not liable for an injury to or
the death of the person if . . . [t]he
person or the parent or legal guardian of
the person if the person is under
eighteen years of age has signed a
release before taking control of the
equine.”)

Ark.

Unlikely

Williams v. United States, 660 F. Supp.
699, 703 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (“A custodian
of a child who advises [the child’s]
parent of potentially hazardous activity
in which his child may participate and
receive injury through no fault of
anyone does not by doing so effectively
disclaim legal responsibility for injuries
to the child that the custodian causes . . .
. It is inconsistent for the Government to
promise ‘supervised’ activities and then
disclaim liability when a child dies
because he was lost to observation for an
unreasonable period of time by those
charged
with
responsibility
of
supervision . . . . To permit the
Government to assume the care and
custody of school children without an
underlying policy encouraging the
exercise of reasonable care would
violate basic principles of fairness.”)

Cal.

Yes

Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist.,
224 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1564 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (“The public as a whole
receives the benefit of such waivers so
that groups such as Boy and Girl Scouts,
Little League, and parent-teacher
associations are able to continue without
the risks and sometimes overwhelming
costs of litigation. Thousands of children
benefit from the availability of
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recreational and sports activities. Those
options are steadily decreasing—victims
of decreasing financial and tax support
for other than the bare essentials of an
education. Every learning experience
involves risk. In this instance Hohe
agreed to shoulder the risk. No public
policy forbids the shifting of that
burden.”)
Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch.
Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 805 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (“It is well established that a
parent may execute a release on behalf
of his or her child.”)
Eriksson v. Nunnink, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d
234 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (parental preinjury liability waiver enforced against
minor’s wrongful death claim).
Colo.

Yes

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–22–107
(2003) (“The general assembly further
declares that the Colorado supreme
court's holding in [Cooper v. Aspen
Skiing Co.], 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002),
has not been adopted by the general
assembly and does not reflect the intent
of the general assembly or the public
policy of this state . . . . A parent of a
child may, on behalf of the child, release
or waive the child’s prospective claim
for negligence.”)

Conn.

Yes

Fischer v. Rivest, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 119
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2002) (“The
injuries sustained by Gabriel Fischer
were tragic. However, if courts did not
enforce this type of exculpatory
contract, organizations such as USA
Hockey, little league and youth soccer,
and the individuals who volunteer their
time as coaches could well decide that
the risks of large legal fees and potential
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judgments are too significant to justify
their
existence
or
participation.
Thousands of children would then be
deprived of the valuable opportunity to
play organized sports.”)
Saccente v. LaFlamme, 35 Conn. L.
Rptr. 174 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11,
2003) (“The decision here by her father
to let the minor plaintiff waive her
claims against the defendants in
exchange for horseback riding lessons at
their farm is consistent with the rights
and responsibilities regarding a child
possessed by a parent and recognized by
the legislature and cannot be said to be
against public policy. The plaintiff's
father made a conscious decision on the
behalf of his child to go to the
defendants' farm for the purpose of
obtaining horseback riding lessons for
her. This was obviously an independent
voluntary decision made upon what he
viewed as her best interests.”)
Del.

Possibly

Doe v. Cedars Acad., No. 09C–09–136
JRS, 2010 WL 5825343, at *4 (Del.
Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2010) (enforcing a
California forum selection provision
contained in a parental pre-injury
liability waiver because “[t]o conclude
that John Doe is not bound by the
Agreement's otherwise enforceable
terms, as Plaintiffs contend, simply
because he is a minor would be
tantamount to concluding that a parent
can never contract with a private school
(or any other service provider) on behalf
and for the benefit of her child. As a
practical matter, no service provider
would ever agree to a contract with a
parent if a child could ignore the
provisions of the contract that pertain to
him without recourse. Such a result is
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inconsistent with the law's concept of
the family which ‘rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's
difficult decisions.’” However, the court
declined to address the enforceability of
the liability waiver itself: “This Court
need not weigh in on behalf of
Delaware, however, because even if the
pre-injury release is invalid, the
presence of the provision would not
render
the
entire
Agreement
unenforceable.”) (footnotes omitted).
Fla.

Yes

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.301(3) (“In
addition to the authority granted in
subsection (2), natural guardians are
authorized, on behalf of any of their
minor children, to waive and release, in
advance, any claim or cause of action
against a commercial activity provider,
or its owners, affiliates, employees, or
agents, which would accrue to a minor
child for personal injury, including
death, and property damage resulting
from an inherent risk in the activity.”)
But see Claire’s Boutiques v. Locastro,
85 So.3d 1192, 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012) (“After [Kirton v. Fields, 997
So.2d 349 (Fla. 2008)], however, the
legislature passed a statute to limit its
holding by permitting parents to release
a commercial activity provider for a
child’s injuries occurring as a result of
the inherent risk of the activity under
certain circumstances . . . . Those
circumstances do not include releasing
the commercial activity provider from
liability for its own negligence . . . .
[T]he legislature did not intend to permit
commercial activity providers to avoid
the consequences of their own
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negligence when children are injured,
recognizing the essential holding of
Kirton.”) (footnotes and internal
citations omitted).
Ga.

Possibly

See DeKalb Cty. Sch. Sys. v. White, 260
S.E.2d 853 (Ga. 1979) (enforcing an
athletic eligibility release executed by a
parent against the parent’s minor child).

Haw.

Yes

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663–10.95(a)
(“Any waiver and release, waiver of
liability, or indemnity agreement in
favor of an owner, lessor, lessee,
operator, or promoter of a motorsports
facility, which releases or waives any
claim by a participant or anyone
claiming on behalf of the participant
which is signed by the participant in any
motorsports or sports event involving
motorsports in the State, shall be valid
and enforceable against any negligence
claim for personal injury of the
participant or anyone claiming on behalf
of and for the participant against the
motorsports facility, or the owner,
operator, or promoter of a motorsports
facility. The waiver and release shall be
valid notwithstanding any claim that the
participant did not read, understand, or
comprehend the waiver and release,
waiver of liability, or indemnity
agreement if the waiver or release is
signed by both the participant and a
witness. A waiver and release, waiver of
liability, or indemnity agreement
executed pursuant to this section shall
not be enforceable against the rights of
any minor, unless executed in writing by
a parent or legal guardian.”)
Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 788
P.2d 164 (Haw. 1990) (enforcing against
a minor an arbitration provision

68

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 69
contained in a contract executed by the
minor’s parents).
Idaho

Possibly

Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Educ. Found.,
941 P.2d 1301 (Id. 1997) (invalidating a
parental pre-injury liability waiver
because it was not drafted properly).
Accoamzzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs., 15
P3d 1153 (Id. 2000) (discussing the
enforceability
of
an
arbitration
provision).

Ill.

No

Meyer v. Naperville Manner, 634
N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994)
(“Since a parent generally may not
release a minor child's cause of action
after an injury, there is no compelling
reason to conclude that a parent has the
authority to release a child's cause of
action prior to the injury.”)
Wreglesworth ex rel. Wreglesworth v.
Arctco, 738 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2000) (“Accordingly, we hold that
any settlement of a minor's claim is
unenforceable unless and until there has
been approval by the probate court. Thus
under Illinois law, the August 16, 1997,
release is unenforceable by the Arctco
defendants with regard to Nicholas’
claims.”)

Ind.

Possibly

Bellew v. Byers, 396 N.E.2d 335, 337
(Ind. 1979) (Claims brought by children
were barred where their parent signed a
settlement release stating that the parent
“[did] hereby release and forever
discharge [one alleged joint tortfeasor
and wife] . . . from any and all claims,
demands, damages, actions, or causes of
action of every kind or character arising
out of an automobile accident.”)
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IND. CODE ANN. § 34–28–3–2 (allowing
an emancipated minor to execute valid
minor liability waiver).
Huffman v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 564 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 588
N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 1992).
Iowa

No

Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258
(Iowa 2010) (“We conclude for all of
these reasons that the public policy
protecting children from improvident
actions of parents in other contexts
precludes the enforcement of preinjury
releases executed by parents for their
minor children. Like a clear majority of
other courts deciding such releases are
unenforceable, we believe the strong
policy in favor of protecting children
must trump any competing interest of
parents and tortfeasors in their freedom
to contractually nullify a minor child's
personal injury claim before an injury
occurs.”)

Kan.

Possibly

Betz v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Agency
of Kansas, 8 P.3d 756, 762 (Kan. 2000)
(After the parent of a minor executed a
settlement and release, the minor is not
allowed to bring a claim for medical
expenses based on the argument that the
parent “waived” her right to recover:
“Betz may not now seek medical
expenses because he no longer holds a
cause of action for medical expenses,
which was extinguished upon settlement
of his daughter's case.”)

Ky.

Unknown

La.

No

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (“Any
clause is null that, in advance, excludes
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or limits the liability of one party for
intentional or gross fault that causes
damage to the other party . . . . Any
clause is null that, in advance, excludes
or limits the liability of one party for
causing physical injury to the other
party.”)
Me.

No

Rice v. Am. Skiing Co., No. CIV.A.CV–
99–06, 2000 WL 33677027, at *3 (Me.
Super. Ct. May 8, 2000) (“This court
cannot conclude that the public policy
consideration
espoused
by
the
defendants is paramount to the right of
the infant to his negligence claim.”)

Md.

Yes

BJ's Wholesale Club v. Rosen, 80 A.3d
345, 362 (Md. 2013) (“We have, thus,
never applied parens patriae to
invalidate, undermine, or restrict a
decision, such as the instant one, made
by a parent on behalf of her child in the
course of the parenting role. We
conclude, therefore, that the Court of
Special Appeals erred by invoking the
State's parens patriae authority to
invalidate the exculpatory clause in the
Kids' Club Rules agreement.”)

Mass.

Yes

Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d
738, 746–47 (Mass. 2002) (“In the
instant case, Merav's father signed the
release in his capacity as parent because
he wanted his child to benefit from
participating in cheerleading, as she had
done for four previous seasons. He made
an important family decision cognizant
of the risk of physical injury to his child
and the financial risk to the family as a
whole. In the circumstance of a
voluntary, nonessential activity, we will
not disturb this parental judgment. This
comports with the fundamental liberty
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interest of parents in the rearing of their
children, and is not inconsistent with the
purpose behind our public policy
permitting minors to void their
contracts.”)
Vokes v. Ski Ward, No. 032313B, 2005
WL 2009959, at *1 (Mass. Super. July
5, 2005) (“There is no allegation of
fraud,
deceit,
negligent
misrepresentation, duress, lack of
capacity, lack of consideration or of any
other impediment to the enforcement of
the contract. Under those circumstances,
the Court finds that there was a valid
enforceable release signed by the
plaintiff's mother before his participation
in the ski school program.”)
Mich.

No

Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1,
16 (Mich. 2010) (“The relief impliedly
sought by defendant requires the
creation of a new public policy for this
state by modification of the common
law. Although this Court has the
authority to create public policy through
its management of the common law, we
share that authority with the Legislature.
This Court has fewer tools for assessing
the societal costs and benefits of
changing the common law than the
Legislature, which is designed to make
changes in public policy and the
common law. Moreover, defendant has
failed to identify any existing public
policy supporting the change in the
common law that it seeks; the existing
positive law and common law indicate
that enforcing parental waivers is
contrary to the established public policy
of this state. Accordingly, in matters
such as these, I am persuaded that the
prudent practice for this Court is
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conservancy of the common law.”)
Minn.

Yes

Moore
v.
Minnesota
Baseball
Instructional Sch., No. A08–0845, 2009
WL 818738 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 31,
2009) (enforcing a parental pre-injury
liability waiver in the context of an
injury a minor sustained while playing
in a youth baseball league).

Miss.

Possibly

Quinn v. Mississippi State Univ., 720
So.2d 843 (Miss. 1998) (The Mississippi
Supreme Court held that reasonable
minds could differ as to the risks that the
plaintiffs were assuming and did not
suggest that parental pre-injury liability
waivers violate public policy).

Mo.

Possibly

Salts v. Bridgeport Marina, 535 F. Supp.
1038, 1040 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (enforcing
parental pre-injury liability waiver in a
jet ski rental agreement).

Mont.

No

MONT. CODE ANN. § 28–2–702
(“Except as provided in 27–1–753, all
contracts that have for their object,
directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone
from responsibility for the person's own
fraud, for willful injury to the person or
property of another, or for violation of
law, whether willful or negligent, are
against the policy of the law.”)

Neb.

Unknown

Nev.

Unknown

N.H.

Unknown

N.J.

No

Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901
A.2d 381, 389–90 (N.J. 2006)
(“Accordingly, in view of the
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protections that our State historically has
afforded to a minor's claims and the
need to discourage negligent activity on
the part of commercial enterprises
attracting children, we hold that a
parent's execution of a pre-injury release
of a minor's future tort claims arising out
of the use of a commercial recreational
facility is unenforceable.”)
N.M.

Unknown

N.Y.

No

Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew
Camps, 172 N.E.2d 283 (N.Y. 1961)
(“[W]e are extremely wary of a
transaction that puts parent and child at
cross-purposes and, in the main,
normally tends to quiet the legitimate
complaint of the minor child. Generally,
we may regard the parent's contract of
indemnity, however well-intended, as an
instrument that motivates him to
discourage the proper prosecution of the
infant's claim, if that contract be legal.
The end result is either the outright
thwarting of our protective policy or,
should the infant ultimately elect to
ignore the settlement and to press his
claim, disharmony within the family
unit. Whatever the outcome, the policy
of the State suffers.”)

N.C.

Maybe

Kelly v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d
429, 437 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (“The court is
persuaded by the analysis of those courts
that have upheld such waivers in the
context of litigation filed against
schools, municipalities, or clubs
providing activities for children, and
concludes that, if faced with the issue,
the North Carolina Supreme Court
would similarly uphold a preinjury
release executed by a parent on behalf of
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a minor child in this context.”)
N.D.

Yes

Kondrad v. Bismarck Park Dist., 655
N.W.2d 411, 414 (N.D. 2003) (“It is
undisputed that Kondrad’s bicycle
accident occurred on the school grounds
while Kondrad was participating in the
BLAST program. This is the very type
of situation for which the Park District,
under the release language, insulated
itself from liability for alleged
negligence while operating the afterschool care program. Under the
unambiguous
language
of
the
agreement, McPhail exonerated the Park
District from liability for injury and
damages incurred by Kondrad while
participating in the program and caused
by the alleged negligence of the Park
District . . . . We hold the Parent
Agreement signed by McPhail clearly
and unambiguously exonerates the Park
District for injuries sustained by
Kondrad while participating in the
BLAST program and which were
allegedly caused by the negligent
conduct of the Park District.”) (footnote
omitted).

Ohio

Yes

Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696
N.E.2d 201, 205–07 (Ohio 1998)
(“Therefore, we conclude that although
Bryan, like many children before him,
gave up his right to sue for the negligent
acts of others, the public as a whole
received the benefit of these exculpatory
agreements. Because of this agreement,
the Club was able to offer affordable
recreation and to continue to do so
without the risks and overwhelming
costs of litigation. Bryan’s parents
agreed to shoulder the risk. Public policy
does not forbid such an agreement. In
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fact, public policy supports it . . . .
Therefore, we hold that parents have the
authority to bind their minor children to
exculpatory agreements in favor of
volunteers and sponsors of nonprofit
sport activities where the cause of action
sounds in negligence. These agreements
may not be disaffirmed by the child on
whose behalf they were executed.”)
Okla.

Unlikely

Or.

Unknown

Pa.

Unlikely

Holly Wethington v. Swainson, 155 F.
Supp. 3d 1173, 1179 (W.D. Okla. 2015)
(“Based on the case law in Oklahoma
and other jurisdictions, the Court is led
to the conclusion that (1) Makenzie's
acknowledgment and execution of the
Release is of no consequence and does
not preclude her claims against
Defendant, and (2) the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would find that an
exculpatory agreement regarding future
tortious conduct, signed by parents on
behalf of their minor children, is
unenforceable.”)

Grenell v. Parkette Nat. Gymnastic
Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 144
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (“In the case before us,
however,
there
was
no
court
involvement in the transaction which
occurred between the minor plaintiff and
the defendants. Thus, she received none
of the protections provided by the
aforementioned
special
rules
of
procedure which apply to the settlement
of minors' claims. Further, the public
policy concern of the effective
settlement of litigation is not involved
here because of the very nature of the
exculpatory agreement which the minor
plaintiff executed. For these reasons, we
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do not believe that the Pennsylvania
courts would bind the minor plaintiff to
the agreement which she signed. Thus,
we will deny the defendants' summary
judgment motion as to those claims
asserted by the minor plaintiff.”)

Troshak v. Terminix Int'l Co., No. CIV.
A. 98–1727, 1998 WL 401693, at *5
(E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998) (Analyzing an
arbitration provision, the court held “that
a parent cannot bind a minor child to an
arbitration provision that requires the
minor to waive his or her right to file
potential claims for personal injury in a
court of law. If a parent cannot
prospectively release the potential
claims of a minor child, then a parent
does not have authority to bind a minor
child to an arbitration provision that
requires the minor to waive their right to
have potential claims for personal injury
filed in a court of law. Accordingly, the
court will not stay the claims brought by
or on behalf of Richard Troshak, III for
personal injury.”)
R.I.

Unknown

S.C.

Unknown

S.D.

Unknown

Tenn.

No

Childress v. Madison County, 777
S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)
(“We, therefore, hold that Mrs.
Childress could not execute a valid
release or exculpatory clause as to the
rights of her son against the Special
Olympics or anyone else, and to the
extent the parties to the release
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attempted and intended to do so, the
release is void.”)
But see Blackwell v. Sky High Sports,
M2016–00447–COA–R9–CV (Tenn. Ct.
App. argued Nov. 16, 2016) (Tennessee
Court of Appeals granting application
for interlocutory appeal to assess the
validity of parental pre-injury liability
waiver).
Tex.

No

Munoz v. II Jaz Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207,
210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (“Therefore, in
light of this state's long-standing policy
to protect minor children, the language,
‘decisions
of
substantial
legal
significance’ in section 12.04(7) of the
Family Code cannot be interpreted as
empowering the parents to waive the
rights of a minor child to sue for
personal injuries. Appellants’ public
policy argument is sustained.”)
Fleetwood Enters. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d
1069 (5th Cir. 2002) (arbitration
provision executed by a parent on behalf
of a minor was not enforceable under
Texas law).
Paz v. Life Time Fitness, 757 F. Supp.
2d 658 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (parental preinjury liability waiver not enforceable
against commercial enterprise).

Utah

Yes
(Inherent
Risks
Associated to
Equine
Facilities; No
Release for
Negligence)

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–4–203 (“(1)
An equine or livestock activity sponsor
shall provide notice to participants of the
equine or livestock activity that there are
inherent risks of participating and that
the sponsor is not liable for certain of
those risks. (2) Notice shall be provided
by . . . (b) providing a document or
release for the participant, or the
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participant’s legal guardian if
participant is a minor, to sign.”)

the

Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1067–
68 (Utah 2001) (“We, too, conclude that
public policy renders void the indemnity
agreement between Navajo Trails and
Hawkins's mother. By shifting financial
responsibility to a minor's parent, such
indemnity provisions would allow
negligent parties to circumvent our
newly adopted rule voiding waivers
signed on behalf of a minor. Although
the indemnity contract theoretically
binds only Hawkins's mother, as a
practical matter, it could chill Hawkins's
pursuit of her legal claims against
Navajo Trails since her mother, not
Navajo Trails, would be the ultimate
source of compensation.”)
Vt.

Unknown

Va.

No

Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 418
S.E.2d 894, 897 (Va. 1992) (liability
waivers are invalid regardless of
whether they relate to the claims of an
adult or a minor).

Wash.

No

Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort,
834 P.2d 6, 12 (Wash. 1992) (“We hold
that to the extent a parent's release of a
third party’s liability for negligence
purports to bar a child's own cause of
action, it violates public policy and is
unenforceable. However, an otherwise
conspicuous and clear exculpatory
clause can serve to bar the parents’
cause of action based upon injury to
their child. Therefore, we hold that
Justin's parents’ cause of action is barred
by the release; Justin’s own cause of
action is not barred.”)
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W. Va.

Unlikely

Johnson v. New River Scenic
Whitewater Tours, 313 F. Supp. 2d 621,
632 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (“[T]he West
Virginia Supreme Court's holding in
Murphy compels the conclusion that a
parent may not indemnify a third party
against the parent's minor child for
liability for conduct that violates a safety
statute such as the Whitewater
Responsibility Act.”)

Wis.

Yes

Osborn v. Cascade Mountain, 655
N.W.2d 546 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (“The
Osborns also contend that the release
Amanda signed was not valid because
she was a minor. That is true, but
irrelevant. The first release, signed by
Joan [on Amanda’s behalf], remained in
effect.”)

Wyo.

Unknown
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BURGLARY AT WAL-MART: INNOVATIVE
PROSECUTIONS OF BANNED SHOPLIFTERS UNDER
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–14–402
By: Jonathan Harwell
“An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It
leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even
the best of laws. He that would make his own liberty secure
must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he
violates this duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach
to himself.”1 –Thomas Paine
I. Introduction
Consider a shoplifter. He is observed at Wal-Mart
putting some steaks into his jacket to take them without
paying. He is apprehended by a Wal-Mart loss-prevention
employee, who alerts police. Before the police arrive, the
shoplifter is given a written notice from Wal-Mart, stating
that he is no longer allowed on any Wal-Mart property; that
any violations of that restriction could result in prosecution
for criminal trespass; and that the notice is in effect until
rescinded by Wal-Mart. The shoplifter is then taken to jail
and charged with and convicted of misdemeanor theft.
Time passes. The shoplifter’s probationary sentence
comes to an end. The shoplifter returns to Wal-Mart and
again unwisely attempts to put some DVDs into his pocket.
He is again apprehended by Wal-Mart employees. This
time, however, he is charged not merely with misdemeanor
theft, even though the value of the merchandise is less than
$500; instead, he is charged also with the Class D felony of
burglary. Because of several prior convictions, he now
faces twelve years in prison without the possibility of
1

3 THOMAS PAINE, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE, 1791–1804 151
(Project Gutenberg, 2010) (1895) (ebook).
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probation.2 He tells his defense attorney: “Sure, I shoplifted
that stuff, but I don’t understand how they can charge me
with burglary.” His attorney responds, hardly reassuringly:
“I don’t either.”
In the fall of 2015, to the surprise and dismay of
both defense attorneys and criminal defendants, this
situation suddenly became quite common in Knox County,
Tennessee. 3 The novel legal theory behind these
prosecutions—although it had apparently never been used
before—is relatively straightforward. The Tennessee
burglary statute covers, among other situations, the entry of
a defendant into a building without the “effective consent”
of the property owner, where the defendant subsequently
commits a theft. 4 The Office of the District Attorney
General has taken the position that although this repeatshoplifting-after-notice situation has not previously been
prosecuted as burglary, the statute clearly authorizes such
prosecutions. 5 The initial notice of restriction from WalMart property constitutes a denial of “effective consent” to
enter subsequently, and the shoplifting constitutes the
requisite theft after entry without consent.6
2

Burglary is a Class D felony and carries a range of punishment of two
to twelve years. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39–14–402, 40–35–111(b)(4)
(2016). For a standard offender with less than two prior felonies, this
would mean a sentence of two to four years (becoming eligible for
parole after thirty percent with the possibility of having the sentence
suspended). TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–35–501(c) (2016). For a career
offender, this would mean an automatic sentence of twelve years (with
parole eligibility after sixty percent of the sentence), with no possibility
of probation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–35–501(f) (2016).
3
See Jamie Satterfield, Knox County DA, Public Defender at Odds
Over New Policy on Shoplifters, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL (Nov. 3,
2015),
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/crime–courts/knox–county–
da–public–defender–at–odds–over–new–policy–on–shoplifters–ep–
1350115307–353301421.html.
4
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–14–402(a)(3) (2016).
5
Satterfield, supra note 3.
6
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–14–402(a)(3) (2016).
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Constitutional criminal law is constantly in flux. On
the other hand, substantive criminal law is much more
stable, and innovations such as enlarging the scope of
historic crimes are rare. Determining whether conduct
constitutes a given crime ordinarily involves application of
settled principles to variant factual scenarios. It does not
generally involve sudden, attempted expansions of the
substantive reach of old laws. This article explores the
structural history of the burglary statute, as well as two oftoverlooked doctrines of criminal law (the rule of lenity and
requirement of fair warning) to argue that this novel theory
of burglary liability is not and should not be a valid
application of the Tennessee burglary statute, Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39–14–402. Part II sets out the statutory structure.7
Part III summarizes the convoluted history of the relevant
provisions,8 in service of the argument, set out in Part IV,
that the burglary statute should be interpreted to apply only
to buildings that are not open to the public.9 Part V presents
a separate but related argument, that due process notions of
fair warning prevent application of this statute to situations
where the defendant could not have been aware in advance
that his or her conduct would be prosecuted in this way. 10
II. The Current Burglary Statute
The first step is to grasp the structure and terms of
the current Tennessee statute. Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39–14–402(a) provides:

7

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
9
See infra Part IV.
10
See infra Part V. This article does not engage with the policy issue of
whether it would be a good idea to punish this factual scenario as a
Class D felony; the article only considers whether the existing burglary
statute actually does so.
8
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(a) A person commits burglary who, without
the effective consent of the property
owner:
(1) Enters a building other than a
habitation (or any portion thereof)
not open to the public, with intent to
commit a felony, theft or assault;
(2) Remains concealed, with the intent to
commit a felony, theft or assault, in a
building;
(3) Enters a building and commits or
attempts to commit a felony, theft or
assault; or
(4) Enters any freight or passenger car,
automobile, truck, trailer, boat,
airplane or other motor vehicle with
intent to commit a felony, theft or
assault or commits or attempts to
commit a felony, theft or assault.11
Section 39–14–402(a)(3) [hereinafter simply “section
(a)(3)”] is the focus of this article because it is the
provision relied upon in these shoplifting prosecutions.
The other operative term, “effective consent,” is
defined earlier in the code. Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39–11–106(a)(9) states:
“Effective consent” means assent in fact,
whether express or apparent, including
assent by one legally authorized to act for
another. Consent is not effective when:
(A) Induced by deception or coercion;
(B) Given by a person the defendant knows is not
authorized to act as an agent;
11

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–14–402(a) (2016).
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(C) Given by a person who, by reason of youth,
mental disease or defect, or intoxication, is
known by the defendant to be unable to make
reasonable decisions regarding the subject
matter; or
(D) Given solely to detect the commission of an
offense;12
As an initial point, it is apparent that this burglary
statute—in particular section (a)(3)—is very different from
the traditional conception of burglary. Historically, while
the precise justifications may be difficult to pinpoint,
burglary served to protect individuals in their houses,
especially at night. As Sir Edward Coke defined it in 1644:
A Burglar (or the person that committeth
Burglary) is by the Common Law a felon,
that in the night breaketh and entereth into
the mansion house of another, of intent to
kill some reasonable creature, or to commit
some other felony within the same, whether
his felonious intent be executed or not.13
Blackstone rather poetically described the harm sought to
be addressed by the crime of burglary:
BURGLARY, or nocturnal housebreaking,
burgi latrocinium, which by our antient law
was called hamesecken, as it is in Scotland
to this day, has always been looked upon as
a very heinous offence: not only because of
the abundant terror that it naturally carries
with it, but also as it is a forcible invasion
12

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–11–106(a)(9) (2016).
SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
LAWS OF ENGLAND 63 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1809) (1644).
13

THE
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and disturbance of that right of habitation,
which every individual might acquire even
in a state of nature; . . . [T]he malignity of
the offence does not so properly arise from
its being done in the dark, as at the dead of
night; when all the creation, except beasts of
prey, are at rest; when sleep has disarmed
the owner, and rendered his castle
defenceless.14
In addition to protecting a specific place at a specific time,
burglary was unusual as it was an inchoate crime even
before development of a more modern notion of the crime
of attempt.15
Sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the statute define
burglary in a somewhat traditional way, preserving the
focus on the inchoate nature of burglary through the
concept of intent, although they do not focus on the house
14

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223–24.
Indeed, for this reason the drafters of the Model Penal Code
suggested that burglary may no longer be a necessary crime given the
development of the law of attempt.
15

The critical issues to be confronted in the law of
burglary are whether the crime has any place in a
modern penal code and, if so, how it should be
graded. The first question arises because of the
development of the law of attempt. Traditionally, an
independent substantive offense of burglary has been
used to circumvent unwarranted limitations on
liability for attempt. Under the Model Code,
however, these defects have been corrected. It would
be possible, therefore, to eliminate burglary as a
separate offense and to treat the covered conduct as
an attempt to commit the intended crime plus an
offense of criminal trespass.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 explanatory note for sections 221.1 and
221.2 (2016).
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or the time of day. 16 Section (a)(1) covers the individual
who enters with the intent to commit a felony or theft.
Section (a)(2) covers the individual who, even if he or she
perhaps entered without that intent, subsequently made a
decision to remain concealed with the intent to commit a
felony or theft.17
Section (a)(3), however, has nothing to do with
intent. It covers individuals that actually commit (or
attempt to commit) a crime after having entered a building
16

Tennessee long followed the common law in its definition of
burglary, focusing on the intent at the time of breaking. Hooks v. State,
289 S.W. 529, 529 (Tenn. 1926) (“the particular felonious intent
alleged is an essential element of the crime”); Stinnett v. State, 217
S.W. 343, 343 (Tenn. 1920) (“the entry of a mansion house is the
essential of burglary”). The 1932 Code, for example, defined burglary
as “the breaking and entering of a dwelling house, by night, with intent
to commit a felony.” TENN. CODE 1932, § 10910. Burglary was
punished by punishment for five to fifteen years. TENN. CODE 1932, §
10910. Breaking and entering of a dwelling house by day, with intent,
was punished less severely, at three to ten years. TENN. CODE 1932, §
10912. Finally, the breaking and entering with intent to commit a
felony of a “business house, outhouse, or any other house of another,
other than a dwelling house,” was also punished with three to ten years.
TENN. CODE 1932, § 10913. In the 1955 Code, these various forms
were codified as burglary in the first degree (entry with intent into
dwelling place in the nighttime), burglary in the second degree (entry
into a dwelling place in the daytime with intent to commit a felony),
and burglary in the third degree (entry with intent into a “business
house, [or other house not a dwelling]”). TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39–901,
903, 904 (1955).
17
The function of the concealment-type burglary is beyond the scope of
this article. Interestingly, at least in some jurisdictions, it appears
possible that this arose as a way of addressing the temporal element—
an individual who entered during the day and hid away until nighttime
was just as threatening as one who entered for the first time during the
nighttime. As the Texas Penal Code once read: “The offence of
burglary is constituted by entering a house by force, threats, or fraud, at
night, or in like manner by entering a house during the day and
remaining concealed therein until night, with intent, in either case, to
commit a felony or the crime of theft.” Summers v. State, 9 Tex. App.
396, 396 (Tex. Ct. App. 1880).
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without authority. This failure to require felonious intent at
some point, and instead only to focus on whether a
substantive offense is actually committed, is a departure
from historical antecedents.18
There is a further distinction, which is crucial to the
discussion here. Section (a)(1) explicitly states that it
covers entry into “a building other than a habitation (or any
portion thereof) not open to the public,” but section (a)(3)
provides only that it covers “a building.” 19 This seems an
odd difference. Why would the statute limit burglary by
entry with felonious intent to certain buildings (those “not
open to the public”), while not similarly limiting burglary
by entry followed by an attempted felony to those
buildings? Yet there is that difference in the language
which forms the basis of the prosecution’s argument in
these cases, allowing so-called “Wal-Mart burglaries” to be
brought under section (a)(3) even though they would be
categorically impossible under section (a)(1).20
Alternatively, is it possible to interpret section
(a)(3) as covering the same structures as section (a)(1) by
arguing that “a building” in section (a)(3) is merely a
shorthand reference to the full phrase set out in section
(a)(1)? To give an analogy, a newspaper might refer
initially to “Mr. John Edward Smith,” but on subsequent
references merely state “Mr. Smith,” with there being no
doubt that it is the same individual as previously identified.
Has the legislature here merely done the same thing,
assuming that the subsequent provisions will be construed
as coextensive with the first one with respect to the
structures covered? Can we contend that the difference in
the language of section (a)(3) was intended merely to
18

Compare TENN. CODE 1932, § 10910, with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–
14–402 (2016).
19
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39–14–402(a)(1), 39–14–402(a)(3) (2016).
20
Section (a)(2) also does not contain the “not open to the public”
language. TENN. CODE ANN. §39–14–402(a)(2) (2016).
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streamline the statute and was never intended to have a
substantive effect?
In arguing that this latter approach is indeed the
correct way to read the statute, we turn first to the tangled
history of the Tennessee burglary statute. Or, rather, for
reasons that will become clear, we begin with the history of
the Texas burglary statute. Hopefully, this historical
excursion will show how penal laws actually get made and
will cast doubt on the position that the difference in
language has ever been viewed, by its initial drafters or
subsequent reviewers and adopters, as being of particular
substantive importance.
III. History of the Current Tennessee Burglary Statute
A. Development of the Texas Burglary Statute
1. Initial Proposal and Discussion
The Texas Committee on Revision of the Penal
Code21 met on November 3, 1967, where they discussed,
among other things, the proposed burglary statute of
Newell Blakely, former dean of the University of Houston
Law Center. That draft stated:
A person is guilty of burglary if
(a) he enters a building or occupied
structures with intent to commit a felony
or theft (THEREIN) at a time when the
building or occupied structure is not
21

The Legislative Reference Library of Texas has provided online a
rich selection materials relating to the revision of the penal code. See
generally
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY OF TEXAS,
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/collections/
PenalCodeIntro.cfm (last visited July 25, 2016).
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open to the public and the actor is not
licensed or privileged to enter;
(b) he remains concealed in a building or
occupied structure with intent to commit
a felony or theft (THEREIN) at a time
when the building or occupied structure
is not open to the public and the actor is
not licensed or privileged to remain; or
(c) he enters or remains concealed in a
building or occupied structure at a time
when the building of [sic] occupied
structure is not open to the public and
the actor is not licensed or privileged to
enter or remain and commits or attempts
to commit a felony or theft
(THEREIN).22
The minutes of that meeting indicate that there was
discussion of section (c); in particular, the expansion
beyond the common law in section (c) to cover situations of
the commission of crimes in buildings without reference to
any burglarious intent at the time of entry:
The committee next turned to Sec.
221.1(1)(c). This sub–division was intended
to deal with the man who develops his
criminal state of mind subsequent to his
entry. Judge Brown said that he was
confused about the difference between (b)
and (c). The difference is that under (b) the
actor enters the building or structure at a
time when it is open to the public, and
remains concealed therein with the intent to
22

Minutes of November 3, 1967 meeting at
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/collections/Penal_Code_Minutes.
pdf#page=104 (last visited July 25, 2016).

129–30,
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commit a felony or theft, and under (c) he
enters the building at a time when it is not
open to the public or remains concealed in it
when it is not open to the public but
develops his intent to commit a felony or
theft subsequent to his entry or concealment.
There was some question about whether
both (b) and (c) were necessary. Judge
Roberts pointed out that under (b) the actor
remains concealed with the requisite intent,
and the state is not required to prove that he
did anything, but under (c), the actor enters
or remains concealed without criminal
intent, but later he either commits or
attempts to commit a felony or theft.
The committee agreed that both (b) and (c) ought to be left
in Sec. 221.1(1).23
Mr. Blakely also raised another issue relating to
consent. As the notes indicate, there was discussion of
several hypotheticals (which will be referred to again later
in this analysis):
Mr. Blakely said that at the time he wanted
to raise the problem under Sec. 211.1(1)(a),
which says, “he enters a building or
occupied structure with intent to commit a
felony or theft at a time when the building or
occupied structure is not open to the public
and the actor is not licensed or privileged to
enter.” It is Dean Keeton’s [long-time dean
Id. at 135. The discussion of the situation of a “shoplifter” in these
minutes is confusing, given that the proposal at that point in time
included the provision “not open to the public” with reference to all
kinds of burglary. Id.
23
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of the University of Texas Law School]
position that a person is never licensed or
privileged to enter with the intent to commit
a crime; in other words, a license or
privilege is always limited to the purpose
stated or implied, or at least some legitimate
purpose. Mr. Blakely thought it necessary to
include the language “and the actor is not
licensed or privileged to enter” because it
would cover the case or [sic] a person who
has his brother-in-law visiting him for a few
days and one night the brother-in-law goes
down town and then decides to go back and
steal from his brother-in-law’s house. When
he comes back and goes in the house he
does not upset anyone because they are
expecting him. Mr. Blakely did not think the
brother-in-law ought to be guilty of burglary
upon his entry. He is not disturbing anyone
and disturbance of habitation is the basic
rational for burglary.
Dean Keeton and Mr. Blakely
disagreed on the substance. Mr. Blakely did
not want the brother-in-law to be guilty of
burglary when he entered, but Dean Keeton
did. Judge Brown pointed out that there are
many cases in his court where a person gains
entry into a house on the pretext of using the
telephone, but commits a theft while the
occupant is in another part of the house.
Dean Keeton brought up the problem
of a servant. He asked Mr. Blakely whether
a servant who broke in at night would be
guilty of burglary. Mr. Blakely said he
would if he were not licensed to enter at
night. Mr. Blakely said, however, that the
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special protection offered by the burglary
statute has no place in cases where the
occupant expects the actor to enter. Judge
Brown disagreed. Mr. Blakely pointed out
that under Dean Keeton’s theory a man
would be guilty of burglary upon entering
his own house if, while away from home, he
decided to go home and kill his wife. Mr.
Blakely pointed out the case of the
shoplifter. A shoplifter often intends to steal
at the time he enters the store and he walks
in and he picks up something. Mr. Blakely
questioned whether or not a shoplifter
should be guilty of burglary just because he
made up his mind before entering the store.
Dean Keeton said the question was
whether a person who had a privilege by law
or a reason to be there should be guilty of
burglary because under the circumstances of
the particular case he intended to commit an
offense or whether he should simply be
prosecuted for the offense he committed. He
said that at that point he was pretty much
disposed to agree with Mr. Blakely’s
position on the substance, but that the draft
did not say what Mr. Blakely wanted it to
say.
Mr. Daugherty said he thought the
maid who has the right to come in and out of
the house all of the time ought not be guilty
of burglary when she enters with the intent
to commit theft. Dean Keeton called for a
vote and the committee agreed that people
such as servants, firemen, and policemen
who ordinarily would have a legitimate
reason for entering, but who by
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happenstance on a particular occasion enter
with the intent to commit a crime, should
not be guilty of burglary. The draft will have
to be worded some way to take care of that
problem.24
2. 1970 Memorandum
In July 1970, the staff of the Penal Code Revision
Project sent a memorandum to the State Bar Committee
with a variety of suggestions regarding different sections of
the proposed draft. As to burglary, the staff offered two
suggestions. First, it suggested the phrase “without the
owner’s effective consent” be substituted for “without
license or privilege.”25
Intriguingly, the Committee offered the following
comment as to the third subsection, which was now
denominated subsection (a)(3). It wrote: “The staff
recommends deleting Subsection (a)(3). It is not in present
Texas law, no other revising state has included it, and the
staff cannot imagine a single example of its application.”26
3. Final Draft and Comments
In October 1970, the State Bar Committee on the
Revision of the Penal Code issued its “Final Draft,” 27 but it

24

Id. at 136–37.
Memorandum from the Texas Penal Code Revision Project to the
State Bar Committee on Revision of Penal Code; Observers; Law
Enforcement Advisory Committee; Advisory Committee on
Corrections;
Reporters
223
(Jul.
13,
1970),
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/collections/Penal_Code_Minutes.pdf#page=4
35.
26
Id.
27
See generally STATE BAR COMM. ON REVISION OF THE PENAL
CODE, TEXAS PENAL CODE: A PROPOSED REVISION (October 1970),
25
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did not heed the suggestion of the staff memo to simply
remove (a)(3). The proposal included, as section 30.02
(“Burglary”), the following:
(a) An individual or corporation commits
burglary if, without the effective consent
of the property owner:
(1) he enters a habitation, or a
building (or any portion of a
building) not open to the public,
with intent to commit a felony
or theft; or
(2) he remains concealed, with intent
to commit a felony or theft, in a
building or habitation; or
(3) he enters a building or habitation
and commits or attempts to
commit a felony or theft.
(b) For purposes of this section, “enter”
means:

http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/collections/Texas_Penal_Code_1970.pdf
(last visited July 25, 2016). The foreword states:
Committee meetings convened to consider reports, of
which there have been 20 to date, lasted at least a day
and a half, and sometimes two days; at the meetings
committee members subjected the reports and
reporters to a grueling review that often resulted in
substantial revision of the draft statutes proposed.
Meeting discussions were tape-recorded and minutes
of the meeting prepared summarizing the discussion
and setting out the revisions directed by the
committee. Finally, detailed explanatory comments
were prepared for each approved section of the draft
code.
Id. at viii.
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(1) intrusion of any part of the body;
or
(2) intrusion of any physical object
connected with the body.
(c) Burglary is a felony of the second degree
unless it was committed in a habitation,
in which event it is a felony of the first
degree.28
As to sections (a)(1) and (a)(2), the document listed its
derivation as from a Wisconsin Statute, a Minnesota
Statute, and the Texas Penal Code. 29 As derivation for
section (a)(3), it stated merely: “New,” reflecting that this
was an innovation without precedent. 30 The Committee
Comment began by stating:
With this code’s addition of a general
criminal trespass offense, Section 30.03, and
a general attempt offense, Section 15.01, all
conduct covered by the various burglary
offenses in present law is punishable as a
trespass, as an attempt if the offense
intended is not completed, or as the intended
completed offense. Thus burglary as a
separate offense could be eliminated without
eliminating penal sanctions for any conduct
now criminal. A separate burglary offense,
however, does perform an important
criminological function in addition to its
trespassory [sic.] and attempt functions; it
protects against intrusion in places where
people, because of the special nature of the
place, expect to be free from intrusion. The
28

Id. at 203.
Id.
30
Id.
29
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provision of this protection is the rationale
underlying Section 30.02.31
The Comments noted that “[t]he types of intrusions made
burglarious . . . are more varied than in present law,” as it
covers instruments and discharge of missiles into
buildings.32 It also notes that “[m]ore significant[ly],” there
is a “change in the manner and time an intrusion must be
made,” as distinctions between day and night intrusions
have been removed.33 The Comments continued, referring
to those hypotheticals discussed above:
The concept of effective consent makes
burglarious not only intrusions without
consent but also those made with apparent
consent if given because of force, threat, or
fraud, if given by one whom the actor knows
lacks capacity to consent, or if given to
detect the commission of an offense . . . .
This concept broadens burglary to cover, for
example, one who enters through an open
door, held not a burglarious entry in Milton
v. State, 6 S.W. 303 (Tex. Ct. App. 1887), or
one who enters with consent of the owner or
law enforcement officers given to detect an
offense, held not burglary in Speiden v.
State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 156 (1877). As in
present law, however, one who, with intent
to commit a felony or theft, enters a building
open to the public or otherwise has consent
to enter, such as a servant or brother-in-law,
commits no burglary and can be prosecuted
only for the commission or attempted
31

Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 204.
33
Id.
32
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commission of the offense he intended,
unless he remains concealed after consent to
his presence has terminated. Private offices
and other portions of a building not open to
the public are covered, however; one who
enters a storeroom closed to the public in a
store otherwise open to the public (with the
requisite intent) commits burglary.34
The Comments then discuss sections (a)(2)
and (a)(3) specifically:
The
concealment
feature,
Section
30.02(a)(2), is derived from present law,
Penal Code arts. 1389, 1391, and covers, for
example, one who, with the requisite intent,
enters a business while it is open to the
public and hides until it closes. Section
30.02(a)(3) includes as burglary the conduct
of one who enters without effective consent
but, lacking intent to commit any crime
upon his entry, subsequently forms that
intent and commits or attempts a felony or
theft. This provision dispenses with the need
to prove intent at the time of entry when the
actor is caught in the act.35
There was no explanation, nor indeed any
acknowledgment, of the change between the 1967 proposal
and this one; the removal of the specification that section
(a)(2) and section (a)(3), like section (a)(1), applied only to
buildings not open to the public.36
34

Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 205.
36
Indeed, the discussion of section (a)(2) directly referred to the “not
open to the public” criterion. Id. at 205.
35
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4. Subsequent Legislative Action in Texas
A bill was introduced into the Texas legislature
encompassing a variation on this proposal. As to burglary,
its language was the same as the proposed language, with
the exception that section (a)(3) was revised to read “a
habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not
open to the public . . . .” 37 This bill died a quick death,
however, and was tabled in May 1971, with the legislature
instead proposing a committee to “study and educate the
public in the proposed revision of the Texas Penal Code . . .
.”38
After a period of additional study and coordination,
in 1973, another attempt was made, and a bill was signed
by the Texas Governor on June 14, 1973.39 The language as
to burglary was very close to that of the 1970 proposal. 40
B. Development of the Tennessee Burglary Statute
1. Law Revision Commission
In the same time period, the Tennessee legislature
also began considering changes to the state’s criminal law.
37

Tex. H. B. 419, 1971 Leg., 62nd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1971),
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/billSearch/text.cfm?
legSession=620&billtypeDetail=HB&billNumberDetail=419&billSuffi
xDetail=&startRow=1&IDlist=&unClicklist=&number=100
(last
visited July 25, 2016).
38
Tex. H.C.R. 184, 1971 Leg., 62nd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1971). To be
clear, there is no reason to think that the burglary sections were the
cause of the failure of the proposal.
39
Tex. S. B. 34, 1973 Leg., 63rd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973),
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/billSearch/BillDetails.cfm?
legSession=63–
0&billtypeDetail=SB&billNumberDetail=34&billSuffixDetail=&startR
ow=1&IDlist=&unClicklist=&number=100 (last visited July 25, 2016).
40
See id.
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The State of Tennessee Law Revision Commission was
created in 1963 as an independent research agency of the
state, composed of nine attorneys serving staggered
terms.41 It surveyed the existing state criminal law as well
as that of other jurisdictions.42 A rough draft of a proposed
code was prepared based on the Illinois criminal law. 43 The
Commission then decided, however, that it needed a
“model . . . that was more compatible with the particular
needs of Tennessee.”44 It therefore settled on the Proposed
Revision of the Texas Penal Code, which had been
published in 1970, which served as the “organizational
backbone” of the Law Revision Commissions draft.45 The
Law Revision Commission published its Proposed Final
Draft in November 1973.46
With respect to the burglary statute, at least, the
1970 Texas proposal was followed very closely. 47
LAW REVISION COMM’N, TENNESSEE CRIMINAL CODE AND CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT vii (1973).
42
See generally Floyd Dennis, Project Attorney, “Work Document 39–
6(1) Criminal Code (Substantive), 39–6 Offenses Against Property”
(surveying statutes in various jurisdictions).
43
LAW REVISION COMM’N, CRIMINAL CODE: TENTATIVE DRAFT ii
(1972).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See generally LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 42.
47
When compared to the 1970 Texas draft, the Tennessee Law
Revision Commission proposal presented few changes: (1) a change
from “individual or corporation” to “individual, corporation, or
association”; (2) a change from “a habitation, or a building (or any
portion thereof) not open to the public” to “a habitation or a building
other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public”;
and (3) making first-degree burglary cover only “occupied
habitation[s]” and not all habitations. Id. at 122. That is, the Law
Revision Commission proposal read:
41

(a) An individual, corporation, or association
commits burglary if, without the effective
consent of the property owner:
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Strikingly, the Law Review Commission proposal also
copied, nearly verbatim, the Comments of the Texas
proposal, with only a few emendations (such as replacing
Texas case law citations with Tennessee citations). 48 This
included the introduction about the reason for retaining a
separate burglary statute; the paragraph quoted above about
“one who, with intent to commit a felony or theft, enters a
building open to the public or otherwise has consent to
enter, such as a servant or brother–in–law, commits no
burglary”; and the explanation of section (a)(3) stating that
it “dispenses with the need to prove intent at the time of
entry when the actor is caught in the act.”49
Copies of an initial draft of the Law Revision
Commission proposal were distributed to over 1000
“interested Tennesseans,” and the proposed final draft was
(1) he enters a habitation, or a building (or
any portion of a building) not open to
the public, with intent to commit a felony
or theft; or
(2) he remains concealed, with intent to
commit a felony or theft, in a building or
habitation; or
(3) he enters a building or habitation and
commits or attempts to commit a felony or
theft.
(b) For purposes of this section, “enter” means:
(1) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(2) intrusion of any physical object connected
with the body.
(c) Burglary is a felony of the second degree unless
it was committed in an occupied habitation, in
which event it is a felony of the first degree.
Id.
48
Compare id. at 124, with STATE BAR COMM. ON REVISION OF THE
PENAL CODE, supra note 28, at 206.
49
Id. The only significant changes in the comments were the addition
of several sentences about self-propelled vehicles as habitations and the
deletion of a short paragraph stating that a “claim of right defense to
theft” is also a defense to burglary. Id.
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sent to all subscribers to the Tennessee Code Annotated for
feedback. 50 In 1973, the legislature appointed a special
committee to review these efforts and to report to the
General Assembly. 51 Meetings between this committee and
the Law Revision Commission were held, as were public
hearings.52 The Law Revision Commission identified one
primary argument against the revision: claims that “the
lawyers and judges in Tennessee could not cope with so
massive a change in the criminal statutes.” 53 For whatever
reason, the criminal code was not revised at that time.
2. Sentencing Commission
Some fifteen years later, efforts began again and
this time met with success. In the late 1980s, the Tennessee
Criminal Code was comprehensively revised based on the
research and submission of the Tennessee Sentencing
Commission, which drafted a proposed new code, drawing
on the work of the Law Revision Commission. 54 In
particular, the Sentencing Commission’s 1989 Proposed
Criminal Code included the following definition of
burglary, which closely followed the Law Revision
Commission’s proposal (although limiting it to “a person”
and not a corporation or association):
Section 39–14–402. Burglary.
(a) a person commits burglary who, without
the effective consent of the property
owner:
STATE OF TENN. LAW REVISION COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
89TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON CRIMINAL LAW REVISION 10 (1975).
51
Id. at 11.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 11.
54
See generally TENNESSEE SENTENCING COMM’N, PROPOSED REVISED
CRIMINAL CODE (1989).
50
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(1) Enters a habitation, or a building
other than a habitation (or any
portion thereof) not open to the
public, with intent to commit a
felony or theft; or
(2) Remains concealed, with the
intent to commit a felony or
theft, in a building or habitation;
or
(3) Enters a building or habitation
and commits or attempts to
commit a felony or theft.
(4) Enters any freight or passenger
car, automobile, truck, trailer or
other motor vehicle with intent to
commit a felony or theft.
(b) For purposes of this section, “enter”
means:
(1) Intrusion of any part of the body;
or
(2) Intrusion of any object in
physical contact with the body or
any object controlled by remote
control, electronic or otherwise.
(c) Burglary under Section (a)(1), (2) and (3)
is a class D felony unless it was
committed in an occupied habitation, in
which event it is a class C felony.
Burglary under section (a)(4) is a Class
E felony.55
The Comments to the 1989 Proposed Criminal Code
explained the primary changes, again copying nearly
verbatim the commentary attached to the 1970 Texas
55

Id. at 153–54.
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proposal that was then included in the Law Revision
Commission draft.56 This included the key paragraph:
As in present law, however, one who, with
intent to commit a felony or theft, enters a
building open to the public or otherwise has
consent to enter, such as a servant or
brother–in–law, commits no burglary and
can be prosecuted only for the commission
or attempted commission of the offense
intended, unless the offender remains
concealed after consent to his or her
presence has terminated.57
It also included an explanation of the purpose of the
innovation of section (a)(3):
Subsection (a)(3) includes as burglary the
conduct of one who enters without effective
consent but, lacking intent to commit any
crime at the time of the entry, subsequently
forms that intent and commits or attempts a
felony or theft. This provision dispenses
with the need to prove intent at the time of
entry . . . .58
3. Enacted Version
Consequently, the legislature enacted in 1989 the
recommendation of the Sentencing Commission. 59 The
enactment of the burglary statute followed the Sentencing
Commission’s 1989 proposal, except that in section (c) it
56

See id. at 154–57.
Id. at 156.
58
Id.
59
1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 6.
57

104

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 105
removed the word “occupied.”60 Aggravated burglary was
defined as “burglary of a habitation,” and punished as a
Class C felony, as set forth in section 39–14–403. 61
Especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, was
burglary of “a habitation or building other than a
habitation,” where the victim suffered serious bodily injury,
as set forth in section 39–14–404.62

60

The language thus read:
Section 39–14–402. Burglary.
(a) a person commits burglary who, without the
effective consent of the property owner:
(1) Enters a habitation, or a building other
than a habitation (or any portion
thereof) not open to the public, with
intent to commit a felony or theft; or
(2) Remains concealed, with the intent to
commit a felony or theft, in a building
or habitation; or
(3) Enters a building or habitation and
commits or attempts to commit a felony
or theft; or
(4) Enters any freight or passenger car,
automobile, truck, trailer or other motor
vehicle with intent to commit a felony
or theft.
(b) For purposes of this section, “enter” means:
(1) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(2) Intrusion of any object in physical
contact with the body or any object
controlled by remote control, electronic
or otherwise.
(c) Burglary under Section (a)(1), (2) and (3) is a class D
felony if the burglary was committed in a building other
than a habitation. Burglary under section (a)(4) is a
Class E felony.

1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1223.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1224.
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4. 1990 Modification
A year later, the legislature amended the burglary
statutes to distinguish habitation burglary from building
burglary.63 After these amendments, building burglary was
covered by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39–14–402;
habitation burglary was covered by section 403; and
burglary with serious bodily injury was covered by section
404. There were no other substantive changes made.
5. 1995 Update
Five years later, in 1995, the legislature again made
a few minor changes to the statute to produce its final
form. 64 This change consisted of two relatively minor
alterations from the prior version of the statute: (1) it
changed the language from “felony or theft” to “felony,
theft or assault” throughout; and (2) it made two changes to
subsection (4) (adding “boat, airplane” and adding “or
commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or
assault”). 65 Section 39–14–402 has remained unchanged
since 1995.
IV. Discussion of Interpretation of Statute
A. How Should We Consider the Information
Regarding the Development of the Burglary
Statute?
The United States Supreme Court has recently
emphasized that, while the precise language of a statute is
certainly not to be disregarded, it is not the only relevant

63

1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts, 704–05.
1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 879.
65
Id.
64
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criterion for construction. 66 While language may seem, on
its face, to be “plain,” ambiguity may arise when that
language is considered in context:
If the statutory language is plain, we must
enforce it according to its terms. But
oftentimes the “meaning—or ambiguity—of
certain words or phrases may only become
evident when placed in context.” So when
deciding whether the language is plain, we
must read the words “in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Our duty, after all, is “to
construe statutes, not isolated provisions.”67
Here, where the language of the burglary statute at
least poses some questions of interpretation, it is necessary
to consider both the overall structure of the statute, as well
as its legislative history. 68
The burglary statute differs from ordinary
legislation in several respects. First, and this is perhaps not
unusual, it was but a small part of a large piece of
legislation—the comprehensive re–writing of the entire
criminal code for the state. The legislators who voted on
the adoption of the criminal code may not have thought
much about the burglary section, if indeed they considered
it at all. Second, it was copied wholesale from a proposed
code of another state. Because of this, it is not clear that
anyone in Tennessee actually considered the precise
wording of the burglary statute on this point. Nothing is
66

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citations omitted).
Id.
68
State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000) (“Provisions of
the criminal code should be ‘construed according to the fair import of
their terms, including reference to judicial decisions and common law
interpretations, to promote justice, and effect the objectives of the
criminal code.’”).
67
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necessarily wrong with this, but it does complicate
questions of legislative “intent.”
There is another way, however, that this differs
from ordinary legislation in a helpful fashion. In preparing
the draft for consideration by the legislature, the Sentencing
Commission published copious commentary explaining
various goals and considerations. To be sure, this
commentary was (at least as to the burglary statute) copied
almost verbatim from the Texas code, but it was
nonetheless published and available to the legislature at the
time the revised code was enacted. The Court of Criminal
Appeals has considered the comments attached to the
proposed revised code to be relevant to determining
“legislative intent,” given that they were “available to the
96th General Assembly prior to the enactment.” 69 Thus,
while as a practical matter no one in Tennessee may have
focused on this point, and the votes of the legislators almost
certainly were not driven with these concerns in mind, we
can use the comments included in the proposed criminal
code as a persuasive interpretive guide to the statute. It may
be something of a fiction, but it is a convenient and useful
one that allows us to go beyond the mere words of the
statute to an explanation of its purpose and the
understanding of its proponents.
B. What Is the Purpose of Section (a)(3)?
Based on this history, and in particular, the
comments to the 1989 Proposed Criminal Code, we can try
to address two primary questions.
First, why does section (a)(3) exist? The short
answer is that it exists because several people in Texas
thought it was an important addition to the law of burglary
69

State v. Levandowski, No. 03C01–9503–CR–00076, 1996 WL
315807, at *7, *8 n.13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 1996), aff'd, 955
S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1997).
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and because, when the Tennessee Sentencing Commission
decided to copy the Texas Penal Code, no one in Tennessee
decided to take it out. The germ of section (a)(3) came in
the 1967 Texas draft, where it was ostensibly offered to
deal with the situation of a defendant who entered a
building not open to the public and who developed the
intent to commit the felony after the initial entry. 70 There
was initial confusion amongst the Texas drafters as to
whether this constituted an addition to the other available
prongs of burglary. 71 Indeed, by 1970, the staff of the
Texas Penal Code Revision Project specifically contended
that this provision was not in the present law, had not been
adopted by other states, and it “[could not] imagine a single
example of its application.”72 This initial proposal had no
difference in the language between the different sections, as
all required that the building not be open to the public.
Despite this criticism, this section remained in the
1970 Texas proposal, under the now-familiar streamlined
language “enters a building or habitation and commits or
attempts to commit a felony or theft.” 73 The comments
noted that this is a novel provision, and went on to suggest
that the purpose of section (a)(3) is primarily an evidentiary
one: “This provision dispenses with the need to prove
intent at the time of entry when the actor is caught in the
act.” 74 This is a reasonable purpose—it hardly seems
appropriate that a defendant could evade conviction for a
burglary charge after, say, breaking into a house and
stealing valuables by arguing that he developed the
intention of stealing the valuables only after he had broken
into the house. The Tennessee Sentencing Commission
70

See Minutes, supra note 22.
Id. at 135.
72
Memorandum, supra note 26, at 440.
73
STATE BAR COMM. ON REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, supra note 28,
at 222.
74
Id. at 224.
71
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copied this provision and also the commentary, indicating
that it, too, believed that section (a)(3) solved this limited
problem of reducing the burdens on the prosecution in
those cases where the defendant had actually committed an
offense (and had not merely been intending to commit an
offense).75
C. Why Does Section (a)(3) Say Only “A Building”
and Not “Not Open to the Public”?
Second, there is the question of why (a)(3) does not
use the qualifier “not open to the public.” That is, why is
different language used in (a)(1) than in (a)(3)? On this
point, one must acknowledge the ordinary principle of
statutory interpretation that legislature is presumed to
choose its words with care, and that a decision to include or
exclude words must have been done for some reason. As
the Tennessee Supreme Court has written:
A basic rule of statutory construction is that
the legislature is presumed to use each word
in a statute deliberately, and that the use of
each word conveys some intent and has a
specific
meaning
and
purpose . . . .
Consequently, where the legislature includes
particular language in one section of the
statute but omits it in another section of the
same act, it is presumed that the legislature
acted purposefully in including or excluding
that particular subject.76

Compare id., with TENNESSEE SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 55,
at 156 (1989) (“This provision dispenses with the need to prove intent
at the time of entry.”).
76
Bryant v. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., 33 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn.
2000) (citations omitted).
75
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Here, the history is totally silent on this drafting
decision. The initial 1967 Texas draft, in fact, did contain
such language, making this third section coextensive with
the first section as to the structures covered. 77 The 1970
Texas final draft, however, did not, and it was that draft
which was copied by the Tennessee versions.78 (Strangely,
the failed 1971 bill in Texas re-introduced such language,
but it disappeared again by the time of the enacted 1973
law).79 There is no indication in the commentary that there
was any reason for this exclusion. That is, there is no
acknowledgment that, due to this fact, section (a)(3)
potentially covers different structures than section (a)(1),
nor is there any explanation for why that is the case.
Several pieces of evidence support the conclusion
that section (a)(3) was not intended, and should not be
interpreted, to cover a broader range of buildings than
(a)(1). First, the fact that the purpose of section (a)(3) was
an evidentiary one—to make it easier to prove the case
when a defendant was caught red-handed—supports a
narrow interpretation of section (a)(3). If section (a)(3) was
intended to make it easier to prove cases that otherwise
would be brought under section (a)(1), then there is no
reason for section (a)(3) to cover a different set of
structures (entry into buildings open to the public) than
section (a)(1) does.
Second, to the extent that the comments addressed
the issue, there seems to be no understanding that section
(a)(3) could be interpreted to cover different places than
section (a)(1). On the contrary, the comments assume that it
should not be interpreted in such a manner. As noted above,
the introductory commentary, in explaining the reason why
77

Minutes, supra note 22.
STATE BAR COMM. ON REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, supra note 28,
at 203.
79
Compare Tex. H. B. 419, 1971 Leg., 62nd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1971)
with Tex. S. B. 34, 1973 Leg., 63rd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
78
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there even should be a burglary statute, included the
explanation that burglary “protects against intrusion in
places where people, because of the special nature of the
place, expect to be free from intrusion. The provision of
this protection is the rationale underlying this section.” 80
This hardly evidences any understanding that, because of
the way section (a)(3) is phrased, it can be interpreted
potentially to cover all buildings and not just habitations
and private buildings. A Wal-Mart can hardly be
considered a place with a “special nature” of privacy. If, as
stated, that is the purpose of the burglary statute,
interpreting it to cover buildings open to the general public
does not further that purpose.
The third important piece of evidence on this issue
comes from the language of the comments to the 1989
Proposed Code quoted above (again, language first
included in the 1970 Texas draft and then adopted by the
Law Review Commission and the Sentencing
Commission):
As in present law, however, one who, with
intent to commit a felony or theft, enters a
building open to the public or otherwise has
consent to enter, such as a servant or
brother-in-law, commits no burglary and can
be prosecuted only for the commission or
attempted commission of the offense
intended, unless the offender remains
concealed after consent to his or her
presence has terminated.81
Read carefully, this passage states that one who enters “a
building open to the public” and commits a theft offense

80
81

TENNESSEE SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 55, at 154.
Id. at 156.
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“commits no burglary” and can be convicted only of theft. 82
Crucially, it does not say that such a person can be
convicted only under section (a)(3); it says, rather, that that
person cannot be convicted of burglary at all. 83 This
provides strong support for the conclusion that the drafters
of this provision did not intend for the statute to be (and,
indeed, did not realize that it might be) interpreted to cover
buildings that are open to the public.
D. The Balance of the Evidence Supports the
Conclusion that Section (a)(3) Applies Only to
Buildings Not Open to the Public. Any
Lingering Doubt Should be Removed by the
Rule of Lenity.
The situation of this statute on this point can thus be
summed up as follows: (1) it is a statute subject to multiple
interpretations; (2) one such interpretation (the
prosecution’s interpretation) is more consistent with
ordinary interpretation of the statutory language, because it
treats a difference in language between two sections as
being intentional and meaningful; (3) the prosecution’s
interpretation, however, produces a contrast in the statute
that makes little or no policy sense; (4) there is no
indication in the explanatory commentary that the drafters
intended to produce this differential treatment and enlarge
the statute beyond its stated purpose; and (5) there are
82

Id.
Id. Readers of these comments (in 1989 or the present) will perhaps
be puzzled as to why “servant” and “brother-in-law” were used as
examples. As noted above, those examples relate to questions asked in
the first committee discussion of the earliest Texas draft and relate to
specific factual scenarios. Minutes, supra note 22, at 136–37. The fact
that these examples remained in the commentary long after their
context disappeared certainly suggests that there was no thoroughgoing consideration of the commentary by the Law Revision
Commission or the Sentencing Commission.
83
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strong indications through the commentary that the drafters
believed that burglary was categorically unavailable for a
building “open to the public.”
How, then, should this situation be resolved? The
principles of statutory interpretation support the conclusion
that, although the language of the statute is important, that
language should not be used to support an irrational
conclusion, particularly where that conclusion is
completely in contrast to the overall structure and
legislative history. To adopt the prosecution’s interpretation
here would be to elevate a minor difference in phrasing to
produce an outcome at odds with all of the lengthy
commentary regarding the statute and unjustified by any
policy purpose. The better interpretation is that the
limitation “not open to the public” should be applied to
section (a)(3) as well as section (a)(1).
Further, if there is any lingering doubt, that doubt
must be resolved in favor of the defendant under the rule of
lenity.84 That doctrine is “rooted in fundamental principles
of due process which mandate that no individual be forced
to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his or her
conduct is prohibited.” 85 “[T]o ensure that a legislature
speaks with special clarity when marking the boundaries of
criminal conduct, courts must decline to impose
punishment for actions that are not ‘plainly and
unmistakably’ proscribed.” 86 Where there is ambiguity or
uncertainty in defining a statue, the rule of lenity requires
the ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the defendant. As
the Supreme Court has explained:
State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 768 (Tenn. 2014) (“[T]he ‘rule of
lenity’ requires the ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the
defendant.”).
85
State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 137–38 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting
State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tenn. 2010)).
86
Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112–13 (1979) (citing United
States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917)).
84
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In various ways over the years, we have
stated that “when choice has to be made
between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate,
before we choose the harsher alternative, to
require that Congress should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite.”87
Even more pertinently, the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals has written:
[W]hen the fair import of the language of a
penal statute, in the context of the legislative
history and case law on the subject, still
results in ambiguity, the rule of strict
construction would apply to limit the
statute’s application to those persons or
circumstances clearly described by the
statute.88
That language from Horton—where the “language”
of a statute, in the “context of the legislative history and
case law,” provides an ambiguity—applies perfectly to this
situation.89 Here, where there are substantial arguments on
87

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (citation omitted).
State v. Horton, 880 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
89
Id. Sadly, the “rule of lenity” is one that is frequently cited but
seldom applied. Since 1990, there have been roughly fifty appellate
cases that have used the word “lenity” in Tennessee. The majority of
these relate to the single issue of how to define the unit of prosecution.
See, e.g., State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 543 (Tenn. 2012) (“Courts
apply the ‘rule of lenity’ when resolving unit-of-prosecution claims . . .
.”). On several occasions the courts have cited the rule of lenity not as a
tie-breaker but rather as a final supporting argument, after essentially
appearing to resolve the issues on other grounds. See, e.g., State v.
Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that the rule of
lenity supports the conclusion that insurer was not a “victim” for
restitution purposes); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn. 1996)
88
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both sides, it is ultimately unnecessary to decide exactly
which side slightly wins the debate. If the rule of lenity is
to be taken seriously, 90 to be used not merely as a last resort
in those exceedingly rare (if not imaginary) situations of
exact equipoise, it should apply here. 91 Unless legislative
(stating that the rule of lenity supports the conclusion that the court
must instruct on non-statutory mitigating factors); State v. Edmondson,
No. M2005–01665–CCA–R3CD, 2006 WL 1994534, at *5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. July 18, 2006), aff'd, 231 S.W.3d 925 (Tenn. 2007) (stating
that carjacking must occur in the presence of a victim); Horton, 880
S.W.2d at 736 (stating that rule of lenity supports a logical reading of
multiple offender statute).
In only five cases can it be said that the rule of lenity actually
contributed significantly to the resolution of the case. See Hawkins, 406
S.W.3d at 137 (applying the rule of lenity to a claim that the
defendant’s tossing a shotgun over a fence constituted concealing
evidence); Marshall, 319 S.W.3d at 563 (applying the rule of lenity to
the theft of services statute); State v. Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d 603,
605 (Tenn. 1997) (stating that the false report statute does not cover
responses to inquiries); State v. Magness, 165 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2004) (applying the rule of lenity to the weight of
methamphetamine); State v. Conway, 77 S.W.3d 213, 224 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2001) (applying the rule of lenity to the interpretation of the tenyear look-back period for prior D.U.I. offenses). Of these, arguably
only Conway and Hawkins really turn on the rule of lenity.
90
See John L. Diamond, Reviving Lenity and Honest Belief at the
Boundaries of Criminal Law, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 39 (2010)
(“The lenity doctrine should not be viewed as an obsolete historical
anachronism nor restricted to grievously ambiguous language, but
should instead allow courts to engage the other two branches of
government to better insure that a prosecution is with notice, fairly
applied, and consistent with legislative intent.”).
91
Strangely, in two cases between the years of 1999 and 2000, one
judge of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals took the position
that, after passage of the revised code, strict construction of penal
statutes is no longer required in Tennessee. State v. Kilpatrick, 52
S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (“Criminal statutes are to be
fairly interpreted, and strict construction is not required[.]”); State v.
Kendrick, 10 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (“Strict
construction is no longer required in ascertaining the meaning and
application of a penal statute[.]”). This position seems to have faded
from view.
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history and the overall structure of the statute are to be
disregarded entirely, at the very least they produce doubt
about the prosecution’s preferred interpretation which must
be resolved in favor of the defendant.92
Perhaps the easiest way to see the force of this
contention that there is a significant doubt as to the
propriety of the State’s position is not in legal, but in
practical, terms. Ever since the burglary statute was passed
in 1989, individuals have engaged in shoplifting. Likewise,
stores have banned people from entering based on prior
behavior, and people have disregarded those orders. Yet it
appears that until 2015, none of these situations were
apparently prosecuted in the state of Tennessee as burglary.
There are two possible explanations for this lack of
prosecutions. The first is that, although it was clear that this
situation constituted burglary, every elected district
attorney in the state (or their subordinates) decided to treat
these repeat shoplifters with mercy, and to not charge them
with burglary even though it was apparent that they had
committed that crime. The other possibility is that, as has
been argued herein, the application of the statute to this
situation is simply not clear. This second alternative, given
the institutional pressures on and predilections of
prosecutors, seems far more realistic. Prosecutors are not in
the business of blanket leniency. Thus, under the rule of
lenity, the state should not be able to prosecute entries into
businesses open to the public as burglary.
V. Due Process Concerns
A. Introduction
There is another issue to address as well. As noted
above, despite the fact the statute has been in effect since
92

Of course, if the legislature disagrees with this interpretation, it is
free to amend the statute.
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1989, and has existed unchanged since 1995, the spate of
prosecutions in 2015 for repeat shoplifters in Knox County
apparently constituted the first such application of the
statute to this scenario. At the very least, there are no
appellate opinions dealing with the subject and, in litigation
on the issue to date, the state has not identified any prior
uses. This, therefore, poses a serious issue of whether these
2015 prosecutions can proceed without violating principles
of fair warning.
B. Prior Decisions
There are few relevant appellate decisions in
Tennessee discussing section (a)(3). Notably, none of these
cases address the issue of whether the “open to the public”
language should apply to (a)(3).
However, there is a limited body of authority
discussing the concept of “effective consent” as it applies
to burglary. Specifically, the courts have considered the
“effective consent” aspect of the burglary statute on three
occasions. In State v. Ferguson, the defendant was charged
with burglary for entering a self-service laundromat on
three occasions and stealing money from video game
machines and a soap dispenser.93 He entered during regular
business hours when the laundromat was open for business
and unlocked. 94 He was convicted after a jury trial and
appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
against him as to whether he had “effective consent” to
enter. 95 On appeal, the State’s theory as to why the
defendant did not have effective consent was that the owner
only allowed people to enter to play video games or do

93

229 S.W.3d 312, 312–13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
Id. at 313.
95
Id. at 314.
94
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laundry, and not to commit thefts.96 The court rejected this
expansive argument, stating:
We conclude that the plain language of the
statute dictates that the Defendant had the
effective consent to enter the laundromat.
The North Main Laundry facility, which was
often unattended, was open and unlocked for
persons to enter the premises. The owners of
the laundromat were authorized to set their
business hours and supervision methods and
elected to permit entry during the hours of
5:30 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. without any specific
entry restrictions. “Effective consent” also
includes apparent consent, and we conclude
that it was apparent to a person who
approached the laundromat during the hours
it was open for business that the person had
the owner's consent to enter. The Defendant
entered the facility during these hours, and
thus the owners gave effective consent in
fact for the entry.97
As to the argument that the owners did not consent to
“loiterers or other criminal actors” entering, the court noted
that “the laundromat did not employ any type of entry
restrictions during regular business hours.” 98 Even had
there been personnel on duty, there was no reason to
believe that the defendant’s entry would have been
barred.99 The Court, therefore, reversed the conviction.100

96

Id. at 315.
Id. at 316 (footnote omitted).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 317.
97
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Similarly, in State v. Flamini, the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed a burglary conviction for lack
of evidence. 101 There, the defendant robbed a gas station
convenience store and was convicted of burglary. 102 The
court wrote:
In this case, the property in question was a
convenience store and gas station open to
the public 24 hours a day. Ms. Rutledge
testified that the store did not maintain a list
of prohibited persons and that “people just
kind of walk in and out as they please.”
Clearly, the defendant possessed the
property owner's consent to enter the store.
That he intended to commit a robbery
therein does not, in any way, alter that
consent. The record establishes that the
defendant sought dismissal of the burglary
charge on this exact basis, and after the
prosecutor asserted that the defendant's
intent to commit robbery revoked the
owner's consent, the trial court denied the
motion. The court should have granted the
motion because the prosecutor's position
was wholly untenable . . . . If the statute
were read in the manner suggested by the
prosecutor, every felony committed within a
building or habitation would also constitute
burglary. Our legislature did not intend such
a result.103

101

No. E2008–00418–CCA–R3–CD, 2009 WL 1456316 (Tenn. Crim.
App. May 26, 2009).
102
Id. at *6.
103
Id. (citations omitted).
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Finally, in State v. March, the defendant was
convicted of taking stamps and checks from a church’s
office.104 On appeal, the defendant argued that as he had
consent to enter the church at any time because his family
performed custodial duties at the church. 105 The Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that
the consent did not extend to the secure office:
Although church officials were aware that
the Defendant assisted his parents with their
duties opening and closing the church and
maintaining the premises, the Defendant
acted outside the consent granted to his
parents to enter the premises, and at least
derivatively allowed to him. He entered the
financial office and the locked file cabinet,
even though the duties performed by the
Defendant's parents with the Defendant's
assistance were not financial in nature, and
although he had no authority to write checks
on behalf of the church.106
Contrasting this evidence with the evidence presented in
Flamini and Ferguson, the court concluded:
In Ferguson, the defendant stole money
from coin-operated machines in a
laundromat, and in Flamini, the defendant
robbed the clerk at a convenience store. In
both cases, this court noted that the
businesses were open to the public when the
crimes occurred and held that the defendants
104

No. W2010–01543–CCA–R3–CD, 2012 WL 171894 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 20, 2012).
105
Id. at *6.
106
Id. at *7.
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could not be guilty of burglary because they
had effective consent to enter the businesses.
In the present case, the financial office and
secretary's office at the church were kept
locked when not in use, meaning they were
not accessible to members of the public who
attended church services or functions, unlike
the retail areas of the laundromat and
convenience store in Ferguson and Flamini.
The proof shows that access to the two
offices was limited, that the Defendant
entered them without effective consent, and
that the Defendant committed thefts from
the offices. The evidence is sufficient to
support his convictions for two counts of
burglary.107
The Court therefore affirmed the conviction.
C. Reasonable Understanding
The State’s position in these shoplifting cases
requires interpreting the statute in two specific ways. First,
as discussed at length above, it requires that section (a)(3)
be interpreted as applying even to buildings that are “open
to the public.” Second, it requires that “effective consent”
be interpreted as not applying when a business provides an
individual with a notification that he or she is not allowed
on the premises, even if those premises do not physically
restrict entry or check identification at the door. Given the
case law discussed above regarding “effective consent,”
that is not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the tenor of much
of the discussion in those cases centers on physical barriers
and whether employees check identification at the door,
which would not apply to a Wal-Mart, which has
107

Id.
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automatically opening doors and no personnel screening
out prospective customers.
D. Doctrine of Fair Warning
This situation—where an old statute has suddenly
been repurposed for new use—is one that the doctrine of
fair warning, and the related doctrine of vagueness, is
supposed to handle. As the United States Supreme Court
has explained, there is a “basic principle that a criminal
statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a
crime . . . .”108 Even more importantly, “no man shall be
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.” 109 Case law
provides, as the standard for decision, that the analysis
must be based on “a person of common intelligence.”110 As
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has summarized:
The fair warning requirement embodied in
the due process clause prohibits the states
from holding an individual criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not
have reasonably understood to be
proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 74 S. Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989
(1954). Due process requires that the law
give sufficient warning so that people may
avoid conduct which is forbidden. Rose v.
Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 96 S. Ct. 243, 46
L.Ed.2d 185 (1975).111
108

Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964).
Id. at 351 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)).
110
State v. Burkhart, 58 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Grayned
v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
111
State v. Whitehead, 43 S.W.3d 921, 928 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
109
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Similarly, the overlapping doctrine of vagueness
provides that a penal statute cannot be applied “if it fails to
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.” 112
Relying on some of the same principles covered by the fair
warning doctrine, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently
explained that under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the
Tennessee Constitution:
[A] criminal statute cannot be enforced
when it prohibits conduct “‘in terms so
vague that [persons] of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.’” Id. (quoting
Leech v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 582 S.W.2d
738, 746 (Tenn. 1979)). The primary
purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to
ensure that our statutes provide fair warning
as to the nature of forbidden conduct so that
individuals are not “held criminally
responsible for conduct which [they] could
not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617,
74 S. Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). In
evaluating whether a statute provides fair
warning, the determinative inquiry “is
whether [the] statute's ‘prohibitions are not
clearly defined and are susceptible to
different interpretations as to what conduct
is actually proscribed.’” Pickett, 211 S.W.3d
at 704 (quoting State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d
431, 447–48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)); see
112

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).
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also State v. Whitehead, 43 S.W.3d 921, 928
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).113
Finally, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals recently
wrote:
To determine whether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague, a court should
consider whether the statute's prohibitions
are not clearly defined and are thus
susceptible to different interpretations
regarding that which the statute actually
proscribes.114
Unfortunately, despite the strong language of these
cases, the doctrine is rarely actually used to prohibit
prosecutions.115 If the rule of lenity is applied sparingly in
113

State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 22–23 (Tenn. 2015); see also
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
114
Mitchell v. State, No. M2014–02298–CCA–R3–HC, 2015 WL
6542894, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2015) (citing Whitehead,
43 S.W.3d at 928).
115
See Crank, 468 S.W.3d at 23. In Crank, the Tennessee Supreme
Court explained:
[T]his Court has recognized the “inherent vagueness”
of statutory language, Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704,
and has held that criminal statutes do not have to
meet the unattainable standard of “absolute
precision,” State v. McDonald, 534 S.W.2d 650, 651
(Tenn. 1976); see also State v. Lyons, 802 S.W.2d
590, 592 (Tenn. 1990) (“The vagueness doctrine does
not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court
believes could have been drafted with greater
precision, especially in light of the inherent
vagueness of many English words.”). In evaluating a
statute for vagueness, courts may consider the plain
meaning of the statutory terms, the legislative history,
and prior judicial interpretations of the statutory
language. See Lyons, 802 S.W.2d at 592 (reviewing
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the case law, the doctrine of fair warning and void-forvagueness gets even less use. Yet, properly understood, and
if the language of these cases is to be taken seriously, it is a
perfect fit for the situation presented by these burglary
cases.
It is fair to say that individual criminal defendants
prior to late 2015 were unlikely to realize that they were
committing the crime of burglary. Even attorneys and
experienced judges quite possibly would not have
characterized this series of events as burglary (and reacted
with surprise and perplexity when such charges started
appearing). Indeed, even had an attorney researched the law
and precedent, that attorney would have reported that there
were no indications that this scenario had ever been
charged as burglary in Tennessee and would be unlikely to
be considered burglary. In that situation, the doctrine of fair
warning should prevent application of the burglary statute.

VI. Conclusion
It is not unusual for litigants to present novel and
innovative theories that, when accepted, change the
direction of the law. That is the essence of the common law
and is fully accepted as a way for the civil law to evolve. A
different set of concerns apply, however, where the
consequences include the loss of liberty. The doctrines of
prior judicial interpretations of similar statutory
language); Smith, 48 S.W.3d at 168 (“The clarity in
meaning required by due process may . . . be derived
from legislative history.”).
Id.
There is an obvious tension in these decisions. Is a person of
“common intelligence” somehow also supposed to be well-versed in
legislative history and judicial precedent?
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both lenity and fair warning protect, in slightly different
ways, an underlying notion of fairness to defendants. It
seems fundamentally unfair to punish someone, particularly
to imprison someone, for doing something that they did not
realize was wrong. It also seems fundamentally unfair to
punish someone who did something they knew was wrong
but thought was relatively minor as if they had committed a
major crime. This is the same basic instinct that rejects ex
post facto laws. 116 On either a retributive theory or a
deterrence theory of punishment, it seems crucial that an
individual realize that certain actions violate a law before
he or she can be punished for violating it.
To be sure, this insight is counterbalanced by
another principle, that “ignorance of the law is no
excuse.” 117 The resulting compromise, which is
theoretically unsatisfying but at least workable, is to focus
on whether a reasonable person would know, or at least can
know, that the law applied to this situation, or whether a
reasonable person would be uncertain. As Justice Holmes
once wrote:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will
carefully consider the text of the law before
he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a
fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if
a certain line is passed. To make the

116

Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 476 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he notion of a common-law crime is utterly anathema
today, which leads one to wonder why that is so. The obvious answer is
that we now agree with the perceptive chief justice of Connecticut, who
wrote in 1796 that common-law crimes ‘partak[e] of the odious nature
of an ex post facto law.’”).
117
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015).
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warning fair, so far as possible the line
should be clear.118
Thus, even if the state’s interpretation of the statute
is technically correct in some metaphysical sense (which,
as argued above, it is not), it would nonetheless violate of
our traditions of fair warning and lenity to impose that
interpretation on an unsuspecting defendant. Expansions of
the criminal law should happen through the orderly
legislative process, rather than through the creativity of a
prosecutor stretching well-established laws.

118

McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
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CLOSING THE CRIME VICTIMS COVERAGE GAP:
PROTECTING VICTIMS’ PRIVATE RECORDS FROM PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE FOLLOWING TENNESSEAN V. METRO
By: Daniel A. Horwitz
I. Introduction
In March of 2016, the Tennessee Supreme Court
ruled 4–1 that law enforcement’s investigative files are
categorically exempt from public disclosure under the
Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”) throughout the
pendency of a criminal case.1 The underlying lawsuit pitted
a vast media coalition spearheaded by The Tennessean
against both law enforcement officials and a rape victim
who intervened to protect her privacy interests under the
pseudonym “Jane Doe.” 2 Ultimately, the court’s holding
represented a resounding victory for law enforcement and a
significant setback for Tennessee’s news media, which lost
on every substantive claim presented.3 At present, however,
how the court’s ruling will affect crime victims’ ability to
protect their private records from public disclosure after
criminal proceedings have concluded is not yet clear.
Tennessean v. Metro represented the first occasion
that the Tennessee Supreme Court has considered when, if
ever, crime victims’ private records are protected from
public view under the TPRA. Notably, although the case’s
central holding—that law enforcement’s investigative
records are shielded from disclosure “during the pendency
of [a case’s] criminal proceedings and any collateral
challenges to any convictions”—provides some measure of
protection to crime victims, 4 significant questions remain
1

Tennessean v. Metro., 485 S.W.3d 857, 873 (Tenn. 2016).
Id. at 859.
3
Id. at 874.
4
Id. at 873.
2
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unsettled. Specifically, the court’s ruling in Tennessean
potentially establishes a three-part “coverage gap” that
creates substantial uncertainty as to whether crime victims’
private records are exempt from public disclosure in the
following instances:
(1) if their cases do not result in a plea or a
conviction;
(2) if they are not victims of a sexual
offense; or
(3) if the records that they seek to protect
from public disclosure—no matter how
personal or private in nature—are not
specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute.5
In a future case, however, the Tennessee Supreme
Court is likely to hold that these three categories of records
are exempt from disclosure under the TPRA as well.
Specifically, the court is likely to find that such records are
shielded from public view pursuant to Article I, section 35
of the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40–38–102(a)(1)—two of Tennessee’s
relatively new “victims’ rights” provisions—which
collectively establish that crime victims have legally
cognizable rights to be protected from “intimidation,”
“harassment,” “abuse,” “indignity,” and “lack of
compassion” throughout Tennessee’s justice system. 6
5

See generally id.
See Brief for Domestic and Sexual Violence Prevention Advocates as
Amici Curiae in Support of Intervenor Jane Doe and Partially in
Support of Petitioners The Tennessean, et al. at 6–37, Tennessean v.
Metro., 485 S.W.3d 857 (2016) (NO. M–2014–00524–SC–R11–CV/);
Opening Brief of Intervenor—Appellee Jane Doe at 9–26, Tennessean
v. Metro., 485 S.W.3d 857 (2016) (NO. M–2014–00524–SC–R11–CV).
6
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II. The Tennessee Public Records Act
As a general matter, all governmental records in
Tennessee are considered public records under the
Tennessee Public Records Act unless the records are
specifically exempt from disclosure by law.7 Notably, when
the TPRA was first adopted in 1957, it only provided for
two such exemptions—one for medical records of patients
in state hospitals, and another for military records involving
national and state security. 8 In the half century since,
however, the Tennessee legislature has systematically
added more than forty additional statutory exemptions to
the TPRA, rendering it one of the most exception-laden
public records statutes in the nation.9
As importantly, the TPRA has also been amended
to include a “catch-all” provision that creates several
additional exemptions to disclosure. 10 This provision
establishes that even if certain governmental records are not
protected from disclosure by the TPRA itself, they are
nonetheless exempt from disclosure if there is an
The arguments presented in this article reflect many of the arguments
that were made to the Tennessee Supreme Court in Tennessean both by
amici curiae supporting Jane Doe and by Jane Doe herself. See id.
7
Memphis Pub. Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tenn.
1994) (noting that section 10–7–505(d) of the Tennessee Code
“expressly sets up a presumption of openness to records of
governmental entities” and that “the burden is placed on the
governmental agency to justify nondisclosure of the records”).
8
Act of Mar. 18, 1957, ch. 285, § 2, 1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts 932, 932
(codified as amended at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10–7–503 to –506
(2016)); see also Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2004) (“As originally enacted, the public records statutes
excepted only two classes of records from disclosure. These records
included the medical records of patients in state hospitals and military
records involving the security of the United States or the State of
Tennessee.”).
9
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 10–7–504(a)–(s) (2016).
10
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10–7–503(2)(A) (2016); see also Swift, 159
S.W.3d at 571–72.

131

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 132
exemption that is “otherwise provided by state law.” 11
Significantly, for purposes of this catch-all provision, “state
law” has been interpreted expansively to include state
statutes, the Tennessee Constitution, Tennessee common
law, rules of court, and administrative rules and
regulations.12
With respect to shielding crime victims’ records
from public disclosure, Tennessean recognized that section
10–7–504(q)(1) of the TPRA expressly exempts some
crime victims’ records from public disclosure once a
defendant has been convicted or pleaded guilty. 13
Separately, the court held that while criminal proceedings
are pending in a given case, Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 similarly exempts victims’ records from
disclosure under the TPRA’s catch-all provision.14 In light
of these holdings, however, the court’s majority opinion did
not address two separate and potentially broader sources of
protection for crime victims. Specifically, the court
declined to consider arguments raised by both Jane Doe
and several amici curiae that the following two provisions
protect victims’ private records from public disclosure as
well:
(1) Article I, section 35 of the Tennessee
Constitution, which affords crime
victims a constitutional right “to be free
from intimidation, harassment and abuse
throughout the criminal justice system”;
and
(2) Tenn. Code Ann. § 40–38–102(a)(1),
which affords crime victims a statutory
11

TENN. CODE ANN. § 10–7–503(2)(A) (2016).
Swift, 159 S.W.3d at 571–72 (collecting cases).
13
See Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 859.
14
Id.
12
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right to “[b]e treated with dignity and
compassion.”
Thus, whether these provisions operate to fill the tripartite
coverage gap left open by Tennessean’s majority opinion
has yet to be determined.
III. Case Summary
Tennessean v. Metro arose out of a public records
request filed by The Tennessean in October of 2013.15 The
paper’s request sought access to law enforcement records
concerning a high-profile rape that took place at Vanderbilt
University and resulted in the arrest and prosecution of four
of Vanderbilt’s star football players. 16 Among other things,
The Tennessean requested access to text messages and
videos that had been sent or created by third-party
sources.17 Of particular interest to the media coalition were
records involving former Vanderbilt football coach James
Franklin, who had contacted the victim by cell phone four
days after she was raped while she was undergoing a
medical examination.18
Ultimately, the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville (“Metro”) denied The Tennessean’s public
15

Id. at 860.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Tony Gonzalez, Attorneys: James Franklin Contacted Victim in
Vanderbilt Rape Case, THE TENNESSEAN (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2014/04/29/jamesfranklin-allegation-surfaces-vandy-filing/8476049/ (“The filing also
includes a new allegation about interactions between the alleged victim
and former head football coach James Franklin and former director of
performance enhancement Dwight Galt—both now at Pennsylvania
State University. Referring to records, the attorneys said the victim was
contacted by Franklin and Galt during a medical examination four days
after the rape to explain "that they cared about her because she assisted
them with recruiting.”).
16
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records request, causing the paper to petition for access to
the requested records in Davidson County Chancery
Court. 19 Thereafter, the victim in the case intervened,
arguing that certain records implicating her personal
privacy—such as her private cell phone records and a video
recording of her rape—were exempt from public disclosure
under Tennessee’s victims’ rights laws. 20 After a full
hearing, the trial court ruled that some, but not all, of the
records that The Tennessean had requested were public
records and had to be disclosed.21
Eventually, the case reached the Tennessee
Supreme Court. 22 Upon review, four of the court’s five
justices held that while criminal proceedings remained
pending, the Metro Nashville Police Department’s entire
investigative file was exempt from public disclosure under
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which governs
discovery during criminal prosecutions. Additionally, with
respect to the victim’s records, the majority opinion
explained: “Our ruling today protects Ms. Doe’s privacy
concerns by shielding all of the investigative records from
disclosure during the pendency of the criminal proceedings
and any collateral challenges to any convictions.” 23 The
court also noted that:
At the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 10–7–504(q)(1) grants protection to
Ms. Doe by providing that when a defendant
has plead guilty or been convicted of and
sentenced for a sexual offense or violent
sexual offense specified in Tennessee Code
19

Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 860.
Id. at 860–61.
21
Id. at 862.
22
See generally id.
23
Id. at 873.
20
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Annotated section 40–39–202, the following
information is confidential and shall not be
disclosed: the victim’s name; home, work
and email addresses; telephone numbers;
social
security
number;
and
any
photographic or video depiction of the
victim.24
Because it was unnecessary to its holding, the
majority declined to address whether any of the records
sought by The Tennessean would also have been protected
from disclosure under one or more of Tennessee’s victims’
rights provisions. This separate argument, however, was
adopted in full by Justice Wade in dissent, who wrote:
Both [A]rticle I, section 35 and section 4038-102(a)(1) . . . qualify as “state law” for
purposes of the catch-all exception to
disclosure under the TPRA. Exceptions must
be recognized pursuant to the catch-all
provision when, as here, there is a
significant risk that the disclosure of
documents will contravene rights guaranteed
by provisions in the Tennessee Code and the
Tennessee Constitution.25
IV. Victims’ Protections and Potential Gaps in
Coverage
With respect to protecting victims’ privacy, the
significance of Tennessean lies in what it potentially leaves
exposed. Under the majority’s opinion, records that a crime
victim has provided to law enforcement are only protected
from disclosure by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
24
25

Id.
Id. at 881 (Wade, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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16 during the pendency of a criminal case. 26 Thereafter,
if—but only if—a defendant is “convicted of, and has been
sentenced for a sexual offense,” then Tennessee Code
Annotated section 10–7–504(q)(1) further provides that:
[T]he following information regarding the
victim of the offense shall be treated as
confidential and shall not be open for
inspection by members of the public:
(A) Name, unless waived pursuant to
subdivision (q)(2);
(B) Home, work and electronic mail
addresses;
(C) Telephone numbers;
(D) Social security number; and
(E) Any photographic or video depiction of
the victim.27
Crucially, however, if only these two protections—
Rule 16’s “pending criminal case” exemption and section
10–7–504(q)(1)’s “post-sentencing for a sexual offense
exemption”—shield victims’ records from disclosure under
the TPRA, then three broad categories of crime victims will
be left unprotected once criminal proceedings have
concluded.
The first category of victims who would be left
without the ability to safeguard their private records from
public view are those whose cases do not result in a
conviction. By its own terms, section 10–7–504(q)(1)
26
27

Id. at 859.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10–7–504(q)(1) (2016).

136

Fall 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 137
applies only “[w]here a defendant has plead[ed] guilty” or
“has been convicted.” 28 Significantly, however, by some
estimates, less than four percent of rapes result in a
conviction. 29 Consequently, if section 10–7–504(q)(1) is
the only provision that protects crime victims’ private
records from public disclosure after criminal proceedings
have concluded, then the approximately ninety-six percent
of rape victims whose cases do not result in a conviction
have no ability to protect their records from disclosure at
all.
Second, even in those rare instances when a
conviction is secured, section 10–7–504(q)(1) applies only
to victims whose perpetrators are found guilty of
committing “a sexual offense or [a] violent sexual
offense.”30 Excluded from this category, for example, are
victims of domestic violence, who represent a significant
proportion of all crime victims.31 This omission is similarly
critical, because domestic violence victims often will not
report their abuse to law enforcement unless they are
confident that their private information will be protected.32
28

Id.
See, e.g., UK CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 2, https://opsvaw.as.uky.edu
/sites/default/files/07_Rape_Prosecution.pdf (last visited July 22, 2016)
(“Since most rapes are not reported to police, the [National Violence
Against Women Study] estimated that only 3.4% of all rapes ultimately
lead to a conviction for the offender.”).
30
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10–7–504(q)(1) (2016).
31
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CJIS SUPPORT CENTER,
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
2013–2015
at
1
(2016),
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/tbi/attachments/Domestic_Violence_
2015_-_Secured.pdf (“A total of 232,031 domestic violence offenses
were reported to TIBRS from 2013 to 2015.”).
32
See Viktoria Kristiansson, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Victim
Privacy and Offender Accountability in Domestic Violence and Sexual
Assault Prosecutions (Part II), STRATEGIES: THE PROSECUTOR’S
NEWSLETTER ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, May 2013, at 7,
http://www.aequitasresource.
29
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As one scholar has explained, for example: “If domestic
violence . . . victims do not feel that their private
information will remain so under confidentiality and
privilege laws, victims may be hesitant to reveal their
trauma . . . .”33
Third, even when a victim’s perpetrator is both
convicted and convicted of a qualifying sexual offense, the
final category of victims who are potentially left out of
Tennessean’s protections are sexual assault victims who
seek to prevent the public from accessing records that are
not specifically exempted from disclosure by Tennessee
Code Annotated section 10–7–504(q)(1). As noted above,
following a defendant’s conviction, section 10–7–504(q)(1)
exclusively prohibits disclosure of a victim’s “name,”
“home, work and electronic email addresses,” “telephone
numbers,” “social security number,” and “photographic or
video depiction[s] of the victim.” 34 Omitted from these
restrictions, however, are myriad highly sensitive and
deeply personal records that victims also have a significant
interest in keeping private—such as their diaries, e-mails,
voicemail, social media records, and text messages. 35 In
Tennessean itself, for example, the victim sought to prevent
the public from accessing the private text messages that she
had exchanged with her mother after she learned that she
had been raped while unconscious the night before. 36 If
section 10–7–504(q)(1) serves as the sole, comprehensive
list of exemptions protecting victims’ records from public
org/Issue_10_Walking_A_Tightrope_Balancing_Victim_Privacy_and_
Offender_Accountability_in_Domestic_Violence_and_Sexual_Assault
_Prosecutions_Part_II_May_2013.pdf.
33
Id.
34
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10–7–504(q)(1) (2016).
35
Cf. id.
36
Oral Argument at 14:47, Tennessean v. Metro., 485 S.W.3d 857
(Tenn. 2016), http://www.tncourts.gov/
courts/supreme-court/arguments/2015/05/28/tennessean-et-al-vmetropolitan-government-nashville-and.
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disclosure following a criminal conviction, however, then
these profoundly private records would all become
available for public scrutiny the moment that criminal
proceedings come to an end.
Because the records that Jane Doe sought to protect
in Tennessean were not yet subject to being revealed due to
the pending nature of the criminal proceedings in her case,
the court’s majority opinion did not address any of these
potential gaps in coverage. Recognizing its many
interstices, however, Justice Wade cautioned: “When the
criminal prosecution concludes, the protections of Rule 16
expire. At that point, absent any other exception, the public
records pertaining to the rape will be subject to public
disclosure, including data from the victim’s cell phone and
video recordings of the alleged rape.” 37 Further, Justice
Wade emphasized several of the aforementioned limitations
of section 10–7–504(q)(1), noting:
[T]his provision applies only if the
defendants either plead guilty or are
convicted at trial. [Additionally], the
materials exempt from disclosure are
limited. For example, the statute would not
protect statements by or about the victim;
written descriptions of photographs and
videos of the victim; or most content of the
victim’s cell phone.38
Accordingly, Justice Wade held in dissent that: “I
believe that the victim of the alleged rape is entitled to an
adjudication of her claim that public disclosure of the
police records would violate her statutory and

37
38

Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 882 (Wade, J., dissenting).
Id.
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constitutional rights [under Tennessee’s victims’ rights
provisions].”39
V. Looking Forward
Based on Tennessean’s holding with respect to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the records that
Jane Doe sought to protect were not yet at risk of being
revealed because criminal proceedings were still pending in
her case.40 As a result, Tennessean’s majority opinion did
not consider her argument that Article I, section 35 of the
Tennessee Constitution—which affords crime victims a
constitutional right “to be free from intimidation,
harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice
system”—constitutes an independent exemption to
disclosure under the TPRA. 41 Nor did it address her
39

Id. at 877.
See id. at 873.
41
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35. Although the terms of Article I, section 35
reference “the criminal justice system” only, several arguments support
the conclusion that its terms are not restricted to criminal proceedings.
See Brief for Domestic and Sexual Violence Prevention Advocates as
Amici Curiae in Support of Intervenor Jane Doe and Partially in
Support of Petitioners The Tennessean, supra note 6, at 10–13. But see
Media Coalition/Appellants’ Response to Brief of Intervenor-Appellee
Jane Doe at 2, Tennessean v. Metro., 485 S.W.3d 857 (2016) (NO. M–
2014–00524–SC–R11–CV/) (arguing that the rights afforded to victims
by the Tennessee Constitution and the Victims’ Bill of Rights “are
limited to the criminal justice system and do not apply to Public
Records Act requests.”); Application of Petitioners for Permission to
Appeal at 4 n.4, Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d 857 (2016) (NO. M–2014–
00524–SC–R11–CV/) (arguing that “[t]he alleged victim has identified
no substantive rights applicable in a civil case under the Public Records
Act to preclude the disclosure of public records.”). First, records of
criminal proceedings are “inextricably intertwined with the criminal
justice system” even when sought in a civil case. Brief for Domestic
and Sexual Violence Prevention Advocates as Amici Curiae in Support
of Intervenor Jane Doe and Partially in Support of Petitioners The
Tennessean, supra note 6, at 11. Second, “in order to be of any value at
40
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argument that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–38–
102(a)(1)—which affords crime victims a statutory right to
“[b]e treated with dignity and compassion”—provides such
an exemption as well. 42 In a future case, however, the
Tennessee Supreme Court is likely to hold that these
provisions operate to fill the coverage gaps referenced
above for three reasons.
First, the only two jurists in Tennessee who have
squarely addressed the arguments that Article I, section 35
and Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–38–102(a)(1)
exempt crime victims’ private records from public
disclosure under the TPRA have wholeheartedly embraced
them, providing the beginnings of precedent to support that
conclusion. 43 Second, while declining to confront the
matter directly, Tennessean’s four-member majority
expressed significant concerns about the potentially
devastating consequences that could result from allowing
crime victims’ private records to become public, suggesting
all, the rights guaranteed to victims by Article I, section 35 must be
held to extend to civil actions.” Id. at 12. Such a holding also would
not be at all unique. For example, although the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that: “No person shall be . . .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”,
the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that its protections may be
asserted “in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or
judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any
disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so
used.” Id. (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45
(1972)). Additionally, given that Tennessean itself makes clear that
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 applies in civil cases, there is
no logical reason why the rights guaranteed by Article I, section 35 of
the Tennessee Constitution should not similarly apply in civil
proceedings. Id. at 13.
42
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–38–102(a)(1) (2016).
43
See Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 881–82 (Wade, J., dissenting); see
also Tennessean v. Metro., No. M2014–00524–COA–R3–CV, 2014
WL 4923162, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014) (McBrayer, J.,
dissenting).
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that such arguments are likely to carry purchase. 44 Third,
there is strong evidentiary support for the conclusion that
exposing crime victims’ private records to the public could
result in victims experiencing intimidation, harassment,
abuse, indignity, or lack of compassion in many
instances—five consequences that Article I, section 35 and
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–38–102 expressly
aim to prevent.45
A. Uniformity of Prior Judicial Decisions
To date, the only two judges in Tennessee who have
squarely considered litigants’ arguments that Article I,
section 35 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–38–
102 independently exempt crime victims’ private records
from public disclosure have wholeheartedly embraced
them, providing the beginnings of precedent to support
such a holding.46 As indicated above, in Tennessean itself,
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Gary Wade held without
equivocation that: “Both [A]rticle I, section 35 and section
40–38–102(a)(1) . . . qualify as ‘state law’ for purposes of
the catch-all exception to disclosure under the TPRA.” 47
Further, Justice Wade made clear that these provisions are
considerably more expansive than Tennessee Code
Annotated section 10–7–504(q)(1) in that they protect a
larger body of records from disclosure and also “apply both
during and after the prosecution.”48
Significantly, in this regard, Justice Wade’s opinion
also mirrored Judge Neal McBrayer’s separate opinion in
the Tennessee Court of Appeals. There, in a similarly
44

See Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 873–74.
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–38–102 (2016).
46
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47
Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 881 (Wade, J., dissenting) (citing Swift v.
Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 571–72).
48
Id. at 882.
45
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victim-protective dissent, Judge McBrayer held that
“victim’s rights under Article 1, § 35 of the Tennessee
Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40–
38–101 through 506 . . . constitute ‘state law’ exceptions to
the Public Records Act.” 49 Additionally, because both
Justice Wade’s and Judge McBrayer’s colleagues resolved
the case on alternative grounds in both instances, no other
judge has yet weighed in on this question. Accordingly,
among the admittedly small number of Tennessee jurists
who have addressed the matter to date, the conclusion that
Tennessee’s victims’ rights provisions independently
exempt crime victims’ private information from public
disclosure is currently unanimous.
B. The Majority’s Concern for Victims’ Privacy
Tennessean’s majority opinion and Justice Kirby’s
separate concurring opinion also indicate that the four
remaining justices were similarly attuned to crime victims’
privacy interests. For example, although unnecessary to its
holding, Tennessean’s majority opinion editorializes: “The
General Assembly wisely enacted [an] exception to the
Public Records Act to protect the release of a victim’s
private information and any photographic or video
depictions without the necessity of a court proceeding.” 50
Curiously, the court’s majority opinion also goes out of its
way to criticize Justice Wade’s comparatively victimprotective dissent for being insufficiently attuned to
victims’ privacy concerns, bemoaning that: “The dissenting
justice expresses concern for Ms. Doe and her right to be
treated with ‘dignity and compassion,’ Tenn. Code Ann. §

49

Tennessean v. Metro., No. M2014–00524–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL
4923162, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014) (McBrayer, J.,
dissenting).
50
Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 873–74.
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40–38–102(a)(1), yet would throw open the police
department's investigative records for all to see.”51
Further, Justice Kirby’s separate concurring opinion
emphasizes that absent a robust exemption to protect
victims’ private records, “[v]ictims of sexual crimes could
find their personal information, as well as videos and
photos of their ordeal, readily available to those who would
post the information online or otherwise further torment
them.”52 Importantly, as detailed in the following section,
these are also among the specific concerns that Tennessee’s
victims’ rights provisions aim to address. Thus, with
victims’ privacy concerns weighing heavily on the minds of
the majority’s justices as well, the notion that the
Tennessee Supreme Court would leave open the three
glaring coverage gaps referenced in this article’s
introduction seems unlikely.
C. The Likelihood of Intimidation, Harassment,
Abuse, Indignity, or Lack of Compassion
Most importantly, the argument that exposing crime
victims’ private information to the public could contravene
the rights guaranteed to victims by Article I, section 35 and
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–38–102 is
remarkably persuasive in many instances. In particular, a
significant body of social science evidence supports the
conclusion that releasing sexual and domestic violence
victims’ private information to the public would frequently
result in such victims experiencing “intimidation,”
“harassment,” “abuse,” “indignity,” or “lack of
Id. at 873 n.24. Given Justice Wade’s express holding regarding
victims’ rights and his additional observation that trial courts have the
authority “to issue protective orders placing discoverable materials
under seal when necessary . . . to protect the rights of the victim,”
however, such criticism was unfounded and seriously misplaced. Id. at
881 n.3 (Wade, J., dissenting).
52
Id. at 874 (Kirby, J., concurring).
51
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compassion” 53 —five consequences that Article I, section
35 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–38–102
expressly prohibit. 54 Thus, given that each of these
consequences provides an independent basis for exempting
a crime victim’s records from public disclosure, it is likely
that at least one of them will be identified as an exemption
under the TPRA’s catch-all provision in a future case.
Despite their alarming frequency, crimes involving
sexual assault and domestic violence are among the most
chronically underreported crimes in the country. 55 In 2000,
only an estimated one-quarter of all physical assaults, onefifth of all rapes, and one-half of all stalking offenses
perpetrated against females by intimate partners are
reported to law enforcement. 56 Significantly, a critical
factor that contributes to such underreporting is “fear of
reprisal if [victims] report.”57
Fear of reprisal is precisely the type of intimidation
that is prohibited by Article I, section 35. 58 Moreover, there
53

See infra notes 55–77 and accompanying text.
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–38–102(a)(1)
(2016).
55
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION
11
(2003),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv03.pdf.
56
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE &
CTRS. OF DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 51 (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf.
57
RICHARD FELSON & PAUL-PHILIPPE PARÉ, THE REPORTING OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT BY NONSTRANGERS TO
THE POLICE 8 (2005) (citations omitted) (citing Simon I. Singer, The
Fear of Reprisal and the Failure of Victims to Report a Personal
Crime, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 289, 289–302 (1988),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209039.pdf.
58
See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35. Tennessee Code Annotated section
40–38–102(a)(2) further provides that: “All victims of crime and
prosecution witnesses have the right to: . . . Protection and support with
prompt action in the case of intimidation or retaliation from the
54
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is reason to believe that such fear constitutes the rule, rather
than the exception. In total, “almost nine out of ten
American women (86%) [believe that] victims would be
less likely to report rapes if they felt their names would be
disclosed by the news media.” 59 Consequently, without
being able to rely on a public records exemption, “[t]he
prospect of having to reveal [private] information . . . [may]
make it less likely that the victim will cooperate in the
proceedings or choose to report the crime in the first
instance.” 60 Thus, “[i]f domestic violence and sexual
assault victims do not feel that their private information
will remain so under confidentiality and privilege laws,
victims may be hesitant to reveal their trauma . . . .”61
Unfortunately, harassment significantly contributes
to such underreporting as well.62 Claims against athletes, in
particular, have generated many well-documented instances
of harassment when a victim’s identity is publicly
known 63 —a consequence that Article I, section 35 of
defendant and the defendant's agents or friends.” TENN. CODE ANN. §
40–38–102(a)(2) (2016).
59
NAT’L VICTIM CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 6
(1992), http://victimsofcrime.org/docs
/Reports%20and%20Studies/rape-in-america.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
60
Nat’l Crime Victim Law Inst., Protecting Victims’ Privacy: Moving
to Quash Pretrial Subpoenas Duces Tecum for Non-Privileged
Information in Criminal Cases, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN BULLETIN
(Sept. 2014) at 1, https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/18060-quashingpretrial-subpeonasbulletinpdf.
61
Kristiansson, supra note 32.
62
See, e.g., Andre Rouillard, The Girl Who Ratted, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andre-rouillard/thegirl-who-ratted_b_5168203.html (documenting extensive harassment
experienced by rape victim).
63
See, e.g., Associated Press, Roethlisberger Accuser Receives “Over
100”
Threats,
THE NEWS CENTER
(Aug.
6,
2009),
http://www.thenewscenter.tv/sports/headlines/52599607.html?device=p
hone&c=y (“The woman who has accused Pittsburgh Steelers
quarterback Ben Roethlisberger of raping her at a Lake Tahoe hotelcasino where she worked told authorities she has received dozens of
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Tennessee’s Constitution similarly forbids.64 Notably, such
harassment also took place during the criminal proceedings
at issue in Tennessean itself—making this concern all the
more salient when it comes to protecting Tennessee’s crime
victims from further molestation throughout the judicial
process.65
Regrettably, the abusive practice of “victim
blaming” also remains frighteningly persistent in society,
and it is especially pervasive in the context of sexual
assault cases. As one court recently explained:
Historically, an exaggerated concern for
female chastity and a regrettable inclination
to blame the victim for sexual assaults,
along with society’s general respect for
sexual privacy, have resulted in an
atmosphere in which victims of sexual
assault may experience shame or damage to
reputation. It would be callous to pretend
that this atmosphere has entirely dissipated,
or to insist that victims of such assault lack
privacy interests because most people today

threatening and harassing phone calls.”); Mark Memmott, Two
Steubenville Girls Arrested After Allegedly Threatening Rape Victim,
NPR (Mar. 19, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2013/03/19/17472
8448/two-steubenville-girls-arrested-after-allegedly-threatening-rapevictim (“The 16-year-old girl raped by two Ohio high school football
players in a crime that has attracted wide attention has also been the
victim of online harassment, the state’s top prosecutor said late
Monday.”).
64
See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35.
65
See Prosecutor: Someone Trying to Intimidate Vanderbilt Rape
Victim,
WSMV
(Feb.
24,
2014,
8:33
PM),
http://www.wsmv.com/story/24810836/someone-trying-to-intimidatealleged-vandy-rape-victim-prosecutor-says (last updated Aug. 25, 2014
8:34 PM).
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understand that the attacker, not the victim,
should be stigmatized and ashamed.66
Sadly, the genesis of victim blaming in sexual
assault cases is probably the law itself 67 —a vestige of
“special requirements for rape prosecutions” that once
included, for example, rules such as “the requirement of a
cautionary instruction to all juries, alerting them that rape
complaints are easy to fabricate” and “rules of evidence
deeming the complainant’s past sexual conduct or
reputation for chastity relevant to her credibility or her
consent to sexual intercourse.”68 Perhaps most despicably,
courts once applied “the requirement of ‘utmost
resistance’” to rape prosecutions, which provided that in
order to sustain a conviction, “[n]ot only must there be
entire absence of mental consent or assent, but there must
be the most vehement exercise of every physical means or
faculty within the woman’s power to resist the penetration

66

Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
The origin of “victim blaming” appears to be attributable to a
historical belief that sex outside of marriage was presumptively
criminal. As Professor Anne M. Coughlin has explained:
67

Since, under our ancestors’ system, the underlying
sexual activity in which a rape complainant engaged
(albeit, by her own testimony, unwillingly) was
criminal misconduct, her complaint logically could
be construed as a plea to be relieved of responsibility
for committing that crime. A court would be
receptive to such a plea only if the woman could
establish that, although she had participated in a
sexual transgression, she did so under circumstances
that afforded her a defense to criminal liability.
Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) (footnote
omitted).
68
JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 867 (6th ed. 2008).
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of her person, and this must be shown to persist until the
offense is consummated.”69
Fortunately, however, in recent decades, courts
across the United States have shed these biases and have
come to recognize that sexual assault represents an
especially egregious crime that can undermine the dignity
of victims.70 Commendably, Tennessee law in particular is
not blind to the indignity of sexual assault or to the public’s
interest in preventing invasions of survivors’ privacy. 71
Additionally, there is evidentiary support for the conclusion
that identifying victims publicly and releasing records of
their assaults can lead to re-victimization and recurring
trauma that may further chill reporting 72 —repercussions
69

Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906).
See, e.g., Braswell v. State, Nos. A–2448, A–2529, 1991 WL
11650678, at *7 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1991) (noting that “sexual
assault violates the victim’s personal sanctity and dignity”); People v.
Luna, 204 Cal. App. 3d 726, 749 (1988) (noting “the revolutionary
change that has taken place in our society, including changes with
respect to the credibility and dignity we extend to adult women and
children who are the victims of sexual assault”); Deborah S. v. Diorio,
583 N.Y.S.2d 872, 881 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992), aff'd, 612 N.Y.S.2d 542
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“While more rape victims are choosing to
‘come out’ [publicly] . . . that choice of dignity must remain with the
victim, who must cope with: post-rape trauma; nightmares; possible
unwanted pregnancy; terrifying concern about infection with the HIV
virus; and loss of a sense of personal security.”).
71
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, No. W2011–01786–CCA–R3–CD, 2013
WL 501779, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 7, 2013) (“An assault
charge, which would be the resulting conviction if there was no ‘sexual
contact’ element, would not . . . protect the dignity of the victims of
such egregious acts.”); TENN. R. EVID. 412 cmts. (noting that
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 endeavored to protect “the important
interests of the sexual assault victim in avoiding an unnecessary,
degrading, and embarrassing invasion of sexual privacy”).
72
See, e.g., National Crime Victim Law Institute, Allowing Adult
Sexual Assault Victims to Testify at Trial Via Live Video Technology,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN BULLETIN, Sept. 2011, at 1–2, https://law.
lclark.edu/live/files/11775-allowing-adult-sexual-assault-victims-totestify (“[R]ecalling horrifying and personal details of the rape forces
70
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that are plausibly among the indignities that section 40–38–
102(a)(1) aimed to prevent, as well.73
In light of these concerns and others, “[o]ver the last
thirty years, every state has enacted some form of victims’
rights legislation and nearly two-thirds have passed
amendments to their state constitutions granting victims'
rights in the criminal justice process.” 74 This wave of
reform was precipitated in no small part by the fact that
“many studies indicate[d] that victims [we]re often more
affected by their treatment throughout the course of their
limited involvement in the prosecutorial process than by the
crime itself.”75 Accordingly, courts across the nation have
begun to treat crime victims—and sexual assault and
domestic violence victims in particular—with significantly
greater compassion in an effort to “protect them from a
second victimization by the judicial process.” 76
the victims to relive the crime mentally and emotionally, leading some
to feel as though the sexual assault is recurring and to re-experience a
lack of control and terror.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); National Crime Victim Law Institute, Protecting Victims’
Privacy: Moving to Quash Pretrial Subpoenas Duces Tecum for NonPrivileged Information in Criminal Cases, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
BULLETIN, Sept. 2014, at 1, https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/
18060-quashingpretrial-subpeonasbulletinpdf (noting that “[t]he
prospect of having to reveal [personal] information to anyone . . . may
cause a victim to feel re-victimized and make it less likely that the
victim will cooperate in the proceedings or choose to report the crime
in the first instance”).
73
The federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which bears many
similarities to Tennessee’s Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights, also reflects
these concerns. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8) (2015) (guaranteeing
crime victims “[t]he right to be treated with fairness and with respect
for the victim’s dignity and privacy”).
74
Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural
Justice, the Crime Victims' Rights Act, and the Victim's Right to Be
Reasonably Protected from the Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 83
(2010) (footnote omitted).
75
Id. at 82 (footnote omitted).
76
State in Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 325 (N.J. Ch. 1997).
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In Tennessee, this reform effort culminated in the
enactment of substantive victims’ rights provisions
including Article I, section 35 of the Tennessee
Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–
38–102(a)(1), which afford crime victims several
important, legally cognizable rights throughout the judicial
process. 77 Accordingly, with the overarching goal of
protecting crime victims against mistreatment deeply
ingrained within Tennessee’s constitutional and statutory
text, the likelihood that Tennessee’s victims’ rights
provisions will be disregarded in a future case when it
comes to filling the coverage gaps left open by
Tennessean’s majority opinion seems vanishingly small.
Conclusion
Whenever Tennessee’s victims’ rights provisions
conflict with a criminal defendant’s federal constitutional
rights—such as the right to confrontation or the right to a
public trial78—there is no doubt that victims’ rights must
bend. As far as the Tennessee Public Records Act is
concerned, however, there is also no doubt that Tennessee’s
victims’ rights provisions operate to exempt victims’
private records from public disclosure in many instances.
Tennessean expressly recognized two such
exemptions: Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16,
which functions to protect crime victims’ records from
77

See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–38–102(a)(1)
(2016).
78
See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defen[s]e.”).
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disclosure throughout the pendency of a criminal case, and
Tennessee Code Annotated section 10–7–504(q)(1), which
protects certain limited categories of records concerning
sexual assault victims from disclosure following a
defendant’s conviction. 79 However, pursuant to Article I,
section 35 of the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40–38–102(a)(1), five additional
consequences—the likelihood of intimidation, harassment,
abuse, indignity, or lack of compassion following the
release of a victim’s private records to the public—also
provide independent bases for exempting crime victims’
records from public disclosure both before and after a
criminal prosecution has concluded. 80 Consequently, in a
future case, it is likely that the three categories of crime
victims who were left unprotected by Tennessean—(1)
victims whose cases do not result in a plea or a conviction,
(2) victims whose perpetrators are not convicted of a sexual
offense, and (3) victims whose private records are not
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute—will
ultimately find that their private records are protected from
public view under Tennessee’s victims’ rights provisions as
well.

79

Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 859.
See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–38–102(a)(1)
(2016).
80
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POLICY NOTE
EMPLOYMENT LAW—SMITH V. ROCK-TENN. SERVICES—
EMPLOYER HELD LIABLE FOR SAME-SEX SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
By: Kaitlyn Dean
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been
relevant for decades, but some of its full implications are
still developing in light of shifting gender norms in
American culture. 1 Recently, in Smith v. Rock-Tenn.
Services, the Sixth Circuit held that hostile work
environment claims are not limited to cases in which the
harasser and the victim are of the opposite sex and that the
jury’s inference of sex discrimination was not unreasonable
based on the plaintiff’s evidence.2
In Title VII claims, Supreme Court precedent
allows for an inference of sex discrimination to be drawn
from the evidence but also notes that such an inference can
be difficult to draw in same-sex situations. 3 The Court
suggests that, especially between males, the line between
“male-on-male horseplay” and “discriminatory conditions
of employment” can be easily blurred. 4 Despite several
documented incidents of unwanted touching and repeated
pleas by the male plaintiff for the harassment to stop, 5 the
defendant in Smith argued that the behavior of the male
aggressor was “mere ‘horseplay,’ beyond the reach of Title
VII” 6 and, thus, could not have created a hostile work
environment.
1

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
Smith v. Rock-Tenn. Servs., 813 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2016).
3
Id. at 307 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75,
80 (1998)).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 303–04.
6
Id. at 308.
2
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The defendant’s argument highlights a common
narrative in our society: that abusive, sexual behavior
between males is somehow less abhorrent because it can be
easily premised with phrases such as “horseplay,” or, “boys
will be boys.” The Smith decision makes it clear that the
Sixth Circuit will not tolerate hostile work environments
simply because employers choose to mischaracterize sexual
harassment as horseplay or ordinary male socializing. As
the Smith court pointed out, this is a self-serving mindset
for responsible parties.7
This precedent will not only impact similar Title
VII cases currently pending in Tennessee, but will also put
employers on notice to take sexual harassment allegations
in the workplace more seriously. Employer liability is a
requirement for a Title VII claim, meaning a plaintiff must
show that the employer “manifested indifference or
unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or
should have known.” 8 The Smith opinion establishes that an
employer’s omissions in light of a sexual harassment
allegation are just as important as actions that are taken and
that meager attempts to halfway follow policy are not
sufficient to escape a Title VII action. 9 While this could
potentially lead to stricter workplace regulations,
employers may save themselves trouble and money by
adopting and adhering to more stringent policies.
The implications for workplace policy in light of
Smith are undoubtedly important. Ideally, however, the
significant impact of this case and similar cases is that other
male recipients of sexual harassment, at work and in
general, will find it less stigmatizing to come forward. As

7

Smith v. Rock-Tenn. Servs., 813 F.3d 298, 308 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 311 (citing Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 814
(6th Cir. 2013)).
9
Smith, 813 F.3d at 312.
8
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we have recently seen in Tennessee, fostering this type of
“boys will be boys” environment can have disastrous
consequences, and the Court’s rejection of the horseplay
argument in Smith was a step in the right direction. 10
Delegitimizing male-on-male sexual harassment as an
acceptable social norm will incentivize victims to speak up.
A major case unfolding in Chattanooga reflects how
situations can escalate when sexual harassment between
males is treated as a casual rite of passage. In December
2015, while on a school-related athletic trip, three
upperclassmen from Ooltewah High School assaulted their
freshman teammate and sodomized him with a pool
cue. 11 The attack caused serious internal damage to the
victim’s organs, and he was hospitalized for more than a
week.12
Hamilton County has taken the crime seriously, and
the adults, who were supposedly supervising the students,
have been charged with failure to report child abuse.13 Also
in response to the assault, the Hamilton County District
Attorney’s Office launched an investigation into the culture
of abuse within the athletic programs at Ooltewah. 14 The
underlying cultural problem at Ooltewah, however, seems
pervasive and similar to the accepted culture at Rock-Tenn.
Services. No one in either setting took issue with the
environment that was being fostered, and no one in a
leadership position took any legitimate steps to stop the
sexual harassment. The detective who was originally
assigned to the Ooltewah case, Rodney Burns, even stated
10

Id. at 308.
Sarah Kaplan, Rape of a Basketball Player, Accusations of Abuse
and Bullying Tear Apart High School, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 22,
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2016/01/22/.
12
Id. at 1.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 4.
11
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in a juvenile court hearing that the case “is much smaller
than what it’s blown up to be.”15 Burns went on to say that
the attack “was something stupid that kids do . . . [,] but it
wasn’t done for sexual gratification or really sexual in
nature.”16 Even in a situation where a minor was violently
raped and seriously injured, Burns’s default response was
to characterize the act as archetypal male behavior. 17 While
this case is still unfolding, the defendant’s arguments will
likely compare to the defendant’s arguments in Smith—that
this was just typical male behavior that happened to go too
far.
The rejection of the defendant’s misguided
argument in Smith will ideally lead to more inclusive work
environments and stricter adherence to zero-tolerance
sexual harassment policies. The compensatory damages
that the Sixth Circuit upheld in favor of the Smith plaintiff
cost Rock-Tenn. Services three-hundred thousand dollars;18
therefore, it is likely employers will be more incentivized to
have clear, meaningful procedures in place should a
harassment situation arise. More importantly, Smith has
potentially opened the door for a more dynamic discussion
on what is normal, acceptable “horseplay” between males.
While the Ooltewah debacle may present a more extreme
case of sexual harassment than presented in Rock-Tenn.,
the root problem is the same. Further, the classification of
sexual harassment as male-on-male “horseplay” is an issue
that will not be resolved until more workplaces, schools,
and courts reject the false narrative that sexual harassment
and abuse between males is acceptable because “boys will
be boys.”
15

Kendi Anderson, Detective Charged with Aggravated Perjury Could
Face Harshest Penalty in Ooltewah Rape Case, CHATTANOOGA TIMES
FREE PRESS, May 21, 2016, http://www.times
freepress.com/news/local/story/2016/may/21/.
16
Id. at 2.
17
Id.
18
Smith v. Rock-Tenn. Servs., 813 F.3d 298, 306 (6th Cir. 2016).
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